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Abstract 
 
   This study investigates ZKHWKHU%ULWLVKHOLWHV¶GLscourse on sovereignty has changed 
as European integration has progressed. Academic research has long recognized the 
existence of discourse change regarding sovereignty, and the process of European 
integration is likely to be a modern event that produces such change in elite 
understanding of sovereignty. The dissertation thus investigates the question of whether 
elite discourse on sovereignty has indeed changed in the context of European integration. 
   This research is separated into two parts. The first part examines how the academic 
literature has discussed sovereignty in the contemporary world, how sovereignty has 
generally been conceptualized in Britain and the challenge of European integration to the 
academic and British political debates around sovereignty thereby presenting the key 
mechanism behind modern discourse change. The second part conducts a discourse 
analysis focussing on statements of British MPs from British accession to the EC to the 
debate on the Treaty of Lisbon. In order to conduct discourse analysis, MPs are classified 
into specific groups: Government, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and those 
who favoured a bill, and those who were against a bill. Further, I divide the process of 
European integration into three time periods: the Accession to the EC and the referendum 
on membership (1971-1975); the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1985-1993); and New Labour (1997-2009). The analysis is carried out by a comparison 
between different groups and time periods. 
  
   Ultimately, the dissertation determines ZKHWKHU %ULWLVK HOLWHV¶ GLVFRXUVH RQ
sovereignty has changed and, if so, whether there is a new interpretation of sovereignty in 
modern day Britain. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Research question 
µThere exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than 
that of sovereignty¶ (James 1986, p3).1  An eminent international lawyer, Lassa 
Oppenheim, made this observation on sovereignty more than a century ago. For a long 
time, the concept of sovereignty has been examined and defined by numerous scholars. 
Why have they examined it and considered it to be important? Because we view this 
concept would be a foundation of state governance. At the same time the concept has an 
ambiguous and changing meaning ± especially given the rise of global concerns beyond 
the framework of the state, such as free trade, human rights, the environment, and others. 
Under these circumstances, some scholars argue that state sovereignty has been eroded 
or undermined. Changes to European state structures are much more visible due to the 
integration process of the European Union (EU). Member states need to obey the 
supremacy of EU law. What does this mean for the sovereignty of member states? 
As European integration has progressed, the International Relations and European 
Integration literatures have paid much attention to theorising sovereignty. They mainly 
ask whether sovereignty has been transferred to the EU or not and how we should 
understand this phenomenon. I found, on the other hand, that there has been much less 
attention paid to the question of how the term sovereignty is used and spoken on the 
                                                 
1
 This phrase was cited from L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1: Peace (London: Longman, 1905), 
p103 
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scene of political debates, and how the meaning or the usage of the term has changed 
over time. Jens Bartelson argues that the linguistic turn has increased rather than 
diminished the staying power of the concept of sovereignty within legal and political 
discourse. He also states that the meaning of sovereignty lies very much in what we 
make of it through our linguistic conventions and rhetorical practices (Bartelson 2006, 
p464). In other words, one might say that sovereignty is very much a constructed concept. 
Therefore, focussing on discourse on sovereignty directs us to interrogate the different 
arguments as to what sovereignty has come to mean. Hence, the aim of this research is to 
discover how the discourse of sovereignty has used and changed in relation to European 
integration. 
Europe is an ideal case for examining debates over sovereignty in µreal politics¶ ņ in 
debates in the media and amongst political elites. For example, these debates can be seen 
in the incorporation process of Community (EU) law into domestic law and subsequent 
amended treaties such as the Single European Act (SEA), the Treaty of Maastricht, and 
so on. I assume that it is difficult to maintain a consistent discourse as one responds to the 
requirement of complex institutional change throughout the deepening and the 
enlargement of integration. Therefore, this study examines these changes in the ways that 
political elites have interpreted and expressed the concept of sovereignty as integration 
has proceeded.  
In this research, I will illustrate and examine the United Kingdom (UK) as my case 
study. In Britain, there has been a long-term paradigm that sovereignty resides in 
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Parliament. How has discourse of µparliamentary sovereignty¶ been influenced by joining 
the process of European integration in the last four decades? The impact of European 
integration on member states of the EU has recently been studied in academics as the 
Europeanisation approach. This research applies the Europeanisation approach to 
illustrate the main mechanism of the EU¶s potential influence over discourse on the topic 
of sovereignty. Further, in comparison with other member states, the relationship 
between Britain and Europe has not been smooth. Britain is the only country that has 
held a referendum on continued membership of the European Community (EC). Britain 
did not initially join the monetary union and has thus far suspended its decision on this 
issue. Further, Britain initially rejected the creation of a new EU treaty that aimed at 
tackling the Eurozone debt crisis as the treaty violates British sovereignty. British national 
sovereignty has been continuously discussed with various integration policies. Hence, 
Britain is a good case for examining the discourse on sovereignty.  
For the purpose of finding the change of discourse, this research divides British cases 
of political discourse on Europe into three time periods in the process of integration: 1) 
the British accession to the EC and the referendum on membership (1971-1975); 2) the 
SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht (1985-1993); and 3) New Labour: from the Treaty of 
Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon (1997-2009). The reason why I divide the analysis 
into these three periods is that they seem most likely to have included disputes on 
sovereignty under different governments. According to the examination of Bulmer and 
Burch, the UK accession (1973), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992),  New Labour 
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(1997-1998) and Devolution (1999) are critical junctures for significant institutional 
change in the UK (Bulmer and Burch 2009, pp189-190).2 As a result, each period of my 
study seems to contain at least one critical juncture of institutional change. The division 
of period will then allow me to effectively investigate changes of discourses over time.  
In sum, my primary question of research is as follows:  
 
µHow has the elite discourse of sovereignty in Britain changed as European 
integration has proceeded?¶  
 
If the same argument about sovereignty has simply been reiterated over the years, this 
will indicate that the discourse of sovereignty has not transformed. Through identifying 
the emergence of different or new usages of discourse on sovereignty ņ different patterns, 
different or new phrases, and new interpretations of arguments ņ and by investigating 
how these arguments have emerged and for what purpose they have been used, I can 
show whether and how the usage and the meaning of sovereignty has undergone a 
transformation over time. Thus this study examines and outlines the impacts of European 
integration, which largely follows the Europeanisation approach that is introduced later in 
this chapter and is examined in Chapter 3, on sovereignty discourse. 
 
                                                 
2
  Bulmer and Burch present the critical moments and critical junctures and define the critical moments as 
when a perceived opportunity arises for significant change; a critical juncture as a significant shift in the 
way things are done which creates a new pathway that is followed through thereafter. 
   In this research, a division into three periods does not originate from their critical junctures. Three periods 
are divided by chronologically, governmentally, and every bill which has reached a resolution. 
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Context of the research 
This research question is led by three broad contexts. They are the historical 
evolution of the sovereignty discourse, the multiplicity of concepts and the critiques of 
current theories of International Relations and European Integration. 
 
Historical context 
   Analyses of the meaning of sovereignty point to the conclusion that history and 
political context make an impact on the manner in which the term is used. Thus it is clear 
that the meaning of sovereignty evolves as political and historical contexts change. This 
section highlights some of these changes in the meaning of sovereignty in classical 
literature. This is also discussed more extensively in Chapter 1. 
What is the origin of the concept and how has it evolved? In the context of the 
modern state, it is said that Jean Bodin was the first to conceptualise sovereignty in a 
systematic manner. As Bodin was fearful of the anarchy generated by religious disputes 
in sixteenth-century France, he established the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled: 
     The prince is the sovereign, because µit is the law of God and of nature that we 
must obey the edicts and ordinances of him to whom God has given power over 
us¶, and princes are µhis lieutenants for commanding other men¶ (Shinoda 2000, 
p13). 
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Hinsley argued in his examination of Bodin, µthe further history of the concept will be a 
history of its use and misuse in varying political conditions and not of restatements of it 
in different or in novel terms¶ (Hinsley 1966, p125). Accordingly, it will be possible to 
follow the evolution of sovereignty if we focus on the usage of sovereignty in the 
historical context.  
   For example, Thomas Hobbes has shifted the relationship from between the ruler and 
the ruled to between the state (sovereign) and individuals (subjects). When Hobbes 
published Leviathan in 1651, England was in the middle of the short era of being a 
republic and there was no king as the ruler. As a result, sovereignty did not reside in one 
person anymore. Rather, Hobbes argued that the µstate¶ as an actor itself possesses 
sovereignty, but the relationship between sovereign and subjects remains the same 
(Hinsley 1966, pp141-143). It is reasonable to say that Hobbes used the pre-existing 
concept of sovereignty in the new political conditions of his time.  
Further, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau have developed the idea of µpopular¶ 
sovereignty. The central argument of Locke is that the people can resist a state which 
tramples upon individual rights (Hoffman 1998, p45). These personal rights and the 
property of individuals were prior to all social and political organization (Hinsley 1966, 
p149). When he published Two Treatises of Government in 1690, England had just come 
out of the Glorious Revolution, and had laid down citizens¶ rights in a Bill of Rights. A 
century later, the French Revolution took place. Hinsley argues that Rousseau equated 
the state with the body politic of the people that was formed by the social contract 
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between associated individuals, reducing government, the rulership, to a mere 
commission in his work Contrat Social in 1756 (Ibid, p153). Thus Rousseau used 
sovereignty to advocate overturning the established order in France at the time. This was 
realised in the revolution after his death.  
Hinsley argues that, since the writings of Kant, the concept of sovereignty has been 
developed along the track of constitutionalism (Ibid, p156). As the principle of popular 
sovereignty has come to prevail against principles justifying ruler absolutism it has 
everywhere been found necessary, in time, to guard against its justification of popular 
tyranny and its culmination in anarchy by channelling it through the forms of the 
constitutional state (Ibid, p156). Thus µlegal¶ sovereignty has been set in law as the 
foundation for the settling of political conflicts. In Britain, µparliamentary¶ sovereignty 
has filled this role, establishing the legal sovereignty of the Westminster parliament, by 
the work of A.V. Dicey. Hideaki Shinoda argues that Dicey¶s theory of sovereignty at 
once explains the imperial principle of sovereignty in the international field and the 
democratic and national principle of sovereignty in the domestic field (Shinoda 2000, 
p52). 
Consequently, these variations in the conceptualisation of sovereignty have been 
produced by particular political conditions. In other words, the evolution of sovereignty 
was a mediating measure for political conflicts. Sovereignty has been used as desired and 
might acquire a different or an additional meaning when other political conditions are 
applied. These changed meanings then have actually been recognised by various political 
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discourses. I assume that European integration has brought some political conflicts in 
member states and that sovereignty would be required to evolve as a mediating measure.  
 
Component context 
   This section highlights the structural meaning of sovereignty. The meaning of 
sovereignty is not a simple structure but one which requires multiple components. Those 
historical elements of the concept outlined above are internal components of the concept 
± they make up µinternal¶ sovereignty. However, the concept of sovereignty also consists 
of another component ± µexternal¶ sovereignty. Neil MacCormick argues that external 
sovereignty is thus distinct conceptually from internal sovereignty, and may be present 
even when in the strict sense internal sovereignty is absent (MacCormick 1999, p129). 
He also argues that the distinction of external and internal sovereignty shows that even a 
strict definition of sovereignty permits a sense of divided or limited sovereignty (Ibid, 
p130). In this respect, it seems that the distinction between external and internal 
sovereignty, or the existence of the concept of external sovereignty itself, confuses our 
understanding of sovereignty. What factors are implied in this external sovereignty? John 
Hoffman argues, citing Hedley Bull¶s work, that sovereignty is conceived as a statist 
attribute, and that states, Bull tells us, are internally sovereign when they exercise 
absolute control over their own territory and inhabitants, and externally sovereign when 
they enjoy µnot supremacy but independence of outside authorities¶ (Hoffman 1998, p83). 
Biersteker and Weber argue that where µinternal¶ refers to the existence of some ultimate 
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authority over a particular domain, µexternal¶ refers to the recognition of that authority by 
others (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p2). External sovereignty suggests that this 
recognition can be partly given by other bodies, and that states might positively attempt 
to attain this recognition and the subsequent independence.  
Thus the concept of sovereignty needs at least two component elements. This dual 
and constitutive character of sovereignty points in an important direction, and partly 
explains why it has been so difficult to grasp analytically (Bartelson 1995, p17). When 
we look at the EU, all member states are recognised as independent countries by the 
others. On the other hand, these states are voluntarily united by the motivation for 
European integration through the creation of supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions. It seems therefore more difficult to see their sovereignty with just two 
components. These states express sovereignty through their relationship with other states 
± the traditional understanding of external sovereignty ± but how do member states, 
especially political elites, allocate sovereignty when they perform their voluntary 
cooperation in the integration process? This is a great dilemma for them. Some people 
would place sovereignty in the supranational institutions. However, there is a question of 
whether it is possible to recognise the power in the supranational institution as 
sovereignty and of whether sovereignty can truly be detached from a state as an ideology. 
Consequently, the impact of European integration may alter such common perceptions 
that sovereignty consists of just internal and external components. That is to say, 
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European integration may require another component or a different usage of sovereignty 
to explain such membership as neither internal nor as external. 
 
Theoretical context 
   This section highlights the academic debates in International Relations theories and 
European integration theories on sovereignty which are of key relevance to this 
dissertation. In early theories of European integration, varying views on European 
integration have been provided. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, scholars have paid 
much attention to theorising sovereignty with theories such as realism or liberalism of 
International Relations and neo-functionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism of 
European integration theories. These debates are very important and should be taken into 
account when we consider the sovereignty issue. However, there are also different 
debates that we cannot neglect and that provide another view for considering sovereignty. 
In theories of International Relations, constructivism has gained momentum in recent 
years. The main argument of constructivists is that the structures of world politics are 
social rather than material (Rosamond 2000, p172). Thus, they criticise rationalist 
approaches such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Sweeney argues that the 
constructivist approach emphasises how collective understandings emerge and how 
institutions constitute the interests and identities of actors (Sweeney 2005, p160) in social 
practices. This stands in contrast to the view that such identities and interests are 
pre-existing or constituted by simple rationality. Therefore, I assume that constructivist 
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accounts can provide a useful position for examining the changing elite discourse of 
sovereignty and for making up a deficiency in the state-centric approach of rationalism. 
Biersteker and Weber asserted that a change of focus towards the social construction of 
sovereignty would allow a richer analysis of the changing nature of sovereignty over 
time (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p6). Constructivism, therefore, can offer us a different 
approach when traditional approaches are unable to explain the conceptual change of 
sovereignty. 
   In the study of European integration, those theories which have focussed on the 
European level such as neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have 
flourished. However, more attention to other levels has also prevailed in recent years. 
Examples are the Europeanisation and Multi-level Governance (MLG) approaches. 
Europeanisation has now become a major theme in studies of the EU. It focusses on the 
impact of the EU on domestic politics. Dyson and Goetz consider that the 
first-generation of Europeanisation emphasised the more formal, observable 
consequences of EU membership and can be traced back to the early 1970s. On the other 
hand, the second-generation, which emerged in the 1990s, is not limited to changes in 
political-administrative structures and policy content, but also focusses on the effects on 
ideas, discourses, and identities (cited in Bache and George 2006, p63). Accordingly, it 
would be worthwhile to examine not only whether and how the machineries of 
government have been Europeanised, as much of the work in this area does, but also 
whether and how governmental elites have changed their discourse because of this 
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Europeanisation. Narrowing the focus down to the UK, Bulmer and Burch argue that the 
concept of Europeanisation provides purchase on the nature and extent of Whitehall¶s 
adaptation to the EC/EU (Bulmer and Burch 2009, p33). Thus I will apply this concept 
as a major framework of mechanism of the discourse change. A detailed examination 
including mediating domestic factors for Europeanisation will be conducted in Chapter 
3.  
MLG proposes that regional, state and supranational actors share control over many 
activities that take place in their respective territories. MLG suggests that the state is 
under pressures from µabove¶ and µbelow¶ and that policy making is a complex interplay 
of various actors at various levels (Sweeney 2005, p182). Ben Rosamond argues that the 
emphasis on governance takes the debate about authority away from the zero-sum 
notions associated with discourses of sovereignty (Rosamond 2000, p110). In other 
words, the discourse of sovereignty might have been forced to change because of the 
changes pointed to by MLG. Government elites will still be asked to promote their 
national interests within this framework, but they alone no longer have complete control. 
MLG approach will be also discussed in Chapter 3. 
   These approaches are not a replacement of existing European integration theories. 
Rather, they can compensate for the weakness of those theories caused by the 
evolutionary change of the world politics. Thus focussing on levels of a state and a region 
in European integration can make up for a blind spot of viewing sovereignty and affords 
a better understanding factors and mechanisms for the discourse change of sovereignty.  
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By taking these three contexts, the historical, component and theoretical into 
consideration, European integration seems to be a major factor for affecting discourse 
change on the topic of sovereignty. My hypothesis, therefore, is that, with this complex 
integration process and the impact on domestic institutions, elites¶ discourse on 
sovereignty has been required to change. In other words, the question is whether political 
elites can continue asserting the same discourse of sovereignty under the challenge of 
European integration and the associated domestic institutional change. In order to test this 
hypothesis it is necessary to discover and analyse these discourses at the various stages I 
set out above. 
 
Structure and Methodology 
   This research is separated into two parts: the confirmation of the evolution of 
sovereignty debates; and the verification of discourse change by the discourse analysis. 
The reason why I focus on discourse and conduct a discourse analysis is that it very 
much depends on supposition, such as in the following statement: 
Sovereignty is a discourse, which promotes a certain political order as the 
authoritative and prescribes certain actions and rights as legitimate. By 
emphasizing sovereignty as a claim, the emphasis is placed on how it is used, or 
being played out, in legal and political practices. This approach implies an 
important difference between claim and control. The discourse of sovereignty can 
 14 
be an effective way to produce µordering power¶ but only if the relevant audience 
accepts this claim (Alder-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen ed. 2008, p82).  
 
This study highlights how political elites have spoken to the relevant audience, the 
nation, emphasising their interpretation of sovereignty. I assume that their interpretation 
has shifted over time through political debates of European integration. This hypothesis 
rests on the basis of views like adaptational pressure in the Europeanisation approach and 
argumentative persuasion in the theoretical debates that will be discussed in this 
dissertation. In order to analyse the discursive change in interpretations of sovereignty, 
the research firstly investigates the theoretical debates behind discourses of sovereignty. 
This will allow me to draw out specific mechanisms and factors which are important to 
look at the changes in discourse. Then, secondly, the research proceeds to conduct 
discourse analysis by examining actual debates about Europe in the British Parliament.  
 
Theoretical analysis (Chapters 1-3) 
In Chapter 1, I will illustrate how the academic literature has discussed sovereignty in 
the contemporary world. This includes reconsidering the meaning of sovereignty: how 
have academics theorised sovereignty and criticised each other?; why has sovereignty 
been required to change?; and how has the concept of sovereignty been used? Through 
reviewing literatures, as a result, the chapter finds that the definition of sovereignty is not 
a simple one. Some people require several meanings for it and some others are opposed 
 15 
to any definitions. According to the shared viewpoint of constructivists, sovereignty can 
be changed through the construction of national interests within various social practices 
in a state. Precisely, constructivists view that the language of sovereignty or the usage of 
sovereignty has been changed in various contexts surrounding the state. 
Chapter 2 focusses on British debates on sovereignty by examining how sovereignty 
has generally been conceptualised in Britain, focussing on the concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the characteristic basis of the concept in British political culture. Further, 
in order to highlight the difference from others, the chapter examines the debates in two 
other member states: France and Germany. In consequence, the conceptualisation of 
sovereignty in Britain is unique. The concept of parliamentary sovereignty has emerged 
solely in Britain. And the confrontational style of British politics is an important character 
of discourse. Therefore, some of political elites may emphasise the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty, some of them may utilise the language of the critiques of the 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty, and others may point out the difference from other 
states. Elites thus are likely to try to define the concept of sovereignty on the basis of 
British political culture. 
Chapter 3 discusses the impact of European integration on discourse change. The 
first section looks at the theoretical and legal perspectives of European integration, 
illustrating some questions of sovereignty that are not solved in these debates. Then the 
second section presents the mechanism of discourse change on sovereignty, focussing on 
the Europeanisation approach. The third section narrows the view into actual legal 
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impact on the British constitution and parliamentary sovereignty and, then, gives three 
different points of argument over sovereignty. And the forth section discusses a 
characteristic of British political system, which competitions between and within parties 
could lead the direction of discourse on sovereignty.  
As a result, the following can be found. The first section shows that sovereignty can 
be theoretically changed and EU law has already affected the sovereignty of member 
states. However, it is possible to find some unsolved questions on sovereignty. The 
second section, then, provides the mechanism of discourse change and reveals the actual 
institutional change in the governmental machinery. The third section recognises the 
actual impact on the British constitution. From a legal perspective, sovereignty has 
changed. However, the argument has never settled as some unsolved questions have left 
in the first section because there are three different arguing points of sovereignty: legal, 
theoretical and practical that make the argument on sovereignty complicated. The forth 
section also finds that the British confrontational style of politics make the argument of 
sovereignty complicated and can be a domestic factor of discourse change. 
In short, it is possible to hypothesise that discourse change can be found through the 
mechanisms of institutional change and the competitive arguments between and within 
parties while focussing how elites refer to the arguing point of sovereignty and 
examining how elites have expressed, defined or interpreted sovereignty in relation to 
European integration. 
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Discourse analysis (Chapters 4-7) 
   In Chapter 4, I will introduce what discourse analysis is and explain how I apply this 
analysis into my study. Many scholars agree that there is no fixed way of carrying out 
discourse analysis. However, this study borrows some stages of the work of Potter and 
Wetherell: 1) sample selection, 2) collection of records and documents, 3) transcription, 
4) coding, 5) analysis. 
Chapters 5-7 conduct discourse analysis on three time periods: the Accession to the 
EC and the referendum on membership (1971-1975); the SEA and the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1985-1993); and New Labour (1997-2009). Each chapter carries out my 
investigation based on three analytical approaches: Word usage analysis; Definition 
analysis; and Interpretation analysis. The details of these analyses are presented in 
Chapter 4. In each analysis, I will examine various groups: Government, the 
Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Favour group who voted in favour of a bill, the 
Against group who voted against a bill, in both Hansard records and two newspaper 
articles: The Times and The Guardian. Thus the analysis is carried out in making a 
comparison between competitive groups, as Europeanisation of party politics is driven 
by the dynamics of long- and short-term government-opposition competition, and is the 
key driver of change is party strategy (Sitter 2001, p22). As different stance on European 
integration can be seen within parties, further, a division into two groups of the Favour 
and the Against can also draw a comparison between competitive groups. Thus 
comparing the result of analyses in different groups reveals the context and the feature of 
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change in each group. In addition to that, total figures of each debate, each period and 
each newspaper will be shown in order to grasp and to compare a general trend of each 
debate and each period as well. Transitions in some analyses can be identified in various 
perspectives: in each group and in total of all groups, by a certain event such as the Treaty 
of Maastricht and by a certain period of time. 
 
   I will then draw a conclusion as to whether British elite discourse on sovereignty has 
changed since the accession to the EC, comparing between groups such as parties and 
between periods over time. The point here is how the change can be estimated. If the 
analysis confirmed µnew¶ discourse of sovereignty and if this new discourse has 
prevailed in debates, sovereignty would have changed its meaning or obtained another 
meaning. If the analysis did not confirm µnew¶ discourse but confirmed the evolution of 
existing discourse, the usage of sovereignty would have been changed. Of course, if the 
analysis did not confirm neither µnew¶ discourse nor the evolution of existing discourse, 
sovereignty would have not changed at all. Therefore, the point is whether some 
differences or changes in discourse which will be found in analyses can regard as µnew¶ 
discourse or the evolution of existing discourse. I expect that elites¶ discourse of 
sovereignty will have been compelled to change in either of the above two ways by 
membership of the EU.  
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Significance of this study 
I believe that analysing elites¶ discourse change in actual political debates is an 
original way of studying the concept of sovereignty. There are many studies examining 
sovereignty in relation to European integration but none have attempted to trace the 
evolution of the concept by analysing actual domestic political discourse. Thus this study 
would reveal how elites have understood and referred to sovereignty. If discourses do not 
just describe things but construct a social reality as constructivists argue, to recognise 
discourse change would be to find a major element for viewing a construction of this 
reality. Consequently, I seek grounds for the concept itself by analysing discourse. Of 
course, elites¶ discourse is only one aspect involved in the construction of a social reality. 
Therefore, this study may not definitively prove whether µthe concept¶ of sovereignty has 
been changed or not by European integration. However, by analysing the µdiscourse¶ of 
sovereignty in political debates, I believe that this study applies a different approach to 
existing studies in the examination of sovereignty. As long as states exist, the argument 
on sovereignty would continue not only in Europe but also in anywhere in the world. 
Then, our future may be decided depending on how elites understand sovereignty. In 
other words, a changed elites understanding of sovereignty which can be a part of shared 
idea can affect and construct the future reality. It is thus hoped that this research will offer 
new insights in the study of sovereignty. 
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1  Academic debates on sovereignty 
This chapter reveals various approaches and views on sovereignty in academic 
debates. When British elites or any other people talk about sovereignty, they at the very 
least need to know or try to understand what sovereignty is. Their basic knowledge and 
possibly its extended idea are likely to be coming from academic understandings of 
sovereignty. Therefore, academic understandings are likely to reflect the common and/or 
elite understandings and thus help show how sovereignty is likely to be defined by elites 
and how its meaning when used by elites is likely to have changed. However, there are 
countless literatures on this subject. Accordingly, I utilise the following approaches to 
examine the academic debates on sovereignty. The first to be discussed is the focus on 
theories. How have academics theorised sovereignty and how have they criticised each 
other? The second is the focus on the context. Why has sovereignty been required to 
change? The third is the focus on the usage. How has the concept of sovereignty been 
used? It is important to grasp the framework and the drift of academic debates on 
sovereignty in order to understand and view the elite discourse on sovereignty. 
 
1.1 Definitions and critiques 
The aim of this section is to present these debates and critiques of the concept of 
sovereignty and to examine the reasoning behind such a variety of definitions. In other 
words, I will show why multiple meanings of sovereignty have appeared, illustrating the 
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crucial importance of the constructivist approach in understanding the evolution of 
sovereignty. 
How have scholars tried to define the meaning of sovereignty? Some have made 
distinctions between different types of sovereignty. For example, Stephen D. Krasner 
divides it into four meanings: domestic sovereignty; interdependence sovereignty; 
international legal sovereignty; and Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 1999, p9). Fred 
Hirsch divides it into three meanings: formal sovereignty; effective sovereignty; and 
autonomy (cited in William Wallace 1986, p368). Boutros Boutros-Ghali gives a good 
reason to make divisions in the concept: µA major intellectual requirement of our time is 
to rethink the question of sovereignty ± not to weaken its essence, which is crucial to 
international security and cooperation, but to recognize that it may take more than one 
form and perform more than one function¶ (cited in Beaulac 2004, p1). By making these 
distinctions between different forms and functions, they have tried to find a better 
definition to fit with the contemporary state system. On the other hand, Weber and 
Bartelson are opposed to definitions ± to all definitions ± because definitions, they argue, 
imply a µrepresentational¶ relationship between language and existence (cited in Hoffman 
1998, p17). Beaulac argues, by focussing on language, that words like µsovereignty¶ have 
their own history, which is not only a history of their changing meaning, their changing 
definition, but a history of the social effects of their changing meaning (Beaulac 2004, 
p3).  
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Language has become a key factor in analysing the meaning of sovereignty in recent 
years. Neil Walker presents a definition of sovereignty as:  
the discursive form in which a claim concerning the existence and character of a 
supreme ordering power for a particular polity is expressed, which supreme 
ordering power purports to establish and sustain the identity and status of the 
particular polity qua polity and to provide a continuing source and vehicle of 
ultimate authority for the juridical order of that polity (Walker 2003, p6).  
 
Then, he argues that there is a distinction between two phases in the modern use of the 
language of sovereignty: the Westphalian phase and post-Westphalian phase. He finds 
that sovereignty of both phases combines to form part of the object-language but only 
sovereignty in the earlier Westphalian phase forms part of the meta-language (Walker 
2003, p10). That is to say, the modern world cannot be explained by the concept of 
sovereignty because, he finds, there is a challenge that is posed by the emergence of new 
forms of polity.  
   A focus on language is one of the features of the constructivist approach. Most of the 
academic debates and critiques on sovereignty these days can be found within this 
approach, and especially its critique of rationalism ʊ in the forms of neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism. Reus-Smit presents three important contrasts with rationalism. First, 
where rationalists assume that actors are atomistic egoists, constructivists treat them as 
deeply social. Second, instead of treating actors¶ interests as exogenously determined, as 
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given prior to social interaction, constructivists treat interests as endogenous to such 
interaction, as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learnt through processes of 
communication, reflection on experience, and role enactment. Third, while rationalists 
view society as a strategic realm, a place where actors rationally pursue their interests, 
constructivists see it as a constitutive realm, the site that generates actors as 
knowledgeable social and political agents, the realm that makes them who they are 
(Reus-Smit 2001, p219).  
Therefore, constructivists can provide us with different views on sovereignty from 
rationalists. What is their view of sovereignty and what do constructivists criticise about 
the rationalists¶ views of sovereignty? Deudney claims that one promise of 
constructivism is its opening to variation in the forms of authority, sovereign or otherwise, 
and social practices that constitute political order. Realising this promise requires a 
conceptualisation of different forms of authority and sovereignty relations, and of 
different social practices, both domestic and international, that generate and sustain 
security structures (Deudney 1997, p192). Indeed, it seems that sovereignty is 
intertwined with various social practices in a state and between states.  
Alexander Wendt locates sovereignty simply as a property of a structure (Wendt 
1999, p207). Wendt insists, however, that sovereignty does not presuppose a society of 
states. Sovereignty is intrinsic to the state, not contingent (Ibid, p209). He contrasts this 
view with those of other constructivists, such as Anthony Giddens. Wendt considers that 
empirical statehood can exist without juridical statehood and that recognition confers 
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upon states certain powers in a society of states, but freedom from external authority per 
se does not presuppose it (Ibid, p209). He argues, in other words, that a state can have 
external sovereignty even if it is not recognised by other states (Ibid, p208). Thus he 
suggested that µanarchy is what states make of it¶ (Ibid, p6). According to Bartelson¶s 
work, Giddens pointed out that µsovereignty simultaneously provides an ordering 
principle for what is ³internal  ´to states and what is ³external  ´to them.¶ This double and 
constitutive character of sovereignty has been touched upon by Ruggie, to whom 
sovereignty is a principle of legitimacy peculiar to the post-medieval international system. 
Similarly, Kratochwil emphasises the impact of territorial sovereignty in the formation of 
the modern state as the constitutive unit in the modern state system (cited in Bartelson 
1995, p17). Philpot analyses constructivists¶ view that national interests are defined or 
µconstructed,¶ not fixed, and that ideas, meanings, and discourses contribute to this 
definition of interests (Philpot 2001, p8). 
On the other hand, Krasner argues against these constructivist views that these studies 
have placed more weight on discourse and the impact of ideas, and less on power and 
material interests as explanations for the contested character of Westphalian sovereignty 
(Krasner 1999, p45). What distinguishes his study from those constructivist approaches 
that have emphasised the problematic nature of sovereignty is not the empirical 
description of reality but rather the weight that should be given to different explanatory 
factors. For all constructivist arguments, shared principles and norms are the critical 
determinants of actual outcomes (Ibid, p50). Krasner sees norms in a different way. For 
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him, international norms are often contradictory, and in the international environment, 
logics of consequences dominate logics of appropriateness. Thus, norms, though not 
irrelevant, do not have the weight that constructivism has attributed to them (Ibid, p51). 
On the contrary, Ruggie has criticised the neorealist view on sovereignty, arguing that 
Waltz¶s conception of structure is static and cannot account for change in either the 
ordering principle or in the level of functional differentiation from the feudal system to 
the modern states system (cited in Lake 2003, p308). 
 
Why, then, has sovereignty become the subject of so much contestation? Although 
many scholars point out some disputable aspects of sovereignty, none of them refuses the 
existence of this notion or seeks to replace its use. Hoffman argues µSovereignty is an 
insoluble but it is insoluble only as long as we associate it with the state¶ (Hoffman 1998, 
p2). Therefore, competing views of the state make this term contestable and as long as 
the state exists, sovereignty will be discussed. It is apparent that those distinctions of 
sovereignty by Krasner or Hirsch were not given at the time of the emergence of the idea 
of sovereignty. If certain conditions surrounding the state changed, then the meaning of 
sovereignty would become ambiguous. In defining the concept, we are obliged to give it 
different or additional interpretations through the construction of theory. 
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1.2 The change in context 
   How have academics viewed the context of discussion? This section introduces two 
recent works on sovereignty of Daniel Philpot and Neil Walker, who theorised 
sovereignty under various changes and challenges to the state in the world. 
   Daniel Philpot focusses on what has occurred around the state in the history of the 
world in his book Revolutions in Sovereignty (Philpot 2001). He premises that the 
sovereign states system arrived most commandingly through revolutions (Ibid, p3). As 
constitutional revolutions since Westphalia have either established or diminished the 
sovereign state, he calls them revolutions in sovereignty. In this perspective, he assumes 
that revolutions in ideas brought the revolutions in sovereignty (Ibid, p8). He explains 
that revolutions in sovereignty occur when ideas arrive on the scene, and proceed most 
vigorously in those locales where ideas are most voluble (Ibid, p7). Then, Philpot offers a 
µframework of ideas¶ in order to describe the effect of ideas. He argues that it consists of 
two µroles of ideas¶. The first role of ideas is to convert people to new identities, leading 
them to want new political ends. The second one is to wield social power, coaxing heads 
of state to pursue new courses (Ibid, pp46-47). 
   Thus, Philpot presents five revolutions in sovereignty resulting from the effect of 
these two roles. They are: Westphalia (1648); Minority Treaties (1878); European 
Integration (since 1950); Colonial Independence (early 1960s); and Intervention 
(Post-Cold War). According to this categorisation, we are currently facing two 
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revolutions in sovereignty: European integration and Intervention. These entail ideational 
changes in both people and heads of states. 
On the other hand, Neil Walker focusses on constitutional pluralism as the theoretical 
context for discussion of sovereignty in his book Sovereignty in Transition (Walker 2003). 
According to his work, constitutional pluralism accepts that, just as we cannot dismiss 
the constitutive power of those claims which continue to be registered in the language of 
sovereignty, we cannot either ignore the objective reality of globalisation and 
multi-dimensionality which has caused many at the meta level to forsake the claims of 
sovereignty. Therefore, constitutional pluralism stands beyond the perspective of any 
particular system in order to conceive of sovereignty in terms of a plurality of unities and 
in terms of the emergent possibilities of the relationships amongst this plurality of unities 
(Ibid, p18).  
Walker then applied the language of late sovereignty to make sense of the new 
multi-dimensional order. He presents four suggestions as to why this age should be 
understood as one of µlate¶ sovereignty, rather than sovereignty or post-sovereignty (Ibid, 
p19): 
1. It suggests fundamental continuity than discontinuity, that the basic conceptual 
apparatus of sovereignty can be adapted to understand the new order. 
2. It suggests a distinctive phase in the discursive career of the term. That just as there 
are continuities in the meaning of sovereignty, there are also significant changes. 
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3. It suggests irreversibility, that there is no way back to the world of early sovereignty 
and the one-dimensional system of states which it represented. 
4. It suggests transformative potential, that sovereignty has entered a final stage, that its 
capacity to represent the world of political authority is being tested to the limits, and 
even, possibly, that in that challenge there may be a transformation into an order of 
authority where sovereignty is of diminishing value, and where its continuing use 
both in the object-language of constitutional representation and in the meta-language 
of explanation and normative projection is tested to the limit. 
 
Walker also suggests three categories of arguments in which late sovereignty 
contains the seeds of its own transformation: 1) conflict and boundary maintenance; 2) 
diffusion of sovereign power; 3) reflexivity (Ibid, p25). As a result, he concludes that the 
dynamic of transformation within late sovereignty will involve the continuous evolution 
rather than the demise of sovereignty (Ibid, p28).  
   This section introduced two arguments on sovereignty. Philpot argues that Europe is 
currently facing two revolutions in sovereignty: European integration and Intervention. 
Walker argues that late sovereignty contains the seeds of its own transformation. Of 
course, these are not the only arguments on sovereignty. What matters is that we need to 
regard these possible changes in context that may affect elites¶ understanding. 
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1.3 The change of usage 
Chapter 2 will discuss how the concept of sovereignty has changed historically in 
Britain and Chapter 3 will explain how European integration poses a modern challenge 
to traditional understandings of sovereignty. This section, however, focusses more 
generally on how the usage of sovereignty has changed. Why have political elites needed 
to use the concept differently? One of answers would be, µSovereignty is a discourse¶. 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen introduces this view citing scholars such as Biersteker and Weber, 
and Neil Walker. She argues that, by emphasising sovereignty as a claim, the emphasis is 
placed on how it is used, or being played out, in legal and political practices 
(Alder-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen ed. 2008, p82). Assuming that it is reasonable, 
the analysis of discourse on sovereignty will be valuable for understanding and finding a 
change in usage. 
The debates on sovereignty have not solely focussed on theorising its meaning. Some 
scholars argue that state sovereignty is still a meaningful concept in today¶s world. 
However, if we focus on how we use it, Gammeltoft-Hansen and Alder-Nissen contend 
that the concept of sovereignty is undergoing rapid changes (Ibid, p2). They argue that 
states and other actors have become increasingly creative in instrumentalizing their use of 
sovereignty to reassert legitimacy, power, and control in face of new challenges (Ibid, p3). 
In a certain sense, it is possible to say that this is a mere repetition of history as Hinsley¶s 
argument µthe further history of the concept will be a history of its use and misuse in 
varying political conditions and not of restatements of it in different or in novel terms¶ 
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(Hinsley 1966, p125). Bartelson also indicates that the meaning of sovereignty is wholly 
contingent on its usage, and that this usage in turn is governed by a blend of linguistic 
conventions and rhetorical intention (cited in Alder-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008, p39).  
   If the usage of sovereignty changed, would the meaning behind the term disappear? 
Bartelson presents two views of concepts: µthe belief that sovereign statehood is here to 
stay has been nourished by a semantic view of concepts and their meaning, while the 
belief that sovereign statehood is undergoing profound changes has been greatly 
facilitated by a nominalist view of concepts.¶ He suggests that there has been the 
transition from the former view to the latter and applies the term µlinguistic turn¶ to 
describe it (Ibid, p34).  
Indeed, the meaning of sovereignty itself will continue to exist as a fundamental 
framework for the state system. However, under the multi-dimensional order or 
revolutions in sovereignty, political elites would be interested in using the function of 
sovereignty rather than discussing and seeking what it means in political practices. 
Focussing on the usage of sovereignty will be instrumental in examining the essence of 
those phenomena.  
 
Summary 
   This chapter introduced a variety of academic debates on sovereignty. We could find 
some criticisms between rationalists and constructivists, or even among constructivists. 
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The definition of sovereignty is not a simple one. Some people require several meanings 
for it and some others are opposed to any definitions. According to the shared viewpoint 
of constructivists, sovereignty can be changed through the construction of national 
interests within various social practices in a state. Precisely, constructivists view that the 
language of sovereignty or the usage of sovereignty has been changed in various contexts 
surrounding a state. This study will try to verify this theory focussing on the UK in the 
process of European integration. Therefore, I will focus on discussion of sovereignty 
within the UK in the next chapter. 
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2  British debates on sovereignty 
   This chapter clarifies the basis of the British concept of sovereignty. It is important to 
know how the British concept of sovereignty has been established in order to analyse 
British elites¶ discourse on sovereignty. For that, I will firstly argue that parliamentary 
sovereignty ought to be seen as the basic assumption within a British conception of 
sovereignty. In a certain sense, parliamentary sovereignty has emerged or has been 
constructed as a new concept of sovereignty in a history of the UK. Therefore, the first 
section of this chapter will set out not only to understand what the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty is but also to view how it is conceptualised. Secondly, then, I 
will examine what underpins the British concept by focussing on its main characteristics. 
As a result, we are able to establish what beliefs British elites emphasise when they talk 
about sovereignty. Thirdly, I will then present the debates on sovereignty in France and 
Germany as other EU member states in order to discover how they vary from Britain, 
especially in regard to debates around Europe. In debates on European matters, some 
MPs refer to other members of the EU when they talk about British sovereignty. They 
often emphasise the difference from other states. Hence, in order to understand the 
difference, I briefly discuss academic debates on sovereignty of these two countries. 
 
2.1 The British concept of sovereignty: Parliamentary sovereignty 
The aim of this section is to examine how sovereignty has been conceptualised in 
Britain ± primarily as what KDVEHFRPHNQRZQDVµparliamentary sovereignty¶. At first, 
 33 
this study briefly reviews a history of the conceptualisation in Britain from the 
Reformation in the sixteenth century to A.V. Dicey¶s work in the nineteenth century. I 
will then critically analyse interpretations of parliamentary sovereignty. For example, 
Nicol looks at the different perspectives on parliamentary sovereignty from within the 
professions of law and politics. He argues that, unlike lawyers, Members of Parliament 
failed to perceive parliamentary sovereignty in terms of judicial power (Nicol 2001, 
p106). This section will answer the questions: What caused this difference? Has 
parliamentary sovereignty ever had one clear definition or was it already problematised 
in the UK regardless of European integration? 
 
History 
   It is difficult to identify a singular origin of parliamentary sovereignty. Rather, it 
seems that the concept has developed alongside the history of parliament in the UK. 
Parliament evolved from the medieval tradition of baronial counsel and consent. 
Participation in law-making was gradually extended from the barons to representatives of 
counties and towns. By the late fourteenth century, according to the study of Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Parliament had become the most authoritative institution in the realm in 
temporal matters, apart from the monarchy itself (Goldsworthy 1999, p229). 
   Goldsworthy argues that the real reason why Parliament was not yet fully sovereign, 
by the beginning of the sixteenth century, was the existence of a rival institution, the 
papacy, which claimed, and was widely acknowledged to possess, an independent and 
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superior authority to enforce God¶s law, at least with respect to exclusively spiritual 
matters (Ibid, p51). In the sixteenth century, throughout the Reformation Parliament 
including the Act of Supremacy in 1533 and the Act against the Pope¶s Authority in 1536, 
the Tudor government changed the relationship between the King and the Pope. 
Although the English Reformation derived from the actions of Henry VIII, the 
Reformation occurred throughout the Continent as well. The papacy itself would 
eventually lose its political power. However, Goldsworthy argues that these 
developments left unresolved questions concerning the nature of Parliament and its 
authority, and that the issue was not finally resolved until 1689 (Ibid, p53). 
   The English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution were major events occurring in 
England during this period. As I have contended in the Introduction, Hobbes argued that 
the relationship has shifted from one between the ruler and the ruled to one between the 
state (sovereign) and individuals (subjects) because of the interregnum. During the period 
from the Restoration to the Glorious Revolution, facing the Exclusion Bill Crisis, John 
Locke rejected the absolute monarchism and presented his idea that, in England, the 
King, Lords, and Commons shared the supreme legislative power that was recognized 
by the constitution (Ibid, p152). Goldsworthy argues that Locke¶s thesis became very 
popular in Whig circles. As the result of the Glorious Revolution, the Bill of Rights was 
enacted and restricted many important royal prerogatives, and this µlaid the foundations 
for affirming, the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament¶. The sovereignty of Parliament, 
µthe highest power in England¶, became µone of the supreme touchstones of the ideology 
 35 
and language of Whiggism¶ (Ibid, pp159-160). The discourse of parliamentary 
sovereignty was thereby applied and expressed by elites who used the idea as part of 
their ideological platform. 
   In 1707, by the Acts of Union, the new Parliament of Great Britain came into being. 
However, this new parliament did not simply inherit the full sovereign powers of the 
English Parliament. As Goldsworthy argues, before the union, the Scottish Parliament 
was not sovereign and there is no good reason to assume that the new Parliament 
inherited µall the peculiar characteristics of the English Parliament but none of the 
Scottish Parliament¶ (Ibid, p166). 
   Through the influence within Britain of the American Revolution, Goldsworthy 
states, the idea that the people rather than Parliament were sovereign became 
increasingly popular in the last few decades of the eighteenth century. Several reformers 
taking this stance denied that Parliament was omnipotent, because they thought it was 
bound by the inviolable rights of the people it was supposed to represent (Ibid, 
pp215-217). Most British reformers µsought the restoration of a balanced constitution 
through parliamentary reform. They wanted a better constitution by way of a better 
Parliament¶. Their object was not to limit Parliament¶s powers, but to make it more 
accountable to the people (Ibid, p219). According to Goldsworthy, these reformers¶ goals 
were largely realized in time: 
     The electoral reforms achieved in the nineteenth century made it possible to 
reconcile, at least to the satisfaction of the vast majority of Britons, the legal 
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sovereignty of Parliament and the political sovereignty of the people, and to that 
extent, the constitutional theories of eighteenth century conservatives and radicals. 
The sovereignty of Parliament was preserved, but given a new, or rather, a 
renewed justification, in that the forms made more plausible a claim that had been 
frequently made since the fourteenth century: that Parliament represented the entire 
community (Ibid, pp219-220). 
 
Dicey¶s definition 
   Although all three branches of government in Britain have accepted the doctrine that 
Parliament has sovereign law-making authority, some critics argue that the doctrine is not 
part of British law (Ibid, p236). A.V. Dicey re-established, in his book Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), the new fundamental principles of the British 
Constitution and proclaimed that sovereignty in Britain belonged to Parliament, 
composed of the king, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Dicey also 
excluded any possibility of legal limitation of parliamentary sovereignty (Shinoda 2000, 
p51). It is said that Parliament is able to enact or repeal any law whatsoever, and that the 
courts have no authority to judge statutes invalid for violating either moral or legal 
principles of any kind (Goldsworthy 1999, p1). Goldsworthy considers that Dicey¶s 
definition of sovereignty should be qualified in two respects. The first qualification is that 
law-making authority is sovereign if it is unrestricted by norms that either are judicially 
enforceable, or satisfy the criteria just listed. The second qualification follows from 
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criticisms that have been made of Hobbesian theories of law, that the sovereign and its 
authority are above all laws, and therefore not susceptible to legal limitation (Ibid, 
pp12-13).  
Shinoda analysed that Dicey¶s theory of sovereignty has certain implications within 
this historical context. 
     On the one hand, the legal sovereignty of the Westminster parliament reigns not 
only over Great Britain but also over all the colonies of the British empire. 
According to Dicey, it is the strongest sovereign in the world. On the other hand, 
the British electors are given another title of sovereignty. Although parliament is 
also called the legal sovereign, the British electors are the politically absolute 
sovereign. In short, Dicey¶s theory of sovereignty at once explains the imperial 
principle of sovereignty in the µinternational¶ field and the democratic and national 
principle of sovereignty in the domestic field (Shinoda 2000, p52). 
 
As I have shown in the Introduction, the interpretation of sovereignty might include 
the existing political conditions. However, because of the deprivation of constitutional 
power in the House of Lords in 1911 and the attack on the traditional British political 
theories by British idealists, national sovereignty achieved its theoretical advancement 
even in the country of the champion of classical constitutionalism (Ibid, p53).  
Armstrong defines the orthodox view of parliamentary sovereignty as including the 
following tenets (Armstrong 2003, p328): 
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     Validity ̿  laws enacted by Parliament are to be considered to be legally valid and 
enforceable; 
     Priority ̿  it is the duty of the courts to apply the latest will of Parliament over and 
above any other inconsistent rule of law, including common law rules; 
     Continuity ̿  sovereignty is continuous and cannot be legally limited. 
 
Critiques 
Rogers and Walters illustrate five reasons why Parliament is not sovereign (Rogers 
and Walters 2006, pp79-80):  
1) It embodies any concept of national sovereignty, although it may contribute 
to the sentiment. 
2) It vies with the Queen to be head of state. 
3) It is not the centre of the day-to-day decision making of government. 
Parliament does not govern. 
4) It is not the sole source of the government¶s powers, many of which are 
derived from the government¶s exercise of the prerogative powers of the 
Crown with little or no recourse to Parliament at all. 
5) It is the government that, by royal proclamation, summons, prorogues and 
dissolves Parliament. 
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Therefore, they view the power of parliament as µlegislative supremacy¶ rather than 
sovereignty. Using the words of Dicey, they define this as the ability to µmake or unmake 
any law whatever¶. They point out a characteristic, which confuses supremacy with 
sovereignty, that one parliament cannot bind its successor parliaments because it has an 
equal claim to legislative sovereignty. However, they consider that even this legislative 
supremacy has been limited in practical ways, by the passing of the Human Rights Act; 
accession to the European Union; and devolution to Scotland and Wales, and, with some 
qualifications, to Northern Ireland (Ibid, pp80-82).  
Borthwick claims that the sovereignty of Parliament has fallen on hard times, with it 
having been described by one commentator as µthe last refuge of the constitutional 
scoundrel¶, and another characterising it as µsomething reassuring to suck when things 
look bad, the mental equivalent of a boiled sweet¶ (Borthwick 1997, p26). Borthwick 
examines the challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament in five ways: the challenge from 
the executive; the challenge from Europe; the challenge from the courts; the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and a written constitution; and the challenge 
from referendum. The challenge of Europe and ECHR will be discussed in the following 
chapters; thus, this section looks at the other three challenges. 
There is a challenge from the executives which concerns the shape and content of 
legislation. Indeed, this leads Borthwick to argue that the effective sovereign power 
belonged no longer to Parliament but to the executive. Governments were able to act in a 
cohesive way as long as they were backed by a disciplined party in the House of 
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Commons (Ibid, p28). Pilkington also observes that in the face of µthe ability of the 
Government to whip its own backbenchers through the voting lobbies to support its 
policies¶, it is only fair to say that what is called by ministers µparliamentary sovereignty¶ 
is rather more accurately µexecutive¶ or µgovernmental¶ sovereignty (Pilkington 2001, 
p80).  
The courts in Britain pose a further challenge ʊ they are prepared to be much more 
assertive in relation to other branches of government than has traditionally been the case. 
They might legitimately challenge the actions of officials if they were, in the court¶s view, 
exceeding the powers granted them under statute (Borthwick 1997, p36).  
Finally, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is challenged by the idea that on 
some issues the electorate themselves should decide through a referendum. There are 
three examples in the past 25 years: in Northern Ireland on the border in 1973, across the 
whole UK in 1975 on continuing membership of the EC, and in Scotland and Wales in 
1979 on devolution (Ibid, p39).  
Accordingly, we found that there were some challenges to parliamentary sovereignty 
within the UK. It is important to examine how British political elites have referred to 
parliamentary sovereignty in relation to these challenges. However, this study mainly 
focusses on the challenge from Europe which will be examined in the next chapter. 
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2.2 Characteristic basis for the concept 
Despite these criticisms of parliamentary sovereignty, it is popular with the British 
people, but the basis of this support needs clarifying. One obvious root is in nationalism. 
The desire here is to achieve self-determination within a community through the 
maintenance of a single collective identity, set of historical rights and cultural traditions. 
A.D. Smith defines nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of 
its members to constitute an actual or potential ³nation  ´ (cited in Bryant 2006, p25). 
Nations usually, but not invariably, need a state to protect their integrity and interest; 
states usually need (to forge) a nation if they are to command allegiance (Ibid, p15). For 
nationalists, therefore, the concept of sovereignty is indispensable for securing a µnation 
state¶ and bringing success to their movement. In order to achieve their claims to a nation 
state, they argue that the concept of sovereignty has never changed, in a similar manner 
to rationalists. Although some rationalists, such as liberal intergovernmentalists, allow the 
existence of supranational institutions and the delegation of sovereignty to those 
institutions for pursuing the national interests as the will of government, nationalists fear 
that such behaviour would jeopardise the fundamental rights that the nation should have. 
They argue that this would consequently undermine the nation state. They believe, once 
again, that national interests can be secured by defending sovereignty. In other words, 
they hold the view that sovereignty still has the classical notion of absolutism and cannot 
be divided.  
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Much Euroscepticism is based on this view, with nationalism feeding a position to 
intergovernmentalism in Europe. Therefore, their response to European integration 
includes rather sentimental value when they find any loss of sovereignty. This sentiment 
is widely recognised in British public discourse, for example in the resistance to the 
introduction of the Euro into the UK, which stresses the tradition of sterling rather than 
judging the currencies by their functional capacity. They use the concept of sovereignty 
for the purpose of maintaining absolutely that which the nation had traditionally and 
collectively established. However, these nationalists ignore the evolution of sovereignty: 
the change in the discourse along with the developments in the world system, and 
especially the changes in the relations between the UK and other states.  
In addition to that, Britain has a quite unique political culture. Pappamikail presents 
the British character as follows: 
  British politics is black and white, them and us, totally wrong or totally right and 
that encourages a confrontational style that also fits into the electoral V\VWHP« the 
British often view sovereignty as something indivisible, either you have it or you 
don¶t (Pappamikail 1998, p217). 
 
This confrontational style needs to be examined more in relation to European 
integration and will be discussed in the next chapter. Further, it seems to me that an 
indivisibility of sovereignty is a key factor to understand British discourse on sovereignty. 
I will take this up later too.  
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Schmidt also defines Britain as a simple polity and argues: 
    A good way to illustrate the ideational problems for simple as opposed to 
compound polities is by analogy to polytheistic and monotheistic religions« when 
you believe in only one God  ؐ read the French Republic state and British 
parliamentary sovereignty  ؐ the inclusion of any others is an attack on the very 
fundamentals of one¶s faith  ؐas it was for the Christians when forced to accept the 
Roman gods (Schmidt 2006, p272). 
 
Those characteristics of British culture may explain the existence of more 
Eurosceptics in the UK than in other member states. It is useful for comparison here to 
examine the situation in other member states. 
 
2.3 Discussions in other member states: France and Germany 
Academic debates on sovereignty may differ in every nation state because the origin 
of sovereign power varies in each. This is true for the member states of the EU as well. 
Before proceeding to examine the impact of European integration on Britain in the next 
chapter, this study briefly illustrates how two of the key member states, France and 
Germany, view the concept of sovereignty in the process of European integration, 
focussing on political, legal and ideological aspects. It is possible to imagine that different 
views on sovereignty compose different eliteV¶ discourse. For example, is there an 
important cleavage over the issue of sovereignty in both countries? Balme and Woll 
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argue that the most constant element of the discussion on European integration in France 
is the persistent disagreement between pro-Europeanists and national sovereignists 
(Balme and Woll 2005, p98). It seems that there are similarities between the arguments 
over sovereignty in France and those in Britain. The legal situation is slightly different, 
however, since both France and Germany have codified constitutions. International 
Treaties signed by their Governments take precedence over national law and have direct 
effect in their national jurisdictions without any requirement for enabling legislation as in 
Britain (Forman and Baldwin 1999, p482). Such conditions could lead to a different 
discourse from the one in Britain. I will further investigate these aspects in each country. 
 
France 
   Balme and Woll argue that one cannot find a unique French vision of European 
integration but rather a spectrum between two poles: wanting integration and wanting to 
preserve national sovereignty (Balme and Woll 2005, p98). Vivien A. Schmidt argues 
that French leaders recognized that only in building Europe could France enhance its 
own power and objectives, even if this entailed pooling a certain measure of national 
sovereignty and, thereby, executive autonomy, and argues that national leaders have 
consistently sought to obscure this by presenting France as maintaining autonomy and 
extending sovereignty through its leadership of Europe in their communicative discourse 
to the public (Schmidt 2006, p76). The discussion of national sovereignty, therefore, 
seems to be a matter of policy area and of political parties. Burban sees that, on the one 
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hand, cooperation over the well-defined economic area of coal and steel did not directly 
affect national sovereignty; but on the other hand, the European Defence Community 
(EDC) touched upon the central core of national sovereignty (Burban 1993, p186). He 
also argues that this was the time, starting in 1987 (when the SEA came into effect), that 
the press, even the mass media, became enthusiastic about building Europe, and the 
parties which had traditionally been hostile or sceptical regarding the European project 
changed their mind. However, from that point onwards to the Treaty of Maastricht of 7 
February 1992, national sovereignty came to be at the heart of the matter because the 
treaty made the Community competent to deal with foreign affairs and security (Ibid, 
pp189-190). Burban observes these time periods and examines as follows: 
     It was over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, however, signed in 1992, that 
the French political establishment really split, in a similar way to the split over the 
European Defence Community. On the left, as on the right, the same causes 
seemed to produce the same effects; and the split is widening within each party 
(Ibid, p191). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, France remained conspicuously cautious about European 
affairs, careful to demonstrate that the EU would not impose undesirable outcomes onto 
French domestic politics (Balme and Woll 2005, p104).  
   European integration has certainly brought ideological changes in each party. Balme 
and Woll illustrate that the most dramatic one was the U-turn of the Parti Socialiste (PS) 
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in 1983, from national Keynesianism to European monetarism. Further, in the Gaullist 
party the Rassemblement pour la R«pblique (RPR), Jacques Chirac had to distance his 
party from the historical stance of de Gaulle on national sovereignty. By the mid-1990s, 
the RPR shared the positions of the PS on the single market and later on the single 
currency (Ibid, p112). It can be said that the approach of both parties in the area of 
economics was largely Europeanised.  
   In the constitutional aspect, although Forman and Baldwin argue that international 
treaties take precedence over national law and have direct effect in their national 
jurisdictions without any requirement for enabling legislation in France, the international 
rule introduced does not merge with French law. It remains separate by virtue of the 
supremacy it has over all national legislative or regulatory rules (cited in Rambaund 1993, 
p176). Balme and Woll also point out that until 1992 the European treaties had no 
specific impact on the French constitution (Balme and Woll 2005, p106). The ratification 
of the Treaty on European Union, however, required a constitutional revision, especially 
due to its provisions on EU citizenship and the right of EU citizens to participate in 
French municipal elections. As a result, European treaties had moved beyond the status 
of international agreements, and the superiority of European law on national law is now 
fully recognized (Ibid, pp106-107). 
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Germany 
   It is possible to find a distinctive approach of Germany towards Europe in academic 
debates. It is said that Germany has recovered its sovereignty through European 
integration (Taylor 2008, p67; Dreyfus et al. 1993, pp165-166). The country completely 
lost its sovereignty through the unconditional surrender of May 1945. Afterwards, the 
Germans found that Europe was the place where they could rehabilitate themselves on 
the international stage by participating in the membership. Further, Europe provided an 
alternative identity construction (Marcussen et al. 1999, p628). Schmidt argues that 
European integration was consistently presented by Chancellor after Chancellor in terms 
of its identity-enhancing qualities, with a German-as-European identity the main 
construct through which to explain German\¶s relationship to Europe (Schmidt 2006, 
p88). Thus she views that Germany lacks a full sense of national sovereignty (Ibid, p202). 
Moreover, Schmidt argues that sovereignty in Germany has never been a constitutional 
issue, since the German Basic Law (Article 24) explicitly allows the transfer of sovereign 
rights to international organizations (Ibid, p89). For Germany, therefore, sovereignty can 
be gained or maintained through the European dimension. 
   Institutionally, Anderson argues that obvious and unsurprising evidence of 
Europeanization is omnipresent throughout the German federal bureaucracy. The 
Chancellery and the federal ministries have all created European units and in some 
instances entire departments devoted to the evaluation, monitoring, coordination, and 
implementation of European issues and policies. Moreover, the lower house of the 
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German parliament, the Bundestag, has also adapted institutionally to the growing 
salience of the European level of policymaking, and organizational adaptation by the 
parties that is consistent with an increasingly significant EU policy process (Anderson 
2005, pp86-88). 
 
Both France and Germany tend to consider that Europe is a place or means to 
enhance national capacity. Further, they believe that European integration is largely 
developed by the firm relationship between France and Germany. Thus Europe would be 
indispensable for them. There is a quite interesting view of identity that political elites in 
Britain, Germany and France have a different idea of the µOther¶. British political elites 
have continuously considered µEurope¶ as the friendly µout-group¶, whereas German 
elites have seen the country¶s own catastrophic past as the µOther¶, and French political 
elites have traditionally added the US to their list of µOthers¶ (Marcussen et al. 1999, 
p616). In a certain aspect, in order for Germany to break away from the past and for 
France to feel it is competing against the US, they have made good use of European 
integration. In other words, European integration has been used as a response to such 
threats to sovereignty. This being so, for what purpose has European integration been 
utilised in Britain when it comes to understanding sovereignty? The analysis in this 
dissertation will provide some answers to this question. 
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Summary 
This chapter examined British debates on sovereignty. The chapter discussed the 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty and its critiques, some characteristics of the 
concept, and some differences in the concept compared to other member states. These 
debates are likely to be the basis of discourse of MPs. Thus the chapter found that the 
conceptualisation of sovereignty in Britain is unique. The concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty has emerged solely in Britain and the confrontational style of British politics 
is an important character of discourse. Therefore, some of them may emphasise the 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty, some of them may utilise the language of the 
critiques of the notion of parliamentary sovereignty, and others may point out the 
difference from other states. Elites thus are likely to try to define the concept of 
sovereignty on the basis of these debates. However, I consider that they are not the only 
factors included in elite framing of the concept. An external factor, that is to say, the 
impact of European integration on Britain would be another factor in elite understanding 
of the concept. This study is intended as a main investigation of this impact on discourse 
surrounding sovereignty. By taking the core British debates on sovereignty into account, 
therefore, I will examine how European integration is likely to affect the British concept 
of sovereignty in detail in the next chapter. 
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3  European challenge to sovereignty 
   This chapter highlights how European integration is likely to have affected the 
debates on sovereignty both among academics and the British politics. Several studies 
have already been made on the impact of European integration on the UK from 
theoretical and legal perspectives. However, it is difficult to understand what causes 
discourse change on sovereignty. Therefore, this chapter tries to answer the questions of 
why and how discourse change occurs. In order to grasp a broad picture of the debate on 
sovereignty in Europe, firstly, the chapter looks at the theoretical and legal perspectives of 
European integration, illustrating some questions of sovereignty that are still left as a 
knotty problem in the integration process and some key legal cases that have affected 
sovereignty of member states as a fact of legal perspective. Consequently, we would be 
able to understand and view the problem of sovereignty in European integration through 
both the theoretical and legal angles. Secondly, the chapter examines how discourse on 
sovereignty can be practically influenced by European integration, illustrating two 
mechanisms of change in reference to the Europeanisation approach particularly 
adaptational pressure and interactions. At the end of this section, I will argue whether and 
how British government and parliament have been Europeanised, taking those 
mechanisms of change into account. Thirdly, the chapter looks at the impact of European 
integration on the British constitution focussing on parliamentary sovereignty. After the 
confirmation of the constitutional impact of European integration, this section considers 
why the argument of sovereignty has been made complicated in the UK by presenting 
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three aspects of sovereignty: legal, theoretical and practical. Finally, the chapter 
considers domestic factors for discourse change. According to the view of Pappamikail, 
the British political character is noteworthy for its confrontational style (Pappamikail 
1998, p217); thus, I will examine how debates over sovereignty developed into a 
confrontation between and within British parties, for example between government and 
opposition, between those people who are in favour of European integration and those 
who are against European integration in each party, etc. As a result of confrontation or 
competitive debates, their discourse can be changed. 
   Thus this chapter presents the hypothesis that discourse change on sovereignty will 
occur with the mechanisms of institutional change and domestic factors such as 
competitive arguments between and within parties. 
 
3.1 The challenges of European integration 
What interpretations of sovereignty have been challenged by European integration? 
The aim of this section is to find out how European integration theories have tried to 
respond to issues of sovereignty and to illustrate what legal changes have specific 
impacts on sovereignty. 
 
Theoretical perspective 
   On the basis of the examination of definitional issues, I will investigate whether and 
how current theories of European integration have responded to the issue of changing 
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sovereignty. How have neo-functionalists, liberal intergovernmentalists and 
constructivists viewed sovereignty in the process of European integration? Once we have 
viewed the challenge of European integration in theory, I will present some questions that 
have not been sufficiently answered in a practical sense. These questions will provide the 
grounds for examining the actual debates on sovereignty. 
 
Shifting theories 
First of all, what was the difference between theories of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism? Neo-functionalism saw European integration as a self-sustaining 
process driven by sectional spillovers towards an ever-closer union. 
Intergovernmentalism emphasized the gate keeping role of EU member governments 
and their resistance to any wholesale transfer of sovereignty from the member states to a 
new center in Brussels (Pollack 2005, p359). 
   Cram argues, according to Haas¶s neo-functionalism, that national political elites 
might become more supportive of the process of European integration as they learned of 
the benefits which might ensue from its continuation (Cram 1996, p57). Further, 
Sweeney develops the theory of neo-functionalism, using the idea of µelite socialization¶ 
from Strøeby Jensen, arguing that the informal engagement between different nationals 
in the policy-making process nourishes an affinity for the culture of supranationalism and 
can result in a form of embedded loyalty to the integration process (Sweeney 2005, 
p153). Because of the influence of the so-called µthe Luxemburg Compromise¶, however, 
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neofunctionalists were criticized that they had seemingly underestimated the importance 
of nationalism as a prevailing sentiment in European politics (Rosamond 2000, p64).  
Intergovernmentalist theory emerged as an alternative theory of European integration. 
It interprets integration as a zero-sum game, meaning the success of one party in a 
negotiation or deal is mirrored by someone else¶s loss (Sweeney 2005, p154). In the 
1990s, Moravcsik modified intergovernmentalism and his new liberal 
intergovernmentalism emerged as the leading theory of European integration (cited in 
Pollack 2005, pp360-361). According to Moravcsik, there are three essential elements in 
liberal intergovernmentalism: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory 
of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate 
negotiation (Moravcsik 1993, p480; Pollack 2005, pp360-361). That is to say, 
Moravcsik¶s adjustments to intergovernmentalist theory take account of progressions in 
European integration which were not simply the result of autonomous behaviour by each 
government but by other factors such as developments in economic relations. The 
difference here from intergovernmentalist theory is that the integration can have 
positive-sum outcomes (Sweeney 2005, p155) and that national interest is seen as 
divisible. On both things, neo-functionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists agree. 
Their difference is whether national interest can be promoted by supranational 
institutions or only by a state-centric approach. 
However, Pollack indicates that liberal intergovernmentalists¶ basic theoretical 
assumptions were questioned by international relations¶ scholars coming from two broad 
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directions: rational choice and historical institutionalist scholars on the one hand, and 
sociological institutionalists and constructivists on the other (Pollack 2005, pp361-362). 
Although Pollack illustrates these two positions, he claims that the former could be 
integrated with liberal intergovernmentalism to constitute a single rationalist research 
program: a community of scholars operating from similar basic assumptions and seeking 
to test hypotheses about the most important determinants of European integration. By 
contrast, constructivist and sociological institutionalist approaches argue that the most 
profound effects of EU institutions are precisely in the potential remaking of national 
preferences and identities in the crucible of EU institutions (Ibid, p364). As a result, 
theoretical debates on European integration have shifted to two broad camps: rationalists 
and constructivists.  
The primary differences between these two groups, then, are as follows. Firstly, for 
constructivists, institutions are understood broadly to include not only formal rules but 
also informal norms. These rules and norms are expected to constitute actors, that is, to 
shape their identities and their preferences. Secondly, actor preferences are not 
exogenously given and fixed, as in rationalist models, but endogenous to institutions, and 
individuals¶ identities shaped and reshaped by their social environment. Thirdly, 
constructivists generally reject the rationalist conception of actors as utility-maximizers 
operating according to a µlogic of consequentiality¶, in favour of the conception of a 
µlogic of appropriateness¶ (Ibid, p365). Such debates make it clear that it would be 
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difficult to understand the evolution of European integration using only one of these 
simplified models. 
 
Building bridges between the debates 
Under these circumstances, Checkel offers his view that both schools, rationalists 
and constructivists, are right (Checkel 1999, p545). He argues that constructing European 
institutions is a multi-faceted process, with both rationalist and sociological toolkits 
needed to unpack and understand it. Checkel labelled this strategy as µGRXEOH 
interpretation¶in the work with Zürn (Zürn and Checkel 2005, p1057). They argue that 
empirical findings about causal mechanisms and conditions need to be interpreted once 
from the perspective of constructivism, and once from the perspective of rational choice. 
In terms of changes in the discourse of sovereignty, the approaches take quite different, 
though not entirely incompatible, views of how the concept of sovereignty is shaped. 
Thus, borrowing from both approaches would be an ideal way to undertake a broad 
examination of the concept of sovereignty. 
However, can the change in the discourse be sufficiently explained by simply using 
both approaches at once? Checkel shows the deficiency of this argument by examining 
why agents comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international institutions. 
He presents two competing answers, from the two approaches, to this compliance puzzle 
and tries to build bridges between them (Checkel 2001, p553). Rationalists emphasize 
coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives, whereas constructivists 
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emphasize social learning, socialization, and social norms. He considers both schools to 
have largely ignored the influence of social interaction on compliance decisions (Ibid, 
p554). In order to fill this gap, Checkel puts forward argumentative persuasion as a 
mechanism. He argues that argumentative persuasion is a social process of interaction 
that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion 
(Ibid, p562).  
This view was largely developed by the work of Habermas and introduced as the 
third µlogic of social action¶ in recent years (Risse 2000; Pollack 2005; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 2001). The first of these is the logic of consequentiality (or utility maximization) 
emphasized by rational choice theorists; secondly, the logic of appropriateness (or 
rule-following behavior) associated with constructivist theory; and the third is a logic of 
arguing derived largely from Habermas¶s theory of communicative action. Pollack 
explains that in Habermasian communicative action, or what Risse calls the logic of 
arguing, political actors do not simply bargain based on fixed preferences and relative 
power; they may also µargue¶, questioning their own beliefs and preferences and 
remaining open to persuasion and to the power of the better argument (Pollack 2005, 
p387). Risse draws a triangle figure where each of the three logics of social action is 
located at a corner. Then he argues that, if behaviour in the real social world can almost 
always be located in some of the intermediate spaces between the corners of the triangle, 
one single metatheoretical orientation probably will not capture it. Hence the debates and 
the controversies tend to centre around how far one can push one logic of action to 
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account for observable practices and which logic dominates a given situation (Risse 2000, 
pp3-4). Where argumentative rationality prevails, according to Risse, actors do not seek 
to maximize or to satisfy their given interests and preferences, but to challenge and to 
justify the validity claims inherent in them ؐ  and they are prepared to change their views 
of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument (Ibid, p7). Although this 
view was provided as a logic of social action, it would not be clear how this could be 
used as an approach for examining the change of discourse. Rather, argumentative 
persuasion is better understood as a mechanism that actually changes discourse.  
 
Questions on sovereignty 
These theories offered the possibility of the discourse change on sovereignty in 
political debates. However, we can draw some potential questions, which are posed by 
the gap between theoretical and practical perspectives and between a viewpoint of the 
state and the EU, that have thus far not been sufficiently answered. 
 
1. Divisibility 
As far as neo-functionalists are concerned, due to the spillover effect from one sector 
to another, it is possible that sovereignty would gradually be delegated to high authorities 
sector by sector and, ultimately, full sovereignty would transfer to the EU. But there are 
two unanswered questions here. The first question is whether sovereignty can be divided 
between the state and the EU or into several sectors. If we presume that sovereignty is 
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defined as a supreme power to govern a certain country or territory, this divided power 
between two authorities or into some sectors is difficult to regard as the supreme power 
to govern a certain territory. We may need to review the definition itself. The second 
question is whether we will be able to view the shared sovereignty in the EU as 
conceptually the same as that which is inherent in a state. In other words, unless the EU 
can be defined as a state, it will be difficult to apply the current interpretation of 
sovereignty. The definition and the interpretation of sovereignty can be analytic ground 
for finding their answers. 
These questions have been asked elsewhere. For example, Vivien Schmidt views the 
EU as a regional state and argues that the EU could be seen as constituting a new kind of 
regional sovereignty. The problem for her resides in comparing the EU to the nation-state 
in terms of democracy and legitimacy (Schmidt 2006, pp1-14). She argues that: 
These nation-states have had a certain finality characterized in principle by 
individual sovereignty, fixed boundaries, coherent identity, established 
government, and cohesive democracy. By contrast, the EU has no such finality 
but, rather, is better conceptualised as in a constant process of becoming. What it 
is becoming, moreover, is not a nation-state but, rather, a regional state, given 
shared sovereignty, variable boundaries, composite identity, highly compound 
governance, and fragmented democracy split between government by and for the 
people at the national level, and governance, for and with the people at the EU 
level (Ibid, p9).  
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I agree with Schmidt on two points. First, the EU should not be compared to the 
nation-state. Second, the EU is not in a fixed state  ̿it is better conceptualised as in a 
constant process of becoming. These points are fundamental. Regarding sovereignty, 
however, there are some further questions. Can a new kind of µregional sovereignty¶, 
formed through the sharing of national sovereignty, exist separately from member states? 
Will the shared sovereignty be legally separate from that of member states? How should 
we view this regional sovereignty conceptually in relation to the current concept of 
sovereignty? In other words, can people perceive a double sovereignty or a form of 
sovereignty which has somehow µburst out¶, beyond the framework of the nation-state? 
Although Schmidt makes a distinction between this regional state and the nation-state, it 
is difficult to define such developing super-institutions as states because the final form of 
the EU is not yet clear. I hypothesise that the interpretation of sovereignty has changed in 
the process of European integration, and also consider that this interpretation still 
generally fits the framework of the state. I understand and have argued that European 
integration works beyond the state and the EU is sui generis. However, I also want to 
argue that discourse of sovereignty is thus far only perceived within the framework of the 
state.  
I recognise that there are some arguments that sovereignty can be divided, such as 
Walker¶s work of µlate sovereignty¶ or Keating¶s µpost-sovereignty¶ (Keating 2001, p27). 
I consider that these can be theoretically possible if we view sovereignty at a level 
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beyond the state. However, it is difficult to find these arguments, whereby sovereignty 
can reside in actors other than the state, in practical debates at the national level. Thus, the 
difference between Schmidt¶s and my work is whether the new concept of sovereignty to 
be studied exists at the EU level or the national level. And my research seeks the 
discourse, which may not refer directly to such arguments but may be gradually 
influenced through political debates, that national elites have tried to adapt the 
interpretation of sovereignty to the national conditions. 
 
2. Pooling or delegating 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism includes liberal theory and pursues national interest 
within a world market. In order to understand how this works, such scholars found it 
necessary to talk about the pooling or delegating of member states¶ sovereignty to the EU 
in some sectors. Moravcsik argues why member state governments might do so: 
     The degree to which governments favour the pooling sovereignty (voting by other 
procedures than unanimity) and the delegation of sovereignty to supranational 
institutions, depends on the value they place on the issues and substantive 
outcomes in question: higher the gains of a cooperative agreement for a 
government, and the higher the risk of non-compliance by other governments, the 
higher its readiness to cede competencies to the EU to prevent potential losers 
from revising the policy (Schimmelfenning 2004, p80). 
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Further, Pollack focusses on transaction costs, and contends that member state 
principals delegate powers to supranational organizations primarily to the lower the 
transaction costs of policy-making, in particular by allowing member governments to 
credibly commit themselves to international agreements and to benefit from the 
policy-relevant expertise provided by supranational actors (Pollack 2004, p142). In short, 
as rationalists, Liberal Intergovernmentalists interpret those processes of pooling or 
delegation of sovereignty as the will of each government which has not been restrained 
by other actors. This is why rationalist theory suggests an unchanging concept of 
sovereignty. But if we define the concept of sovereignty again as the supreme power to 
govern a certain country, can pooled or delegated sovereignty really be understood as 
keeping supreme power at the national level? There is no easy answer to this question.     
Although governmental elites often use the ideas of µpooling¶ or µdelegating¶ 
sovereignty when they talk about the EU, they are also often challenged by other 
politicians who insist that pooled or delegated sovereignty means the erosion of national 
sovereignty. It is quite likely that discourse change on sovereignty can be found in the 
debates which seek the answer to these questions through argumentative persuasion. 
 
Legal perspective 
   Before we consider these answers, it is impossible to ignore the legal perspective. EU 
(EC) law3 is different from other international laws. The stated µsupremacy¶ and µdirect 
                                                 
3
 Foster explains the difference between EU and EC law as follows: 
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effect¶ of EU law would, it seems, certainly affect the sovereignty of member states. How 
and to what extent has EU law become dominant and seen as a challenge to national 
sovereignty? I will give a concise summary of the legal debates surrounding European 
integration. 
 
EU law 
   Community law is established by the treaties of three original communities, the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) and the European Economic Community. This means that Community 
law is a system of law created by treaty. This independent system has been given 
effectiveness by the creation of Community institutions, by its recognition within the 
national legal systems of the member states, and by developments in the decisions of the 
European Court (Collins 1990, p1). In other words, Community law consists of more 
than one source. According to the classification table of Turner (Turner 2006, p23), the 
primary sources are those original three treaties and amendments made in later treaties, 
such as the SEA and the Treaty on European Union. Secondary sources include 
regulations, directives and decisions. Foster argues that regulations and directives are at 
                                                                                                                                 
At present, most Community law courses, whether called EU law or EC law, are not likely to consider 
the law of the second and third pillars (of the EU) in any depth, if at all. Most courses will study EC law 
only, as contained in the EC Treaty, and will not consider the parts of the EU outside of the EC Treaty 
(Foster 2007, p2). 
Therefore, the terms µCommunity law¶ and µEC law¶ that I quote from some literatures are part of EU 
law. 
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present the two most important forms of secondary law (Foster 2007, p39). EC Treaty 
Article 249 provides that: 
     A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. 
     A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
and form and methods. 
 
Foster explains the differences of these two as follows: 
     Directives are aimed at the Member States or named individuals, whereas 
Regulations apply to everyone. Regulations were designed to be directly 
applicable but it would seem from Art 249 that Directives require some form of 
implementation in order to take effect or have validity in the Community legal 
order. Directives were designed with the harmonisation of different national rules 
in mind whereas Regulations were aimed to be prescriptive by providing one rule 
for the whole of the Community. Hence Regulations would be detailed and precise 
and Directives more likely to be framework provisions laying down general 
guidelines and are therefore less precise by nature (Ibid, p39). 
 
Also, recommendations and opinions are included in the secondary sources but they 
have no binding force. The tertiary sources are general principles, such as proportionality, 
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equality and the protection of fundamental human rights, and the case law of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Turner 2006, p23). 
The ECJ has distinguished European law from international law and from the legal 
orders of the member states. It has been instrumental in the creation of a constitutional 
structure for the European Community through the introduction of a few guiding rules: 
that of the direct effect of Community law, its supremacy over national law, the duties of 
the Member States in all their guises to implement Community rules and the doctrine of 
pre-emption which relates to the delimitation of the competences of the Member States 
and the Community itself (Daintith 1995, p32). 
Thus EU law is remarkably different from other international law in the way it 
directly impacts on the issue of sovereignty. In the following sections, I will look at the 
ideas of µsupremacy¶ and µGLUHFW effect¶ that are major features of EU law. 
 
Supremacy 
Supremacy refers to the fact that Community law takes precedence over conflicting 
provisions of national law, regardless of whether these were made before or after the 
Community law in question (Page 2004, p37). However, there is no Article which clearly 
states that Community law is supreme. Foster states that it can be argued that some of the 
articles of the EC Treaty impliedly or logically require supremacy, for example, Article 
10, Article 12, Article 249, Article 292 and Article 228 (Foster 2007, p52). Turner notes 
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that the closest provisions to this legal requirement are given in Article 10 (in Article 4 of 
the consolidated version): 
  The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's 
objectives. 
 
Member states are therefore asked to place priority on and not to block the Union¶s 
objectives. Rather than through treaties, it is through the decisions and interpretation of 
the Court of Justice that the reasons and logic for the supremacy of Community law were 
first developed (Foster 2007, p53). Supremacy was established by the following two 
cases: Van Gend en Loos in 1963 and Costa v ENEL in 1964. These cases refer explicitly 
to the limitation of national sovereignty, as we shall see in the next section 
 
Direct effect 
   Direct effect means simply that Community law is capable of conferring rights on 
individuals, which national courts are obliged to uphold. This is in contrast to most 
treaties which affect only the states that are party to the treaty and not their citizens (Page 
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2004, p37). This term is sometimes confused with µdirectly applicable¶, which simply 
means that, on joining, Community law immediately becomes national law within the 
new Member State. 
   The µdirect effect¶ principle was first accepted by the ECJ in the Van Gend en Loos 
case. That means the ECJ accepted that, since the Treaty was clearly intended to affect 
individuals as well as member states, it must be capable of creating rights which were 
enforceable by individuals. Van Gend en Loos concerned a Treaty Article that conferred 
rights, but the principle of direct effect has been extended to other EC law by the case law. 
A distinction can be made here between vertical and horizontal direct effect. Vertical 
direct effect concerns the relationship between EC law and the national law. Horizontal 
direct effect, on the other hand, is precisely about the relationship between individuals, so 
concerns rights enforceable in national courts (Turner 2006, pp56-58). 
 
We will now look more specifically at those cases which have established the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect. 
 
Van Gend en Loos case4 
   In this case, the ECJ was asked by a Dutch customs tribunal whether Article 12 EEC 
(the µstandstill¶ provision prohibiting member states from establishing new import duties 
or raising existing ones) was capable of giving rights to individuals which could be 
                                                 
4
 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR1, [1963] CMLR105 
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enforced in their national courts. On the issue of whether the ECJ had jurisdiction to hear 
the case, the Dutch and Belgian governments intervened to argue that the question of the 
internal effect of Community law within the Netherlands was a matter of Dutch 
constitutional law which fell outside the ECJ¶s remit (Nicol 2001, p8). 
   However, the ECJ interpreted concluding: 
     «the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights which become part of their legal heritage (Foster 2007, p53, Page 2004, 
p37). 
 
The ECJ went on to hold that Community law was indeed capable of creating rights 
for individuals which national courts and tribunals were obliged to protect ̿  the doctrine 
of direct effect. Although it claimed some support for the creation of this doctrine from 
the text and system of the Treaty, its primary justification appeared to be that direct effect 
was necessary in order to achieve the objective of the Community (Nicol 2001, p8). The 
ECJ was thereby interpreting Article 10, quoted above, which obliges member states to 
facilitate the achievement of the EC¶s objectives, in this case the establishment of a 
common market. 
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Costa v ENEL case5  
   This case was brought by a former employee of the electricity generating company 
Edison-Volta, who claimed that his interests had been harmed by the formation of the 
ENEL, the Italian nationalised electricity industry. It was claimed that the Italian 
government¶s nationalisation of the electrical generating and supply industries, in 1962, 
had infringed EEC regulations (Pilkington 2001, p107). The case raised the issue of 
whether a national court should refer to the Court of Justice if it considers Community 
law may be applicable or, in the view of the Italian government, simply apply the 
subsequent national law (Foster 2007, p53). The Court said: 
The integration into the laws of each member state of provisions which derive 
from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, 
make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral 
and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of 
reciprocity. ... The obligations undertaken under the Treaty establishing the 
Community would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be 
called in question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories. ... The 
precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189, whereby a regulation 
µshall be binding¶ and µdirectly applicable in all member states¶. This provision, 
which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless if a state could 
                                                 
5
 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR 425,593 
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unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which could 
prevail over Community law. It follows from all these observations that the law 
stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its 
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the 
legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. The transfer by the 
states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the 
rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent 
limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail (Collins 1990, 
p17). 
 
Turner sums up this statement in three points: 
z Member States have given up certain of their sovereign powers to make law; 
z Member States and their citizens are bound by EC law; 
z Member States cannot unilaterally introduce conflicting law (Turner 2006, 
p51). 
 
Collins points out the peculiarity of these cases: 
     What is unusual is the way in which the Court in these cases extended the area in 
which sovereignty is so restricted by extending the areas of the direct effect or 
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applicability of Community law. What that means is that the Court was implying 
from express terms of the Treaty an obligation on the states to provide a domestic 
remedy and also assuming that the national law did or would give a remedy. In 
other words, from the standpoint of the Court, Community law was reaching into 
national law and providing a national remedy whether or not national law in fact 
did so (Collins 1990, pp17-18). 
 
   Supremacy and direct effect have been built up and modified by subsequent cases 
such as International Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF 11/70, Reyner v Belgium 2/74 and 
Simmenthal SpA 106/77. The important point in this study is that those principles have 
been established before the accession of the UK into the EC. International 
Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF case was also prior to this accession and it said that EC law 
cannot be invalidated even by national constitutional law (Turner 2006, p51). Thus the 
relation between community law and national law existed before British accession to the 
EC.  
Now we found that European integration has influenced the understanding of 
sovereignty in theory and has legally affected the sovereignty of member states. The gap 
between theoretical and practical perspectives and between a viewpoint of the state and 
the EU, which I raised as some unsolved questions, may be attempted to bridge through 
argumentative persuasion. However, it is unclear what aspect of European integration 
DIIHFWHOLWHV¶ argument. In other words, how have elites¶ discourse on sovereignty been 
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influenced? The next section will examine two possible mechanisms of change in elites¶ 
discourse on sovereignty. 
 
3.2 Mechanisms of change: Europeanisation 
   The aim of this section is to examine the mechanisms behind potential changes in 
elite discourses caused by European integration, with the Europeanisation approach as 
the framework for discovering these mechanisms, and to apply this approach to the 
British case.  
 
Europeanisation 
Until recent years, the study of European integration has tried to explain 
institution-building, policy integration or policy outputs at the European level by using 
domestic politics as a central explanatory factor in the integration process. Bऺrzel and 
Risse describe this way of research as a µbottom up¶ perspective, in which the dynamics 
and the outcome of the European institution-building process are the main dependent 
variable (Bऺrzel and Risse 2000, p1). However, much less effort has gone into thinking 
about the reverse effect: European integration as an explanatory factor in domestic 
political continuity or change (Goetz and Hix 2001, p1). B rऺzel and Risse view this 
studying as a µtop down¶ process that analyses the impact of European integration and 
Europeanization on domestic political and social process of the member states and 
beyond (Bऺrzel and Risse 2000, p1).  
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Risse, Cowls and Caporaso, then, define Europeanisation as the emergence and 
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, 
legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize 
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of 
authoritative European rules (Cowles et al. 2001, p3). They view that scholars generally 
referred to Europeanization as institution-building at the European level in the beginning 
but slowly began to focus on the effects of Europeanization at the national level (Ibid, p3). 
Featherstone argues, for example, that µEuropeanization¶ today is most often associated 
with domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU 
membership (Featherstone and Radaelli 2006, p7). Through the effects of 
Europeanisation, Olsen believes that a large gap between existing institutional structures 
and adaptational requirements can lead, over time, to a serious performance crisis of the 
institution and finally result in radical and rapid transformations (cited in Cowles et al. 
2001, pp8-9). By adopting this framework of Europeanisation, I will investigate how 
domestic adaptation or change occurs. Bऺrzel and Risse present two conditions for 
expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanisation:  
First, Europeanization must be µinconvenient,¶ i.e., there must be some degree of 
µmisfit¶ or incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and 
institutions, on the one hand, and domestic-level processes, policies and 
institutions, on the other. This degree of fit or misfit constitutes adaptational 
pressures, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for expecting change. 
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The second condition is that there are some facilitating factors  ̿ be it actors, be 
it institutions  ̿ responding to the adaptational pressures (Bऺrzel and Risse 2000, 
p1). 
 
We need to examine these adaptational pressures and facilitating factors in details as a 
mechanism of discourse change. 
In the light of discourse change of sovereignty, meanwhile, Bulmer et al. view that 
not all the adaptation may be attributable to an EU-effect (Bulmer et al. 2002, p17). They 
identify three dynamics of institutional change, through the examination of British 
devolution. These are (Ibid, p16): 
z change emanating from the EU, and often loosely termed as 
µEuropeanisation¶; 
z domestic change at the level of the Member States; and 
z µthird-level¶ change beneath the Member State, deriving from territorial 
politics. 
 
These three dynamics are likely to change discourse on sovereignty as well. My research 
particularly focusses on the impact of European integration on discourse. Hence the first 
dynamic certainly contains the impact of European integration. The second dynamic 
would affect discourse change but not by the impact of European integration. Therefore, 
this is not included as a mechanism of discourse change resulting from European 
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integration. The third dynamic does not seem to be about the impact of European 
integration. According to the work of Bulmer and Burch, however, devolution might go 
hand-in-hand with greater self-reliance within the devolved politics, thereby acting as a 
driver or enabler of Europeanisation (Ibid, p16). Thus this third dynamic can also contain 
the aspect of European integration and be considered another mechanism. 
 
Mechanism 1: adaptational pressures and facilitating factors 
The first of the three dynamics is certainly the impact of European integration. That is 
to say, there is a mechanism through which domestic institutions are penetrated or 
changed by Europeanisation. Risse, Cowls and Caporaso call such phenomena 
µadaptational pressures¶ and theorise that the degree of adaptational pressures determines 
the extent to which domestic institutions would have to change in order to comply with 
European rules and policies and that the degree of adaptational pressure generated by 
Europeanization depends on the µfit¶ and µmisfit¶ between European institutions and the 
domestic structures (Cowles et al. 2001, p7). Hence, the lower the compatibility between 
European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational 
pressure that Europe exerts on member states (Börzel 2005, p50; Cowles et al. 2001, p7). 
That is to say, a µmisfit¶ exerts adaptational pressures. According to Börzel, there are two 
types of misfits by which Europe exerts adaptational pressure on the member states. First, 
European policies might cause a µpolicy misfit¶ between European rules and regulations 
on the one hand and domestic policies on the other. Second, Europe can cause 
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µinstitutional misfit¶ challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective 
understandings attached to them. In this context, Europe might even threaten deeply 
collective understandings of national identity as it touches upon constitutional principles 
such as state sovereignty (Börzel 2005, pp50-51). In recent work of Bulmer and Burch, 
they consider that the term µadaptational pressure¶ only applies at the time of accession 
and present the term µduties of membership¶ for the impulses deriving from the EU 
instead (Bulmer and Burch 2009, p195). 
   Adaptational pressure, or duties of membership in the words of Bulmer and Burch, 
requires some facilitating factors for the change. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso argue that, 
in cases of high adaptational pressures, the presence or absence of mediating factors is 
crucial for the degree to which domestic change adjusting to Europeanization should be 
expected. There are three structural factors that might enable or block adaptational 
change: multiple veto points in the domestic structure, facilitating institutions, and 
cooperative cultures (Cowles et al. 2001, p9). Although multiple veto points are 
preventing factors for adaptation and facilitating formal institutions are promoting factors 
for adaptation, both factors have in common that they are compatible with the µlogic of 
consequentialism.¶ On the other hand, cooperative cultures follow the µlogic of 
appropriateness.¶ Börzel illustrates two features of the influence of these factors. First, a 
consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple 
veto points by rendering their use for actors inappropriate. Second, a consensus-oriented 
political culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs, which facilitates the 
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accommodation of pressure for adaptation (Börzel 2005, p55). Moreover, Risse, Cowles 
and Caporaso identify two mediating factors relating to agency: differential 
empowerment of actors and learning (Cowles et al. 2001, pp11-12). The difference 
between these two is that the former does not assume that actors change their interests or 
identities, whereas the latter constitutes an agency-centred mechanism to induce such 
transformation. Learning is viewed not as instances in which actors merely adjust means 
and strategies to achieve their given goals and preferences but as situations that lead 
actors to change their given goals and preferences themselves in this case. This is called 
µdouble-loop learning¶ or µcomplex learning¶. Hence, mediating factors of cooperative 
cultures and learning seem to be compatible with the constructivist approach to 
international relations. Consequently, Risse, Cowles and Caporaso argue that both 
rationalist and constructivist approaches are relevant to debates around Europeanization. 
   How has this learning been working in practice? Bulmer and Radaelli argue that 
learning becomes an especially important feature where the EU does not work as a 
law-making system but, rather, as a platform for the convergence of ideas and policy 
transfer between member states. This is especially the case with the open method of 
coordination (OMC) (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005, p349). According to Bulmer and 
Radaelli, the OMC is a means of spreading best practice and achieving convergence 
towards the EU¶s goals (Ibid, p349). Armstrong examines the UK adaptation to the 
OMC in relation to the issue of social inclusion. He argues that, despite the absence of 
any legal requirement to do so, the sense that National Action Plans on Inclusion 
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(NAPincls) are required by Europe imbues their production with a quasi-obligatory 
status: like other member states, the UK has produced the NAPincls required under the 
OMC process (Armstrong 2006, p89). This suggests that domestic change without legal 
implementation is certainly possible in the EU. 
  
Mechanism 2: interactions between three levels 
The third of three dynamics of institutional change seems to be not the impact of 
European integration but it is possible to view another direction of mechanism within the 
EU and the Europeanisation approach. Bulmer et al. believe that institutional change will 
occur through the interactions of levels of governance, especially after Blair came into 
office and the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was 
implemented in the UK (Bulmer et al. 2002). Bulmer and Burch argue that the 
devolution reforms have brought the UK into closer alignment with the more 
regionalized patterns of governance of many EU member states. In that sense, although 
not directly prompted by pressures from the EU, the devolved UK now has a better fit 
with the Union¶s pattern of multi-level governance (MLG) (Bulmer and Burch 2005, 
p880). Aalberts cites three characterizing elements of MLG as the work of Hooghe and 
Marks:  
First, rather than being monopolized by national governments, decision-making 
competencies are shared by actors at different levels. « Second, a new mode of 
collective decision-making has emerged, similarly resulting in loss of control for 
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national governments. Third, the traditional separation of domestic and 
international politics has been undermined because of transnational associations. 
« Accordingly, states are only one among a variety of actors influencing 
decision-making at a variety of levels, and do not by definition have a final say 
(Aalberts 2004, p28). 
 
In addition to the relationship between the EU and member states from the 
perspective of mechanism 1, the relationship between member states and their 
subnational or the third level, and also between the EU and the third level have emerged. 
As the relationship between the EU and member states has had an effect of institutional 
change, other relationships possibly cause institutional change to some extent as well. As 
Rosamond states, the emphasis on governance takes the debate about authority away 
from the zero-sum notions associated with discourses of sovereignty (Rosamond 2000, 
p110). As the assumption underlying MLG is pluralism (Richards and Smith 2002, 
p165), MLG may lead to the idea that sovereignty can be divided. Thus, MLG approach 
would provide another mechanism of discourse change. Bulmer et al. focus on the 
interaction of logics in MLG. They firstly offer a definition of Europeanisation: 
A set of processes through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics 
interact with the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
public policies. 
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Then, they present two important points arising from this definition: 
z Multi-level governance entails the interaction of competing logics, located at 
the EU, Member States and, where extant, third levels. It is dangerous to 
attribute institutional change to any one level in isolation. 
z The challenges arising from the interaction of logics are most acute at the 
points of interconnection between the levels of governance (Bulmer et al. 
2002, p17). 
 
They argue that the various branches of the UK polity ± and most particularly 
central government ± must identify an appropriate institutional response to the political 
and other dynamics of the EU (Ibid, p17). This idea would match with µthe logic of 
appropriateness¶ of constructivists. They designate the mechanisms of a polity¶s 
institutional response to Europeanization as involving µreception¶ and µprojection¶, and 
consider that reception and projection are crucial adaptive responses by actors in the 
polity since the need to engage in European policy-making is a consequence of 
Europeanization. These responses, according to the authors, need to be made at the 
Member state level as well as the level of the devolved authorities (Ibid, p17). Bulmer 
and Burch claim that µreception¶ and µprojection¶ are the two steps in the adjustment 
process to the EU. Reception is where domestic institutions must find suitable µtransfer 
devices¶ for processing EU business on the one hand, and projection is where domestic 
institutions must also adapt their procedures in order that the UK government can make 
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an effective contribution to those EU dynamics (Bulmer and Burch 2005, p866). They 
also present the third step µpro-active use of EU arenas,¶ 6 which has been in operation 
since the Blair government introduced the Step Change programme in 1998 (Ibid, p877). 
If we could see such changes of response involving the positive engagement policy 
towards European integration, it would be possible to consider that governmental elites¶ 
discourse would change to adapt those responses. In other words, interactions in EU 
arenas may bring the possibility of more positive interpretations of state capacity in the 
European community and, consequently, may direct member states to exercise their 
capacity more by utilising those arenas. I believe that this trend implies a change in 
governmental elites¶ discourse. Diagram 2 briefly shows two mechanisms of discourse 
change by European integration. 
 
Diagram 2: Mechanisms 
Mechanism 1                                        Mechanism 2 
           
EU                                               EU 
 
                
Adaptational Pressure                                  Interactions 
 
 
State   [mediating factors]              State                     Sub-state 
                                                               (devolved government) 
 
As devolved governments in the UK have been created under the Blair Government, 
Mechanism 2 may largely be acted after 1999 when a formal transfer of powers 
implemented in the UK. 
                                                 
6
 This is written in Figure 1 of Bulmer and Burch 2005, p865 
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Consequently, both the adaptational and the interactive mechanisms reflect a 
constructivist¶s account of the process. Therefore, it is a good bet that discourse change 
towards a new discourse of sovereignty has taken place in this area as the way of 
resolving some contradictions on sovereignty which were raised in the previous section. 
These adaptations and interactions entail both formal and informal processes of 
socialisation. That is to say, the changed discourse has become deeply permeated into 
political debates and, possibly, into general conversation.   
 
Europeanisation of Whitehall and Westminster 
As to the specific impact of Europeanisation within Britain, Allen concludes that 
Britain does indeed have a Europeanized government operating in a still 
non-Europeanized polity (Allen 2005, p139). What does this mean? Bulmer and Burch 
describe it as follows: µWhitehall has adapted smoothly to European integration, whereas 
Westminster has not, and has witnessed successive clashes, such as the great debate over 
membership and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty¶ (Bulmer and Burch 1998, p607). 
They examined and assessed changes in Whitehall through five dimensions: the system, 
organisations, processes, regulation, and the cultural aspects (Bulmer and Burch 2009, 
p30). Change in the system involved formal acceptance of the condition that European 
law would have primacy over national law. Change in organisations, all departments, 
with the exception of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), have 
established EU coordinating arrangements to handle issues across the department. 
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Change in processes is to be found in the more evident elaboration of a system of formal 
meetings and committees, for instance, the creation of the Friday meeting to handle the 
input from UK-based processes into Brussels-based processes; and ultimately the shift to 
a more flexible structure of meetings and decision fora. Change in regulations, over time, 
rules, guidelines, operating codes and understandings have been established and 
inculcated about how to handle EU business and how to engage with the EU. Change in 
the cultural aspects, in addition to the effect on the style of administration; there has been 
cumulatively an emergence of a substantial cadre of civil servants and, indeed, ministers 
who have, through dint of participation in EU policy-making, built up a substantial 
awareness of EU issues, tactics and procedures (Bulmer and Burch 2009, pp185-188). 
Thus the change in Whitehall is substantial. 
Why, then, has Westminster never become Europeanised? Bache and Jordan cite the 
1992 study by George which argues that the adaptation had come from changes on a 
µtechnical level¶ as µcivil servants and interest groups learned how to operate in the EC 
process, rather than resulting from or leading to a political conversion among political 
actors in favour of the EC¶. More recent adaptations compared with the situation in 1992 
show clearer evidence that at least some political actors have gone beyond simply 
strategic interaction with the EU to a more normative commitment to Europeanization 
(Bache and Jordan 2006, p275). Thus, has the impact of Europeanisation in Britain firstly 
affected Whitehall, and only then gradually started to influence Westminster and beyond? 
According to the study of Bulmer and Burch, the Europeanisation of Whitehall has 
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presented few serious challenges to British practice, because the adaptation of Whitehall 
was already somewhat established by the time of accession through the creation of a 
co-ordinating mechanism across Whitehall and the drawing together of legal expertise on 
community treaties, regulations and directives. European integration was seamlessly 
absorbed into the µlogic¶ of the Whitehall machinery. On the other hand, they argue that 
the resultant adaptation has been overshadowed by the more high-profile turbulence of 
European policy in the political domain (Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2005). Buller and 
Smith present the reason why the Heath government rejected the need for a Minister of 
Europe, along the lines of the French, instead being content to parcel out European work 
to the relevant Whitehall departments at the time of entry. First, this method made entry 
into the EEC less politically obvious, and second, spreading the work of the EEC 
throughout Whitehall was the best way of making use of a short supply of expertise on 
the subject (Buller and Smith 1998, pp169-170). Bulmer and Burch also point out that a 
particular problem was the lack of specialist knowledge in Whitehall on the legal 
implications of entry (Bulmer and Burch 1998: p609). That is to say, the political and 
legal implications of entry in Britain were obscured as internal practice, despite the fact 
that the adaptation of Whitehall was clearly an external practice. Lynch argues that 
Heath¶s approach was flawed in that it incorporated elements of both accounts, accepting 
a pooling of national sovereignty in the EC as a means of promoting national interests, 
but maintaining a pragmatic intergovernmentalist vision of European integration in 
which µessential national sovereignty¶ would remain unscathed. He also reveals that the 
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government accepted the Treaty of Rome framework before embarking on detailed 
negotiations (Lynch 1997, pp29-30). Once in office, political leaders may be 
Europeanised or persuaded when they meet those people who work within Whitehall 
ministries. Thus, it is worth considering that Europeanised Whitehall would certainly be 
the source of adaptational pressure to change governmental elites¶ discourse on 
sovereignty. 
However, governmental elites have not presented, and hence do not seem to have 
settled upon, a satisfactory response to the question of sovereignty. Schmidt outlines what 
has been missing in the British discourse on European integration: 
  In Britain, there has been very little discourse on the polity-enhancing aspects of 
European integration. While national leaders opposed to European integration 
have focussed on the polity issues, presenting Europeanization as a threat to 
parliamentary sovereignty, to the µhistorically established rights of Englishmen¶, 
and to an identity constructed with Europe as µthe other¶, those in favor have 
tended to emphasize the economic benefits without confronting the polity issues. 
The result is that the public has been made maximally aware of the drawbacks to 
Europeanization with regard to sovereignty and identity without being presented 
with any countervailing, positive vision of Britain in Europe (Schmidt 2006, 
pp38-39). 
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The point here is how and whether governmental elites express µthe polity-enhancing 
aspects of European integration¶ and a µpositive vision of Britain in Europe¶ in terms of 
the type of sovereignty that I will introduce as µreal sovereignty¶ ± from the analysis of 
Anderson and Weymouth ± in the next section. It seems to me the main difficulty here 
has been dealing with nationalism, and especially the prevalence of the µnational¶ rather 
than µreal¶ view of sovereignty, which may have made articulating a positive vision 
difficult. One possible factor to change is a logic of arguing that I cited in the previous 
section. Risse argues that actors are prepared to change their views of the world or even 
their interests in light of the better argument (Risse 2000, p7). This indicates that MPs 
may alter their view or focus from a µnational¶ aspect of sovereignty to a µreal¶ aspect of 
sovereignty through argument about sovereignty. 
 
3.3 The influence of European integration upon Britain 
   In previous two sections, we have seen the theoretical and legal perspectives of 
European integration and the mechanism of the impact of European integration. At the 
end of the last section, we applied this mechanism to Whitehall. This section looks at the 
impact of European integration on the British constitution. Firstly, this part explores the 
actual legal impact of European integration on British sovereignty through the 
incorporation of Community law into British law and politics. Secondly, the section 
focusses on the resulting impact of EC/EU membership on parliamentary sovereignty. 
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Finally, the section provides three contentious areas of debate around the issue of 
sovereignty in the UK. They are legal, theoretical and practical debates on sovereignty. 
 
Legal impact 
   In Britain, Community Law has become incorporated into the domestic legal order 
by the European Communities Act 1972. Lawrence Collins identifies and summarises 
the broad scheme of the Act as follows (Collins 1990, pp26-27): 
(1) those rights and duties which are, as a matter of Community law, directly applicable 
or effective are to be given legal effect in the United kingdom (s2(1)); 
(2) the executive is given power to make orders and regulations to give effect both to 
obligations of the United Kingdom and to deal with any incidental problems arising 
from those rights and duties which are directly applicable or effective (s2(2)); 
(3) there are limitations on the power of delegated legislation conferred by the Act, most 
notably that the power does not include powers (a) to tax, (b) to legislate 
retrospectively, (c) to sub-delegate, or (d) to impose new criminal offences 
punishable by more than certain specified penalties (s2(2) and Sch 2), but subject to 
those restrictions (and subject to any future Act of Parliament) the orders and 
regulations may include any provision as might be made by Act of Parliament 
(s2(4)); 
(4) any existing or future enactments are to be construed and have effect subject to the 
above (s2(4)); 
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(5) any question as to the meaning or effect of the treaties is to be treated as a question 
of law to be determined in accordance with Community law, of which judicial 
notice is to be taken (s3(1) and (2)); 
(6) specific alterations are made to existing law (statute and common law) to take 
account of specific Community obligations, especially in the area of customs duties, 
agriculture, company law and restrictive practices (ss4-10); 
(7) provision is made for extending the Perjury Act 1911 and the Official Secrets Act 
1911-39 to the European Court and Community institutions. 
 
According to this summary, sections 2(1), 2(2), 2(4), 3(1) and 3(2) seem to affect British 
national law. I will look closely at these particular sections and their interpretations by 
Collins. 
 
Section 2(1): 
     All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the 
Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or enforced, allowed 
and followed accordingly; and the expression µenforceable Community right¶ and 
similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this subsection 
applies. 
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Collins observes that a whole complex of rights and duties has been incorporated into the 
law of the United Kingdom in this way. Further, he argues that not only the Treaty 
provisions themselves and the secondary legislation made thereunder have to be taken 
into account, but also they are to have the effect ascribed to them by the European Court 
(Ibid, p46). 
 
Section 2(2): 
     Subject to Schedule 2 to this Act, at any time after its passing Her Majesty may by 
Order in Council, and any designated Minister or department may by regulations, 
make provision  ̿
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of the United 
Kingdom, or enabling any such obligation to be implemented, or of enabling 
any rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by 
virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or 
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such 
obligation or rights or the coming into force, or the operation from time to 
time, of subsection (1) above; 
and in the exercise of any statutory power or duty, including any power to give 
directions or to legislate by means of orders, rules, regulations or other 
subordinate instrument, the person entrusted with the power or duty may have 
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regard to the objects of the Communities and to any such obligation or rights as 
aforesaid. 
   In this subsection µdesignated Minister or department¶ means such Minister of 
the Crown or government department as may from time to time be designated by 
Order in Council in relation to any matter or for any purpose, but subject to such 
restrictions or conditions (if any) as may be specified by the Order in Council. 
 
Collins finds that the essential aim behind this section is to incorporate into the law 
of the United Kingdom not only those Community rights and obligations which are not 
directly applicable or effective by virtue of section 2(1) but also to fill out and make 
specific provisions for those rights and obligations which are directly applicable or 
effective (Ibid, p113). 
 
Section 2(4): 
     The provision that may be made under subsection (2) above includes, subject to 
Schedule 2 to this Act, any such provision (of any such extent) as might be made 
by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one 
contained in this Part of this Act, shall be construed and have effect subject to the 
foregoing provisions of this section; but, except as may be provided by any Act 
passed after this Act, Schedule 2 shall have effect in connection with the powers 
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conferred by this and the following sections of this Act to make Orders in Council 
and regulations. 
 
This subsection recognises the supremacy of Community law and concerns 
sovereignty. However, Collins argues that no theoretical or practical problem of 
sovereignty arises in this context. The reason is that he considers that section 2(4) only 
expresses a rule of construction which must give way to a contrary intention and, 
therefore, does go part of the way to prevent legislation which would otherwise by 
implication be contrary to Community law. Its effect is, thus, that United Kingdom courts 
should interpret subsequent legislation in such a manner as to be consistent with 
Community law and may read subsequent inconsistent legislation as subject to 
Community law (Ibid, p28). 
 
Section 3(1): 
     For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect 
of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any Community 
instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the 
European Court, be for determination as such in accordance with the principles 
laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court). 
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Section 3(2): 
     Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the 
Communities and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European 
Court on any such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be 
admissible as evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of 
any of the Communities or of any Community institution. 
 
Section 3(1) instructs the courts to refer questions on the interpretation and hence the 
supremacy of Community law to the Court of Justice if national courts cannot solve the 
problem themselves by reference to previous Court of Justice rulings. And section 3(2) 
requires the courts to judicially follow decisions of the Court of Justice on any question 
of Community law. Collins considers that section 3 makes explicit what as a result of 
section 2 must be implicit, namely that Community law is to be treated in the United 
Kingdom as law and not, like foreign law, as fact (Collins 1990, pp128-129). Therefore, 
the combination of sections 2(1) and 2(4) with the control of sections 3(1) and 3(2) 
achieve the essential requirements of the recognition of direct effects and the supremacy 
of Community law for past and future UK legislation (Foster 2007, p62). 
 
Impact on parliamentary sovereignty 
   By giving effect to the European Communities Act 1972, what has actually changed 
in the British legal system? How has the change been understood in terms of 
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sovereignty? I presume that one of the changes was to the relationship between 
parliament and national courts, especially the enhanced role of national courts. 
Paradoxically, it suggests that the power of parliamentary sovereignty has diminished. 
Alan Page argues that, to use Dicey¶s phrase, the positive meaning of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is that µany Act of Parliament, or part of an Act of Parliament, 
which makes new law, or repeals or modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the 
courts¶. The courts could not therefore refuse to obey or give effect to an Act of 
Parliament; nor because it was the supreme law ± the highest form of law known to the 
constitution ± could they hold an Act of Parliament to be invalid (Page 2004, p49). He 
continues to state that community law, however, envisages a wider role for the courts. In 
particular it envisages that in cases of conflict the courts will give effect to Community 
law over conflicting provisions of national law, regardless of the fact that it may take the 
form of an Act of Parliament (Ibid, p49). Membership has thus increased the role of the 
courts in the constitution, and diluted parliamentary sovereignty. Whereas traditionally 
their role was confined to interpreting and giving effect to the law as made by Parliament, 
they now have the power to deny effect to that law where it conflicts with Community 
law (Ibid, p55). 
   Foster sees the status of parliamentary sovereignty in a different way. He argues that 
it is true that the European Communities Act 1972 has transferred sovereignty in certain 
areas as agreed for an indefinite period, but whether it has completely overruled the 
doctrine cannot be stated. The real problem in trying to reconcile these doctrines is that 
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legal reasoning is not fully reconcilable with the practical realities of Community 
membership. Whilst it may be legally possible to repeal the 1972 Act and leave the 
Communities, that is practically and politically untenable. Thus, as far as membership of 
the Communities is concerned, the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is, at least, in 
abeyance, if not completely undermined (Foster 2007, p63). 
To the lawyer, parliamentary sovereignty is not about what Parliament can do but 
how the courts react to what Parliament does. To the lawyer, parliamentary sovereignty 
means that the courts recognize Parliament¶s right to make or unmake any law, that the 
courts will not allow Parliament to be bound by its predecessors, and that the courts 
accord Parliament the status of supreme lawmaker. Thus, Nicol clarifies the difference in 
definition of parliamentary sovereignty from the perspective of the politician and the 
lawyer, and argues that MPs have failed to perceive parliamentary sovereignty in terms 
of judicial power (Nicol 2001, p106). At least, leaving the interpretation of parliamentary 
sovereignty aside, the role of the courts has been legally changed by the Act. It also 
seems that the courts actually accepted the supremacy of Community law in the 
Factortame case.7  Moreover, the Labour government incorporated the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is not an institution of the EU, into 
                                                 
7
  Case 213/89 and Case 221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transportation ex parte    Factortame Ltd 
[1990] ECR I-2433, [1990] 3 CMLR 1 [1990] 3 CMLR 867 
Nicol briefly summarised the case as follows; to protect the British fishing industry against 
µquota-hopping¶, the practice whereby Spanish fishing companies circumvented the Community¶s 
imposition of national quotas for fish catches, Parliament passed the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 which 
inter alia imposed stringent nationality conditions on fishing companies wishing to register as British. 
Then, some companies owned and controlled largely by Spanish nationals applied for judicial review, 
arguing that the provisions breached prohibitions on nationality discrimination in the ECC Treaty (Nicol 
2001, p182). 
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Scottish and English law through the Human Rights Act (HRA) in 1998. Hence, the 
British courts cannot strike down legislation on the basis of the HRA, but they can rule 
that legislation is incompatible with its provisions, and leave the response to that ruling to 
government and Parliament (Saward 2006, p226). 
 
Divergence of arguing points over sovereignty 
   Even though the supremacy of EU law and the decline of parliamentary sovereignty 
have been made clear, the debates on sovereignty have never been settled. This section 
offers the reason behind it. This is related to the questions, which were the gap between 
theoretical and practical perspectives and between a viewpoint of the state and the EU, 
that are mentioned in the first section of this chapter. That is to say, we have some 
different arguing points over sovereignty. 
Helen Wallace argues that the British debate over sovereignty has been polymorphic 
± focusing on the difficulty of reconciling the sovereignty of Westminster with 
permanent EC membership and binding EC law; the role of government of the UK in 
relation to its component territories; and a fear of identity erosion and of catholic 
influences (Helen Wallace 1990, p159). Therefore, changes to sovereignty appear to be 
made up of legal reforms, shifts in political power and more emotive issues of culture 
and identity. For example, Simon Hix argues that, through the acceptance of the 
delegation of power to the European level, and the consequent erosion of the classic 
notion of µparliamentary sovereignty¶, European integration has been a catalyst for 
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radical constitutional reform (Hix 2000, p49). Geoffrey Howe sees sovereignty as a 
nation¶s practical capacity to maximise its influence in the world and argues the need of 
other member¶s sovereignty that the recombination of sovereignty in the EC is the best 
guarantee of strengthening Britain¶s position in the world (Howe 1990, p675). And 
William Wallace asserts that sovereignty remains a powerful and emotive concept in 
British politics (William Wallace 1986, p389). Under the impact of European integration, 
British debates on sovereignty may come down to these three points of argument. 
Colin Pilkington argues that the focus on sovereignty is different between 
governments and Eurosceptics. His claim is that (Pilkington 2001, p80): 
Any government which speaks about the need to preserve sovereignty is almost 
certainly talking about parliamentary sovereignty, and therefore about the 
government fears of a curtailment of its own powers. Those opposed to Europe, 
however, tend to speak in terms of national sovereignty, playing upon the 
chauvinism inherent in the British people. 
 
Besides the difference of the focus on sovereignty, the difficulty is whether these 
sovereignties have been equally affected by membership of the EU. Although Pilkington 
recognises that the UK has surrendered both parliamentary and national sovereignty 
through the act of joining the EU, he believes there is a need to take account of an even 
more recent perspective, given the effects of globalisation. For this he applies the analysis 
of Anderson and Weymouth. 
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   Anderson and Weymouth divide sovereignty into µreal¶, that is the degree of control 
which a nation can exercise over its own destiny, and µtheoretical¶, which can be best 
described as symbolic control, signifying little if any substance. They cite two important 
instances where symbols of British sovereignty can be said to be theoretical rather than 
real. They are the idea of an µindependent¶ nuclear deterrent and the maintenance of the 
strength and importance of the pound sterling. However, these are illusion and, in fact, 
cannot be practised by Britain alone. Anderson and Weymouth argue, therefore, that the 
sovereignty which has quite clearly been lost or surrendered to the European Union is 
almost entirely of a theoretical nature. They suggest that the European concept of pooled 
sovereignty might well mean the definite loss of theoretical sovereignty but in reality 
could actually mean an increase of real sovereignty. According to this viewpoint, real 
sovereignty in a collective organisation like the EU is something that is open to 
negotiation and µreal sovereignty in some areas of governance should be traded in order 
to secure a greater overall level of real sovereignty¶ (Pilkington 2001, pp87-88). As 
Howe¶s view is quite similar to this real sovereignty, this interpretation of sovereignty 
may be found in elites¶ discourse, especially in governmental elites. This would be an 
important viewpoint when analysing elites¶ discourse. 
   Further, in a similar manner, Christopher Lord argues, citing the work of William 
Wallace, that it is useful to distinguish three different meanings of the term µsovereignty¶, 
for part of the problem is that it means quite different things to quite different people. One 
definition stresses the formal, legal right of final decision. Another emphasises the 
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privacy and separation of national decision making: its integrity from outside penetration. 
A third equates sovereignty with power, leverage, ability to produce results and all other 
factors that contribute to the practical control of a state or society over its own destiny. 
These definitions are non-equivalent because it is possible to lose sovereignty in one 
sense and gain it in another (Lord 1992, p422). 
   How, then, can we estimate increases in real sovereignty, or indeed in sovereignty by 
any of the other definitions? It could be possible to view paradoxically. Rogers and 
Walters observe that it would be theoretically possible for Parliament to repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972 and the other legislation that has incorporated 
successive treaty changes into UK law (Rogers and Walters 2006, p389). In other words, 
to the extent that the UK has not withdrawn from the EU, British elites must perceive 
some increase in sovereignty through membership. In comparison with France and 
Germany, British elites¶ assertions in this area have been weak. 
   Accordingly, what is important is whether and how those three definitions have been 
taken and real sovereignty has been recognised. Diagram 1 shows three key points of 
argument on the basis of Lord¶s analysis. Although Anderson and Weymouth have 
presented two kinds of sovereignty, this study will apply three points of argument over 
sovereignty. 
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Diagram 1: The point of argument over sovereignty 
 
The formal, legal right of                                                                                      The privacy and separation of 
final decision                                                                                                           national decision-making 
 
   Legal sovereignty                                                       Theoretical sovereignty 
Some parts of both have been lost in membership 
 
 
 
 
Sovereignty 
                                    
 
 
 
 
Governance 
(the practical control of a state) 
 
Real (practical) sovereignty? 
 
Has this part increased with membership? 
Yes (France and Germany)  
Yes? (the UK): weak in cognition 
 
Indeed, the existence of these incompatible arguments complicates the issue of 
sovereignty. That is why those theoretical questions regarding divisibility and pooling or 
delegating of sovereignty have been problematised. It is possible to imagine that elites 
have argued with each other illustrating one of three points of sovereignty in 
parliamentary debates. My hypothesis is that their focus on these points has changed over 
time by the mechanisms of discourse change. However, another aspect seems to 
complicate it in Britain which is the British political system.  
 
3.4 The axis of confrontation 
   The aim of this section is to summarise domestic factors of discourse change and to 
examine how the European issue has become a major source of confrontation in the 
British political system both between parties and within each party, considering how each 
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opposing stand has represented different interpretations of sovereignty and whether and 
how the axis of confrontation has come to shape oppositional perspectives and a new 
understanding of European integration. This is necessary in order to establish a 
systematic analysis of elite understandings of sovereignty.  
   According to the study of Ladrech, the impact of the EU is by definition indirect on 
national political parties (Ladrech 2009, p8). He argues that it is the Europeanization of 
the national government  ̿ specifically in the scope of domestic policy-making  ̿
that we find EU-generated constraints may have indirect effects on national parties, and 
by extension, patterns of party competition (Ladrech 2009, p9). Sitter views that 
Euro-scepticism is a product of party competition (Sitter 2001, p22). In the UK, if so, 
Europeanisation of Whitehall may have indirect effects on British parties and their 
competition. As we have seen in section 3.2 on Europeanisation of Whitehall, it is 
necessary to look at the impact of Europeanisation on parties and, then, focussing on 
British characteristics of political system may cultivate an understanding of discourse 
change as well. 
As I noted, Pappamikail¶s view of the British character is that µBritish politics is black 
and white, them and us, totally wrong or totally right and that encourages a 
confrontational style that also fits into the electoral system¶ (Pappamikail 1998, p217). It 
makes sense then, that focussing on a confrontation is an appropriate basis for an 
examination into British politics. Stephen George also points out the difficulty of the 
British political system as follows: 
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     For the politicians one difficulty was in the difference between the British 
adversarial political system, in which the government of day usually had a 
majority in Parliament and could get its own way, and the system of compromise 
to which European politicians were used. Coalition governments are the norm in 
most other member states of the EC, so their politicians expect to have to 
compromise, and are adept at it (George 1994, p258). 
 
Certainly, the confrontational style learnt through the relationships between the main 
parties in the UK creates difficulties in achieving compromise.8 However, there is a view 
that such oppositional politics means that the one party might be more accommodating 
simply because the other was less so. Rosamond takes the view that the ferocious 
rhetorical exchanges between Margaret Thatcher and Jacque Delors helped to define 
political fault lines in Britain from the late 1980s. Not only did Euroscepticism become 
normalized as a feature of Conservative Party (and thus government) policy, but the 
Labour Party under the leadership of Neil Kinnock moved quite decisively away from 
hostility to British membership of the EC (Rosamond 2002, p191). 
Michael Smith argues that the EU has been a major and continuing source of political 
cleavages in Britain and that these cleavages have run both between and within political 
parties (Michael Smith 2006, p160). Thus it is necessary to look at such cleavages within 
                                                 
8
  Since 2010, there is a coalition government in the UK. The analysis in this dissertation only extends 
through 2009, however. Therefore, considering how the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats 
have compromised and whether British political system has changed or not will be a challenge to my 
future research. 
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parties as well. Generally, the division has been more serious in the Conservative Party in 
recent years. However, Tim Bale suggests that the Conservative Party would turn into 
µEurorealism¶, or softer Eurosceptism, rather than harder Eurosceptism under the 
leadership of David Cameron, even if the Conservatives left the European People¶s Party 
± European Democrats (EPP-ED) (Bale 2006, p385).  
In order to examine the main confrontation, I look at only the Conservative Party and 
the Labour Party, since it is only these two parties that have held power since the first 
application to the Community to the Treaty of Lisbon.9 I will then investigate the 
direction of the change in elites¶ understandings of European integration and create a 
foundation for further analysis. 
 
Division between parties: ideology and stand 
The Conservative Party once used to be seen as the party of Europe whereas the 
Labour Party was anti-Europe. Nowadays, it seems that they have switched positions 
(Gamble 1998, p11; Jones 2007, p130). Why have they held opposing views? How have 
their attitudes towards Europe shifted? Have their interpretations of sovereignty shifted as 
well? Table 1 is a brief chronology to illustrate governments, the opposition and 
European events. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 This study does not include the coalition government since 2010. 
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Table 1: The governments and European issue 
 Year The Conservative Party The Labour Party European event 
1959  Macmillan / Douglas-Home Gaitskell / Brown / Wilson   
1961     First application to the EEC 
1964 Douglas-Home / Heath Wilson   
1966 Heath Wilson   
1967     Second application to the EEC 
1970 Heath Wilson   
1972     Third application to the EC 
1973     Member of the EC 
1974  Heath / Thatcher Wilson / Callaghan   
1975     Referendum for membership 
1979 Thatcher Callaghan / Foot   
1981    (the Labour split)    
1983 Thatcher Kinnock   
1987     The SEA 
1989 Thatcher / Major Kinnock   
1992 Major Kinnock / Smith / Blair   
1993     The Treaty of Maastricht 
1997 Hague Blair   
1999     The Treaty of Amsterdam 
2000   (ECHR)10 
2001 Duncan Smith / Howard Blair   
2002     Euro 
2003     The Treaty of Nice 
2005 Cameron Blair / Brown   
2009     The Treaty of Lisbon 
Gray highlighted: the year of the general election 
Blue highlighted: in the office of the Government 
The years in the left-hand column of treaties are when they took effect. 
 
   As I will examine in the next section, neither party has been totally united within 
itself either for or against Europe. Although there were some powerful anti-Europeans 
such as Enoch Powell, however, the Conservatives have been basically in favour of 
membership until the 1980s. Even Thatcher described the Conservatives as µthe party of 
Europe¶ to begin with (George and Sowemino 1996, p246). On the other hand, the 
Labour Party has changed its approach a couple of times. Since the late 1980s, their 
                                                 
10
 ECHR (the European Convention on Human Rights) is not a matter for the EU. 
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attitude has switched with that of the Conservatives. Those changes could be due to 
ideological reasons and political tactics.  
Ideologically, the Conservatives have for a long time taken a liberal stance and 
pursued the free market. Therefore, when the Community sought to create the single 
market, this objective suited the party. The Labour Party saw the Community as a 
µcapitalist club¶ and feared that through free market policies it might lead to higher 
unemployment in the UK ± this attitude comes from the basic stance of the Labour Party 
as social democrats (Julie Smith 2005, p705). 
   Pilkington observes that the turning point for Britain was 1988 when Jacques Delors, 
the president of the Commission, visited Britain and laid out his thinking on a social 
charter for Europe. Labour¶s change from an anti-European to a pro-European stance is 
therefore due to a change in the nature of the European Union. When the community 
was seen as promoting improved social and environmental standards, it became natural 
for Labour to support it (Pilkington 2001, pp183-184). But for the Conservatives, the 
creation of a free market by the SEA had fulfilled the extent of their objectives for 
European integration. 
   Secondly, the change of attitude could be seen as due to political strategy. Baker and 
Seawright point out that Wilson¶s famous µzigzagV¶ on Europe (no in 1962, qualified yes 
in 1966, no in 1971, yes in 1975) were largely motivated by whether the party was in or 
out of power at the time (Baker and Seawright 1998, p58). Further, after its worst ever 
election defeats in 1983 when the Labour Party campaigned for withdrawal from the 
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EEC, many of the policies in that manifesto were deemed unpopular and progressively 
withdrawn. Outright opposition to Europe was one of these, and Neil Kinnock, new 
leader of the Labour Party, gradually moved the party to a more positive position on the 
EC (Jones 2007, p135).  
   Hence, focussing on each party separately, taking whether they take power or not into 
consideration, can clarify the competitive debates in Parliament and may allow us to find 
the substance of discourse change. 
 
Division within each party: Scepticism and Europeanisation 
   Gamble highlights the factors that tend to be associated with splits in parties generally. 
They are the prospect of electoral defeat, ideological marginalization, and a lengthy 
exclusion from office. He argues that European integration can be included as well. It 
divides parties because it fuses together issues of sovereignty and identity with political 
economy in a novel and powerful way (Gamble 1998, p12). Jones argues, as a result, that 
the Conservative Party has not been united over Europe but that there are probably more 
divisions on the issue of Europe within the Labour Party (Jones 2007, pp130-134). We 
will now investigate the points of division in each party. 
 
The Conservative Party 
   For the Conservatives, the defence of national sovereignty is a central theme (Lynch 
1997, p80; Ludlam 1998, p41). However, each Conservative MP has a different idea on 
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sovereignty. Ludlam divides them into two camps: µabsolutists¶ and µpoolers¶. Absolutists 
focus on the legislative supremacy of the Westminster Parliament. Ludlam introduces the 
comment of Michael Spicer MP as one of absolutists arguing against further integration 
through the Maastricht Treaty: µthe fact is that the irrevocable powers have not yet been 
transferred, and sovereignty is an absolute: you either have sovereignty or you do not¶ 
(Ludlam 1998, p42). This idea would correspond to theoretical sovereignty in the 
previous section. On the other hand, the poolers tend to judge sovereignty by its 
usefulness as a policy resource to be bargained with in international policy arenas, 
especially in the pursuit of national security and prosperity. In the same way as pooling 
sovereignty in NATO is said to have enhanced Britain¶s military security, sharing 
sovereignty in the EU is said to enhance the prosperity of British industry and commerce. 
As I have noted in the beginning of the previous section, Ludman introduces the 
comment of Geoffrey Howe that µsovereignty is not some pre-defined absolute, but a 
flexible, adaptable, organic notion that evolves and adjusts with circumstances « 
sovereignty might be summarised as a nation¶s practical capacity to maximise its 
influence in the world¶ (Ibid, pp42-43). This would correspond to real sovereignty as 
defined above. 
   Lynch also divides two more superficial but more firm groups within the 
Conservatives: Euro-sceptics and Euro-enthusiasts. He observes that the state, 
constitutional and popular dimensions of sovereignty are all evident in Conservative 
Euro-sceptic thought but criticizes them in that their thought offers only a narrow 
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perspective on the concept and on the impact of European integration on the nation-state 
(Lynch 1997, pp81-82). Consequently, as this division is more visible than that over 
sovereignty, Lynch argues that, when it has formed governments, the defence of 
sovereignty has not been an absolute in Conservative European policy; rather it has been 
a matter of degree. He illustrates that the Thatcher and Major Government resisted the 
erosion of µessential¶ national sovereignty, but in other respects treated sovereignty as 
negotiable (Ibid, p83). The term µessential¶ sovereignty here seems to have been used to 
mediate the party discord.  
   Ludman and Lynch divide the Conservatives into two groups, whereas Martin Kettle 
distinguishes four groups for a period of MajoU¶s leadership and Alistair Jones identified 
six different groups under Hague¶s leadership. Kettle¶s groupings are: Euroenthusiasts, 
Europhobes, Eurosceptics, and Europrogressives or Europositives. The difference 
between Europhobes and Eurosceptics is, according to his examination, whether Britain 
should withdraw from the EU. He finds that few scholars discuss the fourth group, 
Europositives, despite the fact that these count as the majority of the party. They are 
people who µare basically in favour of the Euro-project but who don¶t want to endorse 
change indiscriminately¶ (Pilkington 2001, p188). Jones¶s groupings are: Anti-marketeers, 
Gaullists, Tory modernisers, Free market neo-liberals, Federalists, and Common-sense 
Europeans. These groupings are very useful to understand each individual stand for 
Europe but they do not necessarily involve distinct stands on the concept of sovereignty.  
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The Labour Party 
   The Labour Party split in 1981. Michael Foot was elected Labour Party leader, and 
one of the key platforms under his leadership was withdrawal from the EEC. Those who 
supported continuing EEC membership felt so strongly that, for this and other reasons, 
they left the party and set up a new political party: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
that later merged with the Liberal Party and created the Liberal Democrats in 1988 
(Jones 2007, p135). However, this did not provide unity over the European issue. As 
noted above, there was a gradual change towards a positive stance within the Labour 
party from 1983 onwards. This led to, for example, the ostracising and resignation of 
Bryan Gould who refused to agree with his party leadership and support the Treaty of 
European Union. According to Jones, for the vast majority of the Labour Party MPs, 
there is a tendency to toe the party line. They follow the party leader. MPs of all parties 
can, and do, change their opinions on issues whether through pressure from the party 
whips or through personal experience. Both Kinnock and Blair were once opposed to EC 
membership, but then became ardent supporters (Jones 2007, pp136-137).  
   It is possible to track the changing views of MPs on the issue of sovereignty. Until the 
mid-1980s, according to Philip Daniels, the retention of national economic sovereignty 
was the principal factor in opposition to British membership for the anti-European left of 
the party. On the right of the party, a small anti-European element opposed membership 
largely on the grounds that it would undermine parliamentary sovereignty (Daniels 1998, 
p74). In the 1990s, Baker and Seawright observed that the sovereignty dimension 
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seemed to cross-cut the old right-left ideological positions. They argued that, whatever 
the underlying ideology, if anything, sovereignty seems more important to the mindset of 
Labour MPs than is traditionally believed and, as a result, that there is scope for a 
revision of traditional typologies (Baker and Seawright 1998, p85). This means that both 
the left and the right of the party include both sceptics and enthusiasts.  
   In order to understand these arguments and cleavages within the Labour Party, it is 
necessary to examine whether and how the party has Europeanised (Daniels 1998; 
Featherstone 1999; Heffernan 2002). Daniels argues that Labour¶s µEuropeanisation¶ has 
been a gradual transition, shaped by the interplay of domestic political developments, 
changes in party and trade union thinking, and the dynamics of Europe¶s economic and 
political integration. The point to notice is that, according to Daniels, the issue of national 
sovereignty, which was at the heart of Labour¶s traditional hostility to the European 
project and is the basis for Conservative divisions over Europe, has become a much less 
salient issue for the Labour Party in the 1990s (Daniels 1998, p91). It suggests that a 
certain perception of sovereignty has been accepted within the party. A survey of Labour 
MPs in the 1992-97 parliament indicated that a majority accepted that British sovereignty 
could be pooled (Daniels 1998, p89; Featherstone 1999, p7).  
Therefore, it would be worthwhile to examine the discourse on sovereignty by 
comparing not only a current confrontation between sceptics and enthusiasts but also the 
difference in the party position between the early 1980s and now. 
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   Heffernan argues that the Europeanisation of Whitehall has had significant impacts 
on the European agendas of British political parties and serves to structure the policy 
agenda of incoming governments, be they Labour or Conservative (Heffernan 2002, 
p186). It is quite obvious that Europeanisation would be a key factor of the changes in 
discourses around sovereignty. 
 
We have seen the existence of confrontation in each party so far. Some MPs clearly 
declare whether they are for or against European integration. However, it is difficult to 
find all MPs¶ stands over Europe. In order to make the examination of their discourse 
under the situation of confrontation within parties easier, it is reasonable to divide 
between those who were in favour of a bill and who were against a bill at each debate. 
 
Summary 
   This chapter has argued that European integration has very much affected British 
politics. The sections of this chapter have viewed European challenge to sovereignty 
from the perspective of theory, law, constitution and politics. As a result, the first section 
showed that sovereignty can be theoretically changed and EU law has already affected 
the sovereignty of member states. However, there left some unsolved questions on 
sovereignty between theoretical and practical perspectives and between a viewpoint of 
the state and the EU. The second section, then, provided the mechanism of discourse 
change and revealed the actual institutional change in the governmental machinery. The 
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third section recognised the actual impact on the British constitution. From a legal 
perspective, sovereignty has changed. However, the argument of sovereignty has never 
been resolved because there were three argumentative points of sovereignty: legal, 
theoretical and practical. The fourth section also found that the British political system 
made the argument of sovereignty complicated through competitive debates between 
and within parties. These findings suggest that: 1) discourse can be changed under the 
mechanisms of institutional change by European integration; 2) discourse can be 
changed or varied depending on how MPs recognise and claim their point of argument 
over sovereignty; 3) discourse change can be brought by competitive discussion of 
European matters in the UK such as between government and opposition, the 
Conservative Party and the Labour Party, or those who are for a bill and those who are 
against a bill. 
The main argument of this dissertation, of course, relates to British elites¶ discourse 
on sovereignty. The question posed by this dissertation is whether the British elites¶ 
discourse on sovereignty has changed or not. And, further, if it has changed, how has it 
changed? For my empirical work, therefore, I hypothesise that British governmental and 
some non-governmental elites have applied a more µreal¶ or practical view of sovereignty, 
which may need to adjust to the fact of the accession to the Community and the 
recognition of the legal impact of European integration through the mechanisms of 
adaptational pressure and interactions, to their discourse. I expect then that competitive 
debates between and within parties have brought about discourse change on sovereignty, 
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including the way of argumentative persuasion, over time. However, it is still unclear as 
to how we can measure this process. To make this clearer, I will explain in the next 
chapter how this hypothesis is to be examined. 
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4  Discourse analysis: how discourses 
construct meanings 
   Chapters 1-3 deliberate and examine the context and the mechanism of discourse 
change on sovereignty. We now move to an empirical study of discourse change. 
Therefore, this chapter gives the methodological context for using case studies that 
analyse the British discourse change on sovereignty since the accession to the EC. First, I 
briefly explain what discourse analysis is and why I use this type of analysis for my study. 
Second, I show how discourse analysis is applied to this study and how it is carried out in 
my case studies. Third, I explain how the demarcation of discourse analysis will be 
established and reflect on the limitations of my research design. And fourth, I introduce 
three analytical approaches for my case studies: Word usage analysis, Definition analysis, 
and Interpretation analysis. 
 
4.1 Discourse analysis 
   This section explains what discourse analysis is and why this study uses it. Before 
referring to µdiscourse analysis¶ as a methodology, I need to clarify what the term 
µdiscourse¶ means. Phillips and Hardy define a discourse as an interrelated set of texts, 
and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object 
into being. They also state that texts are not meaningful individually (Phillips and Hardy 
2002, pp3-4). Widdowson states as follows: 
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People produce texts to get a message across, to express ideas and beliefs, to 
explain something, to get other people to do certain things or to think in a certain 
way, and so on. We can refer to this complex of communicative purposes as the 
discourse that underlies the text and motivates its production in the first place 
(Widdowson 2007, p6). 
 
Discourse is, therefore, something which is produced or constructed by human 
activity. Burnham et al. assert that there is widespread agreement that discourses are 
systems of signification that reality is socially constructed by people, who give meaning 
and significance to objects in the material world (Burnham et al. 2008, p250). The term 
discourse already contains the theoretical framework of constructivism11 in which the 
structure of the world is seen as social rather than material. Phillips and Hardy also argue 
that, without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we 
cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 
p2). 
What kind of approach is discourse analysis? Many scholars agree that there is no 
fixed way of carrying out discourse analysis. Gill affirms that, strictly speaking, there is 
no single µdiscourse analysis¶, but many different styles of analysis that all lay claim to 
the name. According to her study, there are at least 57 varieties of discourse analysis (Gill 
                                                 
11
  The term µdiscourse¶ is widely used in various studies such as linguistics, sociology, psychology, and so 
on. In this study, the meaning of discourse mainly contains a perspective of constructivism in the theory 
of international relations. 
 114 
2000, pp172-173). Burnham et al. also argue that the growth of interest in discourse 
analysis has not led to agreement on how studies using this approach should be carried 
out. Rather there are a number of assumptions and guidelines that underlie discourse 
analysis (Burnham et al. 2008, p255). For that reason, many scholars are sceptical of 
discourse analysis as there are no firm guidelines about how such research should be 
carried out. Burnham et al. explain that discourse analysis leaves considerable discretion 
to the researcher who is responsible for ensuring that the analysis is rigorous, systematic 
and convincing, that an appropriate selection of texts has been chosen for analysis, and 
that significant research questions have been addressed (Ibid, p248). 
Gill observes that despite various types of discourse analysis these different 
perspectives do share a rejection of the realist notion that language is simply a neutral 
means of reflecting or describing the world, and a conviction in the central importance of 
discourse in constructing social life (Gill 2000, p172). Potter and Wetherell argue that the 
principal tenet of discourse analysis is that its function involves the construction of 
versions, and is demonstrated by language variation (Potter and Wetherell 1987, p33). To 
put it in another way, discourse analysis is a qualitative methodology that focusses 
attention on the role that language and communications have in shaping the social world 
(Burnham et al. 2008, p248). Discourse analysts pursue how speech and words are used, 
and how accounts are associated with power (Sarantakos 2005, p310). Gee indicates that 
what is important is that the discourse analyst looks for patterns and links within and 
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across utterances in order to form hypotheses about how meaning is being constructed 
and organized (Gee 2005, p118). 
What then, is the difference between discourse analysis and other types of analyses? 
Johnstone argues that what distinguishes discourse analysis from other sorts of study that 
bear on human language and communication lies not in the questions discourse analysts 
ask but in the ways they try to answer them: by analysing discourse ± that is, by 
examining aspects of the structure and function of language in use (Johnstone 2002, p4). 
Phillips and Hardy reveal a distinguished feature of discourse analysis as a qualitative 
methodology. They describe as follows: 
Whereas other qualitative methodologies work to understand or interpret social 
reality as it exists, discourse analysis endeavors to uncover the way in which it is 
produced. This is the most important contribution of discourse analysis: It 
examines how language constructs phenomena, not how it reflects and reveals it. 
In other words, discourse analysis views discourse as constitutive of social 
ZRUOGʊQRWDURXWHWRLWʊDQGassumes that the world cannot be known separately 
from discourse (Phillips and Hardy 2002, p6). 
 
Thus far, I have shown how the concept of sovereignty has been produced and 
reconstructed. This study, then, carries out an analysis of how European integration 
affects discourse of British parliamentary debates, and examines whether those 
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discourses have produced a different view on sovereignty. Burnham et al. describe 
discourse analysis in terms of politics as follows: 
Discourse analysis illuminates the dominant ideas and identifies those who 
legitimate these ideas. In policy arenas the most influential spokesman are likely to 
be politicians, leaders of pressure groups and expert journalists and academics. It is 
thus relatively straightforward for researchers to obtain a representative selection of 
texts on a particular policy area for investigation and analysis. « Dominant 
discourses that are widely accepted that they are considered to be common sense 
may still be challenged and even undermined over time, so that they are replaced 
by new discourses articulated by new elites (Burnham et al. 2008, pp257-258).  
 
The dominant idea or dominant discourse that Burnham et al. illustrate can be 
recognised as the existing concept of sovereignty in this study. Thus, this study actually 
examines whether dominant discourses are replaced by new discourse articulated by new 
elites, specifically MPs in this study. 
 
4.2 Doing discourse analysis 
   This section shows how I apply discourse analysis to this study. The previous section 
revealed that there is no one way of conducting discourse analysis. This observation is 
somewhat troublesome. How then, should I proceed with discourse analysis? Phillips 
and Hardy argue that our interest in the relation between discourse and social reality 
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requires us to study individual texts for clues to the nature of the discourse because we 
can never find discourses in their entirety (Phillips and Hardy 2002, p5). Therefore, the 
basis of analysis will be to find clues to understand discourse from individual texts. Potter 
and Wetherell introduce ten stages in the analysis of discourse (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 
pp160-175) and other scholars have also followed these stages (Sarantakos, 2005; Gill, 
2000). This study also follows them, omitting non-relevant stages such as interviews and 
components already discussed in previous chapters. Below I highlight the stages that are 
of relevance to the discourse analysis here, focussing on the following topics: 
     1) sample selection, 2) collection of records and documents, 3) transcription, 4) 
coding, 5) analysis. 
 
Sample selection 
   The crucial determinant of sample size must be the specific research question (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987, p161). As I have argued in the introduction, the sample of this study 
will be the British elite discourse in relation to European integration. How big the sample 
should be or where to gain the sample from is complex. Potter and Wetherell argue that, 
because one is interested in language use rather than the people generating the language 
and because a large number of linguistic patterns are likely to emerge from a few people, 
small samples or a few interviews are generally quite adequate for investigating an 
interesting and practically important range of phenomena (Ibid, p161). They also 
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mention that, in many cases, practice will be governed by what is available and that 
generally there is no µnatural¶ boundary line to be drawn in these cases (Ibid, p162). 
In order to narrow down the sample size, I define British elite as members of the 
House of Commons because, firstly, formal discussion on sovereignty can be found in 
parliament where all debates have been recorded and, secondly, the House of Commons 
has legislative power. Consequently, I chose to examine crucial debates in the House of 
Commons that relate to European matters:12  
1) Debates which responded to the White Paper of July 1971 in which the 
government announced the intention of entering the EC (October 1971) 
2) Debates on the European Community Bill 1972 which are readings of the Bill 
for the accession to the EC (February - July 1972)  
3) Debates on the continued membership which are called toward a referendum 
on membership (January - April 1975) 
4) Debates on the SEA which are readings of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill (June and July 1986) 
5) Debates on the Treaty of Maastricht which are readings of the European 
Communities (Amendment) Bill (May 1992 - May 1993) 
6) Debates on the Treaty of Amsterdam which are readings of the European 
Communities (Amendment) Bill (November 1997 ± January 1998) 
                                                 
12
  These periods shown in brackets are the time when the term µsovereignty¶ can be found on debates. 
Therefore, it may not correspond with actual debates. 
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7) Debates on the Treaty of Nice which are readings of the European Union 
(Amendment) Bill (July - Oct 2001) 
8) Debates on the Treaty of Lisbon which are readings of the European Union 
(Amendment) Bill (January - March 2008) 
 
There are other debates about European matters as well. For example, there are 
debates on the single currency, debates on the ECHR, and so on. As a condition for the 
sample of analysis, only those debates related to the EC/EU matters that reach a 
resolution are chosen because it is possible to classify MPs into those who voted in 
favour of a bill and who voted against a bill. Hence, I use discourse of MPs on these 
debates as the sample of this study. 
 
Collection of records and documents 
   My primary data source is Hansard where parliamentary debates are recorded. I also 
utilise MPs¶ comments in newspaper articles during the same periods of the selected 
parliamentary debates.13 Potter and Wetherell indicate some of the merits of using 
Hansard records for discourse analysis. They consider that this data source not only has 
the advantage of recording MPs and ministers constructing their own versions of the 
social world and understanding opponents, but is an ideologically powerful form of 
spoken material which comes ready transcribed, saving considerable work (Ibid, p163). 
                                                 
13
 I do not use any editorial comments.  
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   Hansard documents after the mid-1980s can be accessed by the internet. However, 
Hansard documents before the mid-1980s cannot be accessed through the internet. They 
are available only in hardcopy and are stocked in major libraries. Practically, newspapers 
contain various relevant articles. Therefore, two newspapers are chosen which are 
accessible by the internet throughout all periods and these are national papers with 
differing ideologies. They are The Times and The Guardian.  
 
Transcription 
   As mentioned in the Collection of records and documents section, Hansard records 
and the newspaper articles are already transcribed. In order to proceed to the next step, 
Hansards before the mid-1980s need to be photocopied and re-transcribed manually. 
Other data can be copied and pasted from the website to word processor documents. 
Potter and Wetherell argue, however, that the idea that transcription is µsimply putting the 
words down on paper¶ is very far from reality. Transcription is a constructive and 
conventional activity (Ibid, p165). They also affirm that it is important to think very 
carefully about what information is required from the transcript, and at what level the 
analysis will proceed (Ibid, p166).  
 
Coding 
   Potter and Wetherell argue that the goal of coding is not to find results but to squeeze 
an unwieldy body of discourse into manageable chunks (Ibid, p167). The first step of 
 121 
coding for this study is, therefore, to search and find the term µsovereignty¶ in those 
debates. In the Hansard records since the mid-1980s and the newspaper articles this can 
be done by applying the word µsovereignty¶ to the search function on the websites or the 
transcribed versions. However, I also needed to find the term manually in Hansard 
records of the 1970s. It would be an extraordinary piece of work to transcribe all the 
pages of European matters in order to find the word sovereignty. Therefore, I tried to find 
the word µsovereignty¶ in the hard copies of the Hansard records, and then transcribed 
them. Although the main target is a sentence of speech that includes the term 
µsovereignty¶, other sentences may be included to understand speakers¶ significance. 
   Once I had found all the pieces of text that included the word µsovereignty¶, firstly, 
the type of speaker, including which political parties they belong to, was coded. Then, if 
they were in the ruling party, were they a cabinet minister or a backbencher? Further, had 
the speaker declared a stand at the resolution of each legislative procedure? 
Second, I omitted all sentences that were repetitions of other speakers and views of a 
third party. It is important to focus on those sentences that are expressed from the 
speakers¶ own perspective.  
Thirdly, I coded those words which explain and qualify the word µsovereignty¶ in 
each sentence.  
In addition to these works, those sentences written about the speaker¶s definition of 
sovereignty and the speaker¶s interpretation of sovereignty in relation to European 
integration were extracted. This is discussed in section 4.3. 
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Analysis 
   Analysis is made up principally of two closely related phases. First, there is the 
search for patterns in the data. Patterns will be in the form of both variability: differences 
in either the content or form of accounts, and consistency: the identification of features 
shared by accounts. Second, there is the concern with function and consequence. The 
basic theoretical thrust of discourse analysis is the argument that people¶s talk fulfils 
many functions and has varying effects. The second phase of analysis consists of forming 
hypotheses about these functions and effects and searching for the linguistic evidence 
(Ibid, p168).  
   In order to search for patterns in the data, the samples of debates are divided into 
three periods (1971-1975, 1985-1993, and 1997-2009). The first period is the period of 
debates on accession and membership. The second is the period of debates on the SEA 
and the Treaty of Maastricht under the Conservative government. The third is the period 
of debates under the Labour government. Each period then will be analysed in separate 
chapters. In each chapter, three approaches will be used to conduct the analysis: Word 
usage analysis, Definition analysis, and Interpretation analysis. I will explain how the 
demarcation of discourse analysis is defined and how these three approaches are applied 
to my analysis in the next two sections. 
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4.3 Systematic reflection 
   This section explains the measurement of the empirical data for the discourse 
analysis. Up to Chapter 3, the study has tried to show that discourse on sovereignty can 
be changed in theory and that European integration can be a factor in the change of 
%ULWLVK HOLWHV¶ GLVFRXUVH RQ VRYHUHLJQW\ +RZHYHU WKHVH ZHUH discussed as general 
theoretical constructs. We have talked about sovereignty in general and British elite 
vaguely. The empirical study must include measurable concepts. Thus it is necessary to 
further clarify how the measurement was defined for this empirical study. Although the 
previous section introduced some demarcations of the analysis by presenting the work of 
Potter and Wetherell and briefly discussing whose discourse and which discourse were to 
be analysed, this section further explains how and why those demarcations of the 
analysis were defined. 
 
MPs 
   7KHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQRIWKLVVWXG\LVZKHWKHU%ULWLVKHOLWHV¶GLVFRXUVHRQVRYHUHLJQW\
has changed as European integration has proceeded. Who are British elites, though? 
µBritish HOLWHV¶UHIHUVWRDZider population of politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, scholars, 
etc. The aim of this study is to find discourse change in the actual debates of elites. Those 
actual debates can be seen between politicians, between politicians and journalists, 
between scholars, and so on. It is difficult to investigate all elite debates systematically, 
due to time constraints. It is also problematical to investigate elite debates sporadically 
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such as analysing a couple of debates on different agendas by different people. The 
analysis should investigate successive debates over time on a specific agenda such as the 
EU matter through a specific group of elites. Where I can find such successive debates of 
a specific group is in parliament. The British Parliament consists of the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords and both houses have had much debate on the issue 
of European integration. Ideally, I would analyse debate in both Houses, however, the 
amount of data would be unwieldy. The work of description and coding take an 
enormous amount of time. Unfortunately, the time for the research is limited. In order to 
conduct the analysis within the time constraints allowed, I narrow down the sample size 
and focus on members of the House of Commons. As I mentioned, since the House of 
Commons has legislative power, it will be reasonable to analyse the debates in the House 
of Commons rather than the House of Lords if we must select one over the other. 
Accordingly, MPs both influence and are influenced by wider debates resulting from 
democratic accountability in British politics and have had successive debates over the 
European matter. Other elites such as journalists also influence and are influenced but it is 
difficult to find successive debates representing the wider public over time by them. Thus 
MPs seem to be the most appropriate people for the analysis of discourse change. 
 
Group division 
   Many MPs have not made their statements repeatedly. Some of them took the floor 
over a couple of debates over time but none of them did so for the whole period 
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beginning with the accession to the EC. This means that it is hard to analyse their 
discourses individually over time. However, there are some specific groups which have 
existed for the whole period. By dividing into such groups, discourse change of each 
group can be observed throughout the period. And also, it will be possible to clearly point 
up what the differences are between these groups. Therefore, a comparison can be 
possible between groups as well.  
As I argued in the previous chapter, firstly, governmental elites might have been 
influenced by those machineries and bureaucrats which have already Europeanised. 
Under this circumstance, discourse of cabinet members might have also contained the 
perspective of the Europeanisation impact. Accordingly, the statements of MPs who are 
part of the government will be viewed as one group for the analysis. I will try to 
determine how discourse of this group has changed over time and what is different about 
this group¶s discourse compared to other groups. As is characteristic of British political 
culture, secondly, it is possible to view a confrontational style between parties. In the 
period between the accession to the EC and the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conservative Party 
and the Labour Party were either the Government party or the largest opposition party. 
Thus it is reasonable to take these two parties as analytical groups as well. And thirdly, in 
terms of the confrontation style in relation to European integration, the dissertation 
analyses the division between those MPs who were in favour of a bill and who were 
against a bill on the European matters to see what kind of discourse these groups use, and 
whether this changes over time. In this case, all MPs can be included, not just those from 
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the Conservative or Labour Parties. Consequently, classified groups for this analysis are 
Government, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Favour group who voted for a 
bill and the Against group who voted against a bill. I understand that there are other ways 
MPs could be classified. For example, it is possible to divide MPs by the area of an 
election district such as between rural and urban areas, by the number of terms MPs have 
served such as between one term and several terms of serving, and so on. However, 
taking the potential impact of European integration on discourse into account, it is 
reasonable to investigate these five groups for this analysis. 
 
Sources 
   As we have defined who this study analyses and how they are classified, it is 
necessary to clarify from where their statements can be obtained. Statements of MPs are 
recorded in parliamentary debates, interviews or debates organised by the media, 
literature like memoirs, their own websites, etc. The aim of this study is to find discourse 
change in the actual debates on EU issues. Therefore, scattered individual statements 
should be excluded because this study needs to compare discourse over time and under 
the same conditions. In this perspective, the parliamentary debates should be included 
and these debates are recoded in Hansard. Focussing on just the Hansard records may be 
enough for this study as they provide records of the actual debates between members of 
Parliament on the EU. However, it could be useful to confirm whether the debates 
outside of parliament are similar to the parliamentary debates. And also, statements by 
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those MPs who did not make a statement in parliamentary debates can be found outside 
of the Hansard records. Thus this study seeks other sources for the analysis. Debates on 
TV or radio seem to be conceivable as potential sources of debates between MPs, but 
there is a difficulty of transcription of these debates. The transcription and coding work of 
these media demands an enormous amount of time, and could be a separate dissertation 
topic. This study thus must omit them because of the time limit. However, written media 
like newspapers and magazines can be included because these are generally already 
available electronically and so there is no need to transcribe the materials. Of course, 
there are still large amounts of newspaper stories in which MPs discuss the EU. Again, as 
the time is limited, I must narrow down the volume that this study will handle. Firstly, the 
newspaper stories to be used must be obtained through the newspaper websites for the 
whole SHULRGRIWKHGLVVHUWDWLRQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQ6HFRQGO\DVWKHIRFXVLV%ULWLVKHOLWHV¶
discourse, national rather than local editions would be appropriate. And thirdly, as MPs 
are divided into groups by focussing on the confrontational style of British politics, the 
analysis of the media should also take into account such a perspective. Hence, two 
national newspapers, with very different ideologies, can be selected: The Times and The 
Guardian. 
Once selecting the newspapers to be analysed, there is next a problem of what data in 
WKHVH QHZVSDSHUV , VKRXOG LQFOXGH LQ P\ DQDO\VLV 1HZVSDSHUV¶ DUWLFOHV DUH
wide-ranging; some of them are interviews, some of them are comments by editors, and 
some of them are letters from readers. Although the word sovereignty on the European 
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matters can be found in all of these types of articles, this study will limit the analysis to 
the statements of MPs. Therefore, anything which is clearly identified as the statement of 
an MP such as an interview or letter should be regarded as data to be used in this analysis. 
Further, in order to compare the newspaper results to parliamentary debates, the 
timeframe of the analysis must be similar. Therefore, the period within each debate of 
eight debates in four decades is the length of sample collection. The details of why I 
focus on eight debates and four decades will be explained in the next two parts of this 
section. 
 
Eight debates 
   As mentioned in the discussion of the sample collection of the previous section, this 
study analyse these eight debates: 1) Debates which responded to the White Paper of 
July 1971 in which the government announced the intention of entering the EC, 2) 
Debates on the European Community Bill 1972 which are readings of the Bill for the 
accession to the EC, 3) Debates on the continued membership which are called toward a 
referendum on membership, 4) Debates on the SEA which are readings of the European 
Communities (Amendment) Bill, 5) Debates on the Treaty of Maastricht which are 
readings of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, 6) Debates on the Treaty of 
Amsterdam which are readings of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, 7) 
Debates on the Treaty of Nice which are readings of the European Union (Amendment) 
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Bill, and 8) Debates on the Treaty of Lisbon which are readings of the European Union 
(Amendment) Bill.  
The reason I have narrowed down the extent of data analysed by limiting the analysis 
to these debates is because even if we just focussed on the European matter in Hansard 
records, the amount of data would still be large to handle within the timespan allowed for 
a PhD dissertation. Firstly, again, the focus of this study is on the actual debates, thus non 
debates data such as Oral or Written Answers recorded in Hansard will be excluded for 
the analysis. Secondly, in order to be classified between the Favour group who voted for 
a bill and the Against group who voted against a bill, it is necessary to view the process of 
those bills which have been adopted and would have required the UK to change some 
institutions as a member state of the EU, except for the first debate in 1971 that was not 
the legislative procedure. The reason why this study includes the debate of 1971, which 
was µDebates which responded to the White Paper of July 1971 in which the government 
announced the intention of entering the EC¶ as written in the beginning of this part, is 
because this debate was the starting point for the UK¶s accession to the EC. Thus, those 
debates that have not involved passing a bill; that were not about EU matters; or that 
were before the actual joining process into the EC will be excluded. Consequently, the 
eight above-mentioned debates have been left for the analysis. In each debate, then, the 
second and the third readings, which are debates on the bill (except for the first debate in 
1971 that had held a reading once) are the data used for the analysis. The analysis of 
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newspapers also limits the data analysed to the same period of each debate so that the 
results of the newspaper analysis can be compared to the parliamentary debates.  
 
The definition of the period 
   This study focusses on the period between year 1971 and 2009. After year 2009 
which is the Cameron administration and the coalition government of the Conservative 
Party and the Liberal Democrats, there is no ratification process for a new treaty of the 
EU and the administration is on-going at the time of writing this dissertation. Thus it is 
difficult to evaluate post-2009 developments. Before the year 1971, especially in 1960s, 
there were debates over the European matter because Britain applied to join the EEC 
twice in 1961 and in 1967. However, this study has excluded these time periods because 
their debates did not actually result in gaining membership. That is, it is difficult to 
compare to other periods when Britain had already become a member of the EC/EU 
although debates in 1971 and 1972 were before the status of membership. In this 
perspective, these debates of 1971 and 1972 could be compared to those debates in 1961 
and 1967 as debates on the application for membership. Having said that, as this study 
examines the impact of European integration on discourse of MPs, it is reasonable to 
start the investigation from the debate on the actual accession to the EC. Thus the focus 
here is on the period between year 1971 and 2009.  
   The study then divides this almost-40 year period into three time periods. Eight 
debates were held in 1) 1971, 2) 1972, 3) 1975, 4) 1986, 5) 1992-1993, 6) 1997-1998, 7) 
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2001, and 8) 200814. Although it may be possible to compare these eight debates 
individually, the process and the subject of comparison would be complicated. For 
example, how should we compare 1971 to the other seven debates? Do we need to 
compare them one by one? There would be too many comparisons of debates and, as a 
result, the focus point of analysis would be vague. Accordingly, some of these debates 
need to be combined. Debates of 1986 and 1992-1993 were under the Conservative 
government and debates of 1997-1998, 2001 and 2008 were under the Labour 
government. Thus it is reasonable to view each government period as one period for the 
analysis. The problem is how I should treat the three debates in the 1970s because the 
first two debates were under the Conservative government and the last debate was under 
the Labour government. If the study defined the period of the analysis as just the 
government period, it would be possible to divide into four time periods in total. 
However, as far as the length of the period is concerned, these four periods are too 
unequal for the analysis such as only a one-year period of 1975 and thirteen-year period 
of 1997-2009. Taking this perspective into account and because the content of debate 
throughout 1970s can be seen as membership debates in comparison with debates of 
1980s ± 2000s, which were the ratification debates for the revision of the EC/EU treaties, 
I define the three debates in 1970s as one period time for the analysis. The comparison 
                                                 
14
 Although the actual readings for the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon were held in 2008, the Treaty of 
Lisbon itself entered into force in 2009. Therefore, the general framework for the period of the analysis is 
between 1971 and 2009. 
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between the Conservative government of 1971 and 1972 and the Labour government of 
1975 can also be conducted within the analysis of one period.  
   Consequently, this study compares three time periods: 1) 1971-1975, 2) 1985-1993, 
and 3) 1997-2009. Each period then will be analysed in separate chapters. The difference 
of each debate within each period will also be compared. Therefore, the analysis can be 
conducted both within each period and through over-time periods. 
 
This section clarified the demarcation of the data to be used for the discourse analysis. 
Concepts must be measurable and, at the same time, the empirical analysis requires some 
limitations, as it is not possible to analyse all elite discourse on sovereignty. Discourse 
change on sovereignty can be analysed in various ways even though I limit it to British 
elites, and particularly to British MPs. Thus discourse analysis from Chapter 5 onward 
requires further limitation of the extent of data to make clear the scope of the analysis. 
That is why this study applies those conditions above. The Conclusion to the dissertation 
reflects on the potential limitations of the analysis that result from the data selection 
choices outlined in this section. The next section outlines more precisely how the 
discourse analysis will be conducted.  
 
4.4 Three analytical approaches 
This section describes how I conduct my analysis. Basically, this study analyses how 
elites have used the word µsovereignty¶ in their discourse. Therefore, this analysis needs 
 133 
to focus on the usage of sovereignty, which can be examined from various angles. Three 
angles for examining the usage could be confirmed: Word usage, which is about how 
MPs qualify and explain the word sovereignty, Definition usage is about how MPs 
define sovereignty, and Interpretation usage is about how MPs interpret sovereignty in 
the process of European integration. The analysis will be carried out by three approaches 
which are based on these angles.  
Before providing detailed explanations of these approaches, however, I clarify some 
common conditions for this analysis. Firstly, paralanguages such as intonations, accents 
and pauses are not included in the analysis. Some analysts apply this to their discourse 
analysis. However, as it is impossible to listen to past debates, I must focus only on 
written texts of Hansard and newspaper articles. Secondly, the carry-over effect in 
discussion will be excluded. Other speakers¶ comments may affect a speakers¶ discourse 
but, if they are included, the scope of analysis will be unclear and unwieldy. The analysis 
thus only focusses on the speaker¶s discourse. Thirdly, as I have argued in the previous 
section, all sentences that are repetitions of other speakers and views of a third party will 
be omitted. It is important to focus on those sentences that are expressions of speakers¶ 
own view. 
On the basis of these conditions, therefore, I could confirm three common patterns as 
the approaches of this analysis in the discourses. First, speakers used many differing 
words to explain and express the word µsovereignty¶. The words used are different 
depending on the speaker. Second, some speakers tend to explain the definition of 
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sovereignty in their discourse in order to clarify or to support the reasons for their 
statements. Third, many speakers tend to refer to their conclusion or prediction of how 
and whether sovereignty would be affected, once a bill has been passed. The three 
approaches used here are based on these observed patterns in discourses and are labelled 
as Word usage analysis, Definition analysis, and Interpretation analysis. 
 
Word usage analysis 
   The question I ask here is what kind of word speakers have used when they talk 
about sovereignty. Why have they used a variety of words to explain or to qualify the 
word µsovereignty¶? I believe that those words that explain or qualify the word 
µVRYHUHLJQW\¶DUHGLIIHUHQWGHSHQGLQJRQ03V¶SROLWLFDOVWDQGDQGWKHFRQWH[WRIGHEDWHV
Then, I expect that the usage of those words will change over time. The words used 
could be a verb, a noun or an adjective, but they can be classified into two categories: one 
is the word of exposition and the other is the word of possession. The word of exposition 
is those words that explain what sovereignty will be or what sovereignty has been by 
those legislative procedures. And the word of possession is those words that express the 
possession or location of sovereignty.  
In each category, moreover, the words are divided by their meanings. For the word 
of exposition, which explains what sovereignty will be or has been, they are: Negative, 
Changed, Unchanged/Defensive and Positive. The detailed list of these words that 
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appeared in debates is presented as Table A1.1 in Appendix 1. Generally, the meaning 
captured in each of these is as follows: 
Negative: sovereignty will go or has gone, or will be or has been limited. 
     Changed: sovereignty will be or has been changed. 
     Unchanged/Defensive: sovereignty will be or has been defended or unaffected. 
     Positive: sovereignty will be or has been shared, strengthened, or will be or has 
been used for a certain purpose. 
 
Each type can be divided more in detail. For example, in the Negative type, some 
words explain sovereignty has been completely lost, and the other words explain 
sovereignty has not been lost but has been undermined. Strictly speaking, they are 
different meanings. Similarly, in the Unchanged/Defensive type, those words whereby 
speakers explain the status of sovereignty as µunchanged¶ and as µdefensive¶ are different. 
Also, in the Positive type, there are passive meanings and active meanings. In order to 
make a difference among these types and to find a trend of each group easily, however, I 
decided to not subdivide minutely. Hence, the Negative usage means those words which 
explain the status of sovereignty negatively as the result of resolutions. The Changed 
usage means those words which explain that the status of sovereignty will change or has 
changed but do not explain whether it will change or has changed negatively or 
positively. The Unchanged/Defensive usage means those words which explain that the 
status of sovereignty will not change or has not changed, or will be defended or has been 
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defended. And, the Positive usage means those words which explain the status of 
sovereignty positively in either a passive way or an active way. 
For the word of possession, which expresses the location or possession of sovereignty, 
those words are: our, government, Parliament, the House, the people, national, monarch, 
European and restricted such as legal, economic, etc. The words µparliamentary 
sovereignty¶ and µnational sovereignty¶ contain the conceptual meaning itself. In this 
analysis, however, those grouped words are titles of the location or possession. If 
µparliamentary sovereignty¶ and µnational sovereignty¶ were mentioned in discourse, of 
course, they would be regarded as the location or possession, too. The detailed list of 
these words that appeared in debates is also presented as Table A1.2 in Appendix 1. 
Many speakers refer to these words in their discourse. The usage of these words may 
differ in each position or may have changed over time. 
Word usage analysis, both the word of exposition and the word of possession, is 
conducted by a quantitative approach. I simply count each type of word and view the 
number in every position: Government, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the 
Favour group (who voted in favour of a bill), and the Against group (who voted against a 
bill). The data on each debate and on each position will not be the same, so the result of 
the analysis will be presented in ratio by a pie chart in colour.  
 
Definition analysis 
   The Oxford dictionary defines sovereignty as follows: 
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1. complete power to govern a country 
2. the state of being a country with freedom to govern itself 
Oxford Advanced Learner¶s Dictionary of Current English, sixth edition, Oxford 
University Press 2000. 
 
   As I have argued in Chapter 1, however, there are various definitions in academic 
debates. Therefore, the purpose of this analysis is to show how the speakers define 
sovereignty in various ways and to find whether those various definitions have a certain 
trend in different groups or in different periods. As I introduced three different points of 
argument over sovereignty in Chapter 3, I expect that Definition analysis can indicate 
which argument MPs emphasise and can suggest whether their points of argument have 
changed. 
The procedure of analysis is to extract discourses that have made reference to the 
definition of sovereignty and to classify them into the same way as the Word usage 
analysis: Government, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Favour group (who 
voted in favour of a bill), and the Against group (who voted against a bill). The definition 
of sovereignty can be found in two ways: what sovereignty should be and who or which 
body should have sovereignty. The analysis then aims to determine and to present the 
point of the discourse. The analysis of the former definition can be carried out by taking 
three points of argument into consideration: legal, theoretical and practical. For example, 
some people view the definition of sovereignty by focussing on a practical meaning, and 
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other people talk about the definition of sovereignty by focussing on a theoretical 
meaning.  
Legal: the formal, legal right of final decision such as international law, supremacy 
of EU law 
Theoretical: The privacy and separation of national decision-making such as 
independence, freedom and symbolic control 
Practical: power, leverage, ability to produce results, the practical control of a state 
or society 
 
Of course, all definitions cannot apply these three perspectives. Those which are not 
classified into these three perspectives will be also examined and presented as points of 
the discourse. The latter definition can present simply who or which body has 
sovereignty. Hence, the definition of sovereignty may differ in each position and may 
change over time.  
 
Interpretation analysis 
   This is a more detailed form of analysis than the above two analyses. In Word usage 
analysis, the focus is only on the ratio of words. In Interpretation analysis, on the other 
hand, the focus includes how those words are used in discourse. In Definition analysis, 
the focus is on the definition of sovereignty in general; that is, what view on sovereignty 
speakers have. In Interpretation analysis, on the other hand, my focus is to find how 
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speakers have viewed or interpreted what sovereignty will be under the phenomenon of 
European integration and at each event of progress paying attention to the difference of 
discourse. At the end of the first section of Chapter 1, I hypothesised that if certain 
conditions surrounding the state changed, then the meaning of sovereignty would 
become ambiguous and conclude that, in defining the concept, we only give it different 
interpretations through the construction of theory. Therefore, the purpose of this analysis 
is to find those different interpretations through the construction of theory. The procedure 
is to extract those discourses that have made reference to the interpretation, and then to 
show whether the different interpretation can be found in different groups, which are the 
same as the previous two analyses, and in some people who make their statements a 
couple of times, during each period and over time, and then, if some differences can be 
found, how has it changed. The analysis is carried out by applying the following 
theoretical classifications. 
By joining in the EC or passing a bill of European matter, 
1.  Cession: Sovereignty will be transferred to the EC/EU, or all or a part of 
sovereignty will be lost or limited. 
2.  Unaffected: Sovereignty will not be changed. 
3.  Utilisation: Sovereignty will be transferred to or be pooled in the EC/EU in 
exchange for some advantages. 
 
And also, through membership activities in the EC/EU, 
 140 
4.  Reinforcement: Sovereignty will be strengthened, be used or be transformed 
by way of enhancing its capacity. 
 
These classifications seem to be correlated to the word of exposition in the Word 
usage analysis. But this time the Negative usage does not always correspond to cession. 
It could be incorporated into utilisation too because some people say that the UK will be 
advantaged by accepting a limitation of sovereignty. The difference between utilisation 
and reinforcement is that utilisation seeks some advantages in exchange for a part of 
sovereignty and reinforcement views that sovereignty can be strengthened through 
membership activities. As this reinforcement interpretation may suggest that the meaning 
of sovereignty can be changed, I will pay particular attention to this interpretation. 
Analytically, it is possible to divide it into a more detailed classification. For example, 
some people view that the loss of sovereignty is regrettable on the one hand; other people 
view that the loss of sovereignty is desirable on the other hand. However, here I would 
like to take these four categories as the basic line for the analysis and investigate details in 
each section along with this basic line. Hence, most interpretations will be classified into 
these four groups at first. Some speakers state their interpretations several times during 
discussion. I regard them as one interpretation of this speaker, when possible. 
Consequently, the trends and changes of interpretation in those five groups (Government, 
the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the group who were in favour and the group 
who were against) will be examined. As stated above, some people who make their 
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statements of interpretation over time will be examined to determine whether their 
interpretations have changed or not.  
 
Summary 
   This chapter first discussed what discourse analysis is and how I apply it to my 
analysis, how the demarcation of discourse analysis is established, and then, introduced 
three analytical approaches to be used in my case studies. In brief, discourse constructs 
social reality. Hence, discourse analysis is a qualitative methodology that focusses 
attention on the role that language and communications have in shaping the social world 
(Burnham et al. 2008, p248). However, we found that there is no fixed way of carrying 
out discourse analysis. In order to conduct the analysis systematically, I apply the work of 
Potter and Wetherell and borrowed the key relevant stages of the analysis of discourse 
from their guidelines: 1) sample selection, 2) collection of records and documents, 3) 
transcription, 4) coding, 5) analysis. Before I start to analyse discourse change, then, it is 
important to clarify why only MPs are analysed, why they are divided into five groups, 
why Hansard and newspapers are used, why eight debates are applied, and why the 
period of analysis is for 1971-2009 and this period is divided into three time periods for 
the analysis. These conditions make the analysis feasible and unique. 
   For the analysis, three analytical approaches will be adopted: Word usage analysis, 
Definition analysis and Interpretation analysis. Word usage analysis is conducted by a 
quantitative approach and focusses on what kind of words speakers have used when they 
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talk about sovereignty. Those words that explain or qualify the word µsovereignty¶ will be 
different depending on MPs¶ political stand and the context of debates. By dividing those 
words into specific types: Negative, Changed, Unchanged/Defensive and Positive, and 
by counting the number of those words in each type, it should be possible to detect any 
trend in usage in MPs¶ discourse. The trend may differ between government and 
opposition, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, or the Favour group and the 
Against group. Definition analysis is carried out because there are various definitions of 
sovereignty in academia. Therefore, the definition can be different depending on MPs. In 
the previous chapter, I introduced three different points of argument over sovereignty: 
legal, theoretical and practical. A definition analysis can indicate which argument MPs 
pay attention and can suggest whether their points of argument have changed. 
Interpretation analysis focusses on how speakers have viewed or interpreted what 
sovereignty will be under the phenomenon of European integration and at each event of 
progress paying attention to the difference of discourse. Therefore, I expect that MPs¶ 
interpretation of sovereignty can come down to four kinds of interpretation: cession, 
unaffected, utilisation and reinforcement, through the mechanisms of adaptational 
pressure and interactions as to the progress of European integration and through other 
factors such as competitive debates. By analysing interpretations of sovereignty using 
this categorisation scheme, it is expected that any differences between government and 
opposition, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, or the Favour group and the 
Against group will be detected. 
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The main target of these three analyses is a comparison between periods. A 
comparison analysis will be provided in Chapter 7, once analysis of the period between 
1997 and 2009 has been completed. Therefore, in Chapters 5 and 6, analyses are mainly 
focussed on a single period. 
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5  The accession to the EC and the 
referendum on membership (1971-1975) 
This chapter outlines the discourse analysis undertaken for the period between 1971 
and 1975. Samples of analysis include: 1) debates which responded to the White Paper 
of July 1971 when the government announced its intention of entering the EC (October 
1971), 2) debates on the European Community Bill in 1972, which include the readings 
of the Bill for the accession to the EC (February ± July 1972), and 3) debates on the 
referendum on membership (April 1975). 
   The size and extent of the data for each sample is shown as Table A2.1 in Appendix 2. 
The analysis was carried out by looking at the difference amongst groups and over the 
time period, and the data are divided into the following groups: government, the 
Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Favour group (who voted in favour of a bill), 
and the Against group (who voted against a bill). And, also, two newspapers within the 
same period of those three debates are examined: The Times and The Guardian. 
Within the data, as I noted in the previous chapter, all sentences that are repetitions of 
other speakers and introduce general points of view are excluded. For example, µ7KH
pro-Marketeers justify their general position by saying that no more loss of sovereignty 
would be involved when we enter than when we sign any other international agreemHQW¶ 
(Mr James Callaghan, Labour). This is not the speaker¶s (Mr Callaghan) viewpoint on 
sovereignty but him positing the general view of µmarketeers¶.  
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Using this data, I conducted three forms of discourse analysis over this period, Word 
usage analysis, Definition analysis and Interpretation analysis. 
 
5.1 Word usage analysis 
   Word usage analysis is conducted using a quantitative approach and focusses on what 
kind of word, including phrasal verbs, speakers have used in sentences related to 
sovereignty. I believe that those words that explain or qualify the word µsovereignty¶ are 
different depending on MPs¶ political stand and the context of debates. Then, I expect 
that the usage of those words may change over time. Within these sentences, two types of 
words are frequently recognisable. The first is the word of exposition which explains 
how sovereignty has been or will be when or if the UK passes those related bills to 
European matters. The word list of exposition is shown as Table A1.1 in Appendix 1. For 
example, I quote a few of sentences from the debate in 1971. 
1. µ7KHYDOXH-DGGHGWD[LVDGHURJDWLRQRIWKHVRYHUHLJQW\RIWKLV3DUOLDPHQW¶ (Mr 
Michael Foot, Labour) 
2. µ,DFFHSWWKDW%ULWLVKVRYHUHLJQW\ZLOOEHLPSDLUHG¶ (Mr Jo Grimond, Liberal) 
3. µ,I ZH JR LQ sovereignty will be shared because we shall be going into a 
SDUWQHUVKLS¶ (Mr Michael Fidler, Conservative) 
 
The word of exposition is derogation in No. 1, be impaired in No. 2, and be shared 
in No. 3. They can be nouns or verbs within the sentence.  
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   The second recognisable type is the word of possession. Speakers often talk about the 
possession or location of sovereignty. The word list of possession is shown as Table A1.2 
in Appendix 1. In the above examples, this Parliament in No. 1 and British in No. 2 are 
the word of possession.  
   Both types of words do not always appear in the text. And, also, negative phrasings 
need to be excluded because they could be repetitions of other speakers and could be 
indistinct with what the VSHDNHUV¶ SRLQW LV For example, µ,I ZH HQWHU WKH HQODUJHG
&RPPXQLW\ZHVKDOOJDLQDQDFFHVVLRQRIVRYHUHLJQW\QRWORVHVRYHUHLJQW\¶ (Mr Charles 
Pannell). In this sentence, I regard the word gain as the word of exposition. However, the 
word lose is not appropriate for this analysis because it could be a denial of somebody¶s 
comment. This analysis only includes the words that are clearly recognisable as the 
speaker¶s viewpoint. This precondition of analysis is applied to Chapters 6 and 7 as well. 
The final section in Chapter 7 summarises the comparison between these three periods. 
 
5.1.1 The word of exposition 
   As illustrated in the list of the word of exposition in the previous chapter, I classified 
the word of exposition into four types.  
Negative: sovereignty will go or has gone, or will be or has been limited. 
   Changed: sovereignty will be or has been changed. 
   Unchanged/Defensive: sovereignty will be or has been defended or unaffected. 
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     Positive: sovereignty will be or has been strengthened, or will be or has been used for 
a certain purpose. 
 
Except for the µPositive type¶, all the words indicate the result of the accession and 
the further development of the Community. On the other hand, µPositive words¶ indicate 
not only the result but also the active intent of the government or the state. These four 
names of headings just symbolise how words are used. 
This type of analysis does not pay attention to the meaning or the content of discourse. 
The purpose of this type of analysis is to find out the number or the ratio of these types of 
words. In other words, I focus on how often these words have been used. By counting 
the number of those words in each type, it will be possible to find a difference in usage of 
MPs¶ discourse. The analysis is carried out by finding and comparing the difference 
between groups and periods. The size and extent of the data varies in each debate, and I 
show this as a ratio with pie charts. In order to see the difference easily, each type of the 
word usage was coloured differently. Though these colours are not particularly 
significant, red is for Negative and blue is for Positive, purple is for Changed, and finally, 
green is for Unchanged/Defensive. Some key pie charts will be shown in the text and all 
pie charts, including numbers of data points are shown as Figures A2.1 ± A2.7 in 
Appendix 2. 
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Governments (Figure A2.1) 
   As Figure A2.1 indicates, members of governments during this period tended to use 
µPositive words¶ when they talked about sovereignty. This is much clearer when we see 
this in comparison to other groups. Only governments used more than 50% of µPositive 
words¶. Although this is only one approach of analysis, this result shows that the 
government took a positive attitude for the accession to the EC and that the discourse had 
already Europeanised as David Allen argued (Allen 2005, p139). Unfortunately, there is 
only one observation for 1975. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the Conservative 
Government (1971 & 1972) and the Labour Government (1975). That is, it is impossible 
to determine whether the difference between the parties noted in academic literature is 
supported with the data. 
 
The Conservative Party (Figure A2.2) 
   Although the percentage of the µNegative usage¶ has fluctuated slightly, the µPositive 
usage¶ by the Conservative Party was almost the same percentage throughout this period. 
In comparison with governments, speakers from the Conservative Party (in 1971 and 
1972, backbenchers only) used more µNegative words¶ when they talked about 
sovereignty. From only this percepetive, it is possible to infer that the government had 
been Europeanised, and other MPs had not been Europeanised, as Bulmer and Burch 
argued (Bulmer and Burch 1998, p607). 
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Figure 5.1: A comparison of Governments and with the Conservative party through this 
period 
   
N=32 (out of 73 words of sovereignty)   N=199 (out of 371) 
 
The Labour Party (Figure A2.3) 
   As shown in Figure A2.3, the remarkable trend in the Labour Party is that the 
percentage of the µNegative usage¶ is more than three-quarters throughout this period. It 
is therefore possible to say that speakers of the Labour Party tended to use more 
µNegative words¶ than the Conservative Party. In 1975, the µPositive usage¶ was slightly 
higher than the other two debates. This may be because the Labour Party was in power. 
After winning both the 1974 general elections, Harold Wilson suspended collectivity 
over the issue of Europe (Jones 2007, p135). Thus the result could be influenced by 
discourse of those people who were for membership in the party under the Wilson 
Government. 
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Figure 5.2: The results of the Labour Party in each debate 
     
N=43 (out of 75)                    N=174 (out of 325)                  N=31 (out of 83) 
 
Favour & Against (Figures A2.4 & A2.5) 
   I next compare the group that favoured the bill (Figure A2.4) and the group that was 
against the bill (Figure A2.5). Not surprisingly, the µPositive usage¶ of the Favour group is 
much higher than the Against group. However, the results are interesting in that the 
percentage of the µPositive usage¶ for the Favour group has gradually decreased 
throughout this period, whereas the percentage of the µPositive usage¶ for the Against 
group has increased in this period. Another remarkable point is that, in 1972, the 
µUnchanged/Defensive usage¶ of the Favour group was quite high. This is the only case 
in which the µUnchanged/Defensive usage¶ has been more than 20%. Consequently, this 
is also the only case that the µNegative usage¶ is less than 50%, except in government. 
Paradoxically speaking, the µNegative usage¶ of the Favour group in 1971 and 1975 were 
more than 50%. Therefore, the Favour group in this period tended to use µNegative 
words¶ even though they are in favour of bills. 
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Figure 5.3: The results of the Favour and the Against group in each debate 
     
N=51 (out of 103)                   N=126 (out of 221)                  N=72 (out of 176) 
 
     
N=43 (out of 71)                    N=223 (out of 391)                  N=10 (out of 26) 
 
Totals (Figure A2.6) 
   A remarkable trend in this period is that the µNegative usage¶ totalled more than 60%. 
The µPositive usage¶ also gradually decreased year on year. By taking the result of 
different governments into consideration, a small percentage of the µPositive usage¶ 
shows how backbenchers and members of the opposition did not use many µPositive 
words¶ in this period.  
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Figure 5.4: The results of total in each debate 
     
N=94 (out of 174)                   N=356 (out of 621)                  N=82 (out of 203) 
 
Newspapers (Figure A2.7) 
   The available figures show the total for this period (all of the three debates) because 
the extent of the data in each debate was very limited. Although the extent of the data 
from The Times is not great, as shown in Figure A2.7, the results of these two 
newspapers are completely different. The Times introduces more comments with the 
µPositive usage¶, whereas The Guardian introduces over 90% of comments with the 
µNegative usage¶. From a comparison with Hansard records (Figure A2.6, 1971-1975 
Total), it is clear that their results are poles apart. The most similar results with Hansard 
records are the government group (Figure A2.1, 1971-1975 Governments) for The Times 
and the Against group (Figure A2.5, 1971-1975 Against) for The Guardian. Therefore, it 
is possible to say that The Times advocated an approach similar to that of the government 
and The Guardian advocated an approach similar to opposition group who voted against 
the bills. The difference between The Times and The Guardian illustrates the split 
between the government and the opposition. Does this mean that The Times would have 
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already Europeanised too if the government had Europeanised? I will discuss this later 
when comparing other periods.  
 
Figure 5.5: A comparison of The Times and The Guardian  
   
N=8 (out of 16)                     N=34 (out of 111) 
 
5.1.2 The word of possession 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, I have classified the word of possession into 
nine groups: our, government, Parliament, the House, the people, national, monarch, 
European and restricted such as legal, economic, etc. Speakers did not always mention a 
word of possession. Therefore, the results reflect what word of possession they are likely 
to have meant when they talk about sovereignty. Problematic is what the ZRUG µour¶ 
means as it is ambiguous. The word µour¶ can be groups such as parliament, the House, 
the people and national. As this part of the analysis focusses on how often these words 
have been used rather than why they have been used, I will show the frequency of the pie 
chart in the same way as the analysis of the word of exposition. Some key pie charts will 
be shown in the text and all pie charts, including numbers of data points are shown as 
Figures A2.8 ± A2.14 in Appendix 2. 
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Governments (Figure A2.8) 
Because of the shortage of data in 1971 and 1975 (only one in 1971 and no data in 
1975), it is difficult to find trends of governments in each debate. In total, as shown in 
Figure 5.6, more than 60% of speakers talked about the sovereignty of parliament or 
parliamentary sovereignty when they referred to the possession of sovereignty. Although 
other groups (Figures A2.9 ± A2.14) are also likely to use this word of possession, only 
the government is over 60%. 
 
Figure 5.6: Government total 
 
N=16 (out of 73) 
 
The Conservative Party (Figure A2.9) 
The feature of the Conservative Party in this period is that the percentage of use of 
µParliament¶ gradually increased. In 1971, µParliament¶ was the third greatest percentage 
usage after µour¶ and µthe people¶. However, in 1972 and 1975, µParliament¶ was the 
most frequent, and accounted for more than 40% of words of possession. Unlike the 
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result of the word of exposition, the difference between government and the 
Conservative Party, especially in 1972, is not obvious. 
 
Figure 5.7: The results of the Conservative Party in each debate 
     
N=26 (out of 83)                    N=46 (out of 194)                   N=18 (out of 94) 
 
The Labour Party (Figure A2.10) 
There are no significant features in relation to the Labour Party. In comparison with 
the Conservative Party, it is interesting to note that the result in total is quite similar to the 
Conservative Party. The largest percentage is µParliament¶, the second largest is µour¶, the 
third largest is µnational¶, the fourth largest is µthe House¶.  
 
Figure 5.8: A comparison of the Conservative party and with the Labour Party of this 
period 
   
N=90 (out of 371)                   N=98 (out of 483) 
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Favour and Against (Figures A2.11 & A2.12) 
The majority of those who voted in favour of the bill in 1971 used the ambiguous 
word µour¶; on the other hand, those speakers who voted against the bill in 1971 used the 
term µnational sovereignty¶ much more. In 1972, both groups spoke of the sovereignty of 
parliament or parliamentary sovereignty. In 1975, it is difficult to compare because of the 
shortage of data for the Against group. In general, the result of the Favour group is quite 
similar to the result of the Conservative Party and the result of the Against group is 
similar to the result of the Labour Party; especially, the large percentage of the usage of 
µthe House¶ by both the Labour Party and the Against group in 1971.  
 
Figure 5.9: The results of the Favour and the Against group in each debate 
     
N=26 (out of 103)                   N=52 (out of 221)                   N=32 (out of 176) 
 
     
N=20 (out of 71)                    N=87 (out of 391)                   N=2 (out of 26) 
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Figure 5.10: The Labour Party in 1971 for comparing with the Against group in 1971 
 
N=16 (out of 75)    
 
Total (Figure A2.13) 
As a whole, it is difficult to find remarkable features of this period. What we can find 
is that the usage of µParliament¶ in 1971 is not as significant compared to other years. 
Looking at results of the whole of this period, µParliament¶ is the largest percentage. This 
indicates that speakers are likely to believe parliamentary sovereignty to be important 
when they have talked about the European matters since 1972.  
 
Figure 5.11: The results of total in 1971 and the whole of this period 
   
N=46 (out of 174)                    N=224 (out of 998) 
 
Newspapers (Figure A2.14) 
The Times used the same percentage of µParliament¶ and µnational¶, though it must be 
noted that the total number of stories in this period is relatively small and that all data 
 158 
only came from in 1972. The large percentage usage of µnational¶ was not possible to 
view in any group of 1972 and was a feature of the Labour Party and the Against group 
in 1971 and 1975. This is an interesting result because it is said that The Times in this 
period supported the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party in general. In consequence, 
this result is the reverse of the result of the usage of the word of exposition.  
The Guardian introduced much more comments than The Times, and they came 
from all year through this period. The result is that the percentage of µParliament¶ is the 
largest as 49%. The result of The Guardian does not correspond to any other groups.  
The comparison with the total of this period with Hansard records shows that both 
newspapers are not likely to introduce the usage of µour¶.  
 
Figure 5.12: A comparison of The Times and with The Guardian 
   
N=7 (out of 16)                     N=40 (out of 111) 
 
Summary of Word usage analysis 
   In the word of exposition, as a whole, a difference amongst groups is generally clear. 
Members of governments tend to use µPositive words¶. Members of the opposition party 
and backbenchers tend to use µNegative words¶. A difference between newspapers is also 
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clear. The Times tends to introduce comments which use µPositive words¶ on the one 
hand; The Guardian tends to introduce comments which use µNegative words¶ on the 
other hand. However, a difference of the word of possession is not clear. Although 
µParliament¶ and µour¶ are used with a high percentage, MPs generally refer to many 
types of possession.  
 
5.2 Definition analysis 
   This section analyses how speakers define sovereignty. Their comments relating to 
definitions are not many but are diverse. Thus the definition can be different depending 
on MPs. As I introduced three different points of argument over sovereignty in Chapter 3, 
I expect that Definition analysis can indicate which argument MPs pay attention and can 
suggest whether their points of argument have changed. Therefore, I tried to find 
differences, commonalities and consistencies from the various comments. The extent of 
the data that I found from each debate is shown as Table A2.2 in Appendix 2. As we can 
see, the number of comments is not great so that, in order to analyse definitions easily, the 
point of discourse was focussed on each speech, especially taking three points of 
argument over sovereignty into consideration: legal, theoretical and practical. For 
example: 
1. µ6RYHUHLJQW\LVDPDWWHURISRZHUWRPDNHGHFLVLRQVDQGWRDFKLHYHSXUSRVHV,WLVQR
JRRGVD\LQJWKDWVRYHUHLJQW\LVDOHJDOTXHVWLRQ¶ (Mr John P. Mackintosh, Labour) 
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2. µ, XVHVRYHUHLJQW\DVDWHUPRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQGQRWDVDTXHVWLRQRISRZHU¶ (Mr 
Michael English, Labour) 
3. µ6RYHUHLJQW\PHDQVWRPHQDWLRQDOLQGHSHQGHQFHIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDQDWLRQ
V
GHVWLQ\¶6LU*HUDOG1DEDUUR&RQVHUYDWLYH) 
4. µ6RYHUHLJQW\LVUHWDLQHGLQWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQV¶ (Mr Harold Lever, Labour) 
 
The above cited examples are contrasting definitions. The first states that sovereignty is a 
matter of power to make decisions, not a legal question, whereas the second says that 
sovereignty is a term of international law, not a question of power. In other words, the 
first statement emphasise that sovereignty should be viewed through a practical meaning 
and the second one says that sovereignty should be viewed through a legal meaning. 
These contrasting definitions show that there is no consistent agreement on the definition 
of sovereignty amongst MPs and that their points of argument on sovereignty are 
different. The third definition focusses on a theoretical meaning. And the forth definition 
talks about the location of sovereignty. Therefore, the definition of sovereignty can be 
found in two ways: what sovereignty should be as the first three sentences and who or 
which body should have sovereignty as the last sentence. The focus on this analysis is to 
make clear what each group says about the definition of sovereignty, and what is the 
most common or distinctive definition at each debate throughout this period. The points 
of definition are shown as Table A2.3 in Appendix 2. 
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Governments 
   The extent of the data for Government speakers is not great in this period, so the 
result may not represent each government or the whole governments. As the number is 
small, all definitions are cited individually below. 
   In 1971, only Mr Edward Heath, the Prime Minister, made a comment of definition. 
He said, µSovereignty belongs to all of us.¶ This is talking about the location of 
sovereignty. In 1972, only Mr Geoffrey Rippon, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
made a comment. He referred to two statements on the same day: 1) µsovereignty is a 
ZRUGZKLFKLVXVHGPXFKPRUHIRULWVHPRWLRQDOWKDQIRULWVOHJDOVLJQLILFDQFH¶; 2) µ«, 
and nothing that I have said overrides that concept of the legal sovereignty vested in 
Parliament.¶ The second sentence is quite long, thus only a part of it was quoted. It is easy 
to recognise that the second one was a response to a question from an MP that was raised 
after the first comment. Although he found that sovereignty is used for emotional reasons, 
consequently, he focussed on a legal meaning of sovereignty and noted the location as in 
Parliament. In 1975, only Mr James Callaghan, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, referred to a definition of sovereignty: µBut true sovereignty is 
the power to make effectLYHGHFLVLRQVLQRXURZQDIIDLUV¶ It is possible to recognise that 
his definition focussed on a practical meaning of sovereignty.  
   Governments in this period thus had no consensus of definitions. Their diverse views 
included legal and practical meanings and the location of sovereignty as in all and in 
Parliament, and they did not refer to any other definition. 
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The Conservative Party 
   In 1971, nine comments on definitions from Conservative MPs can be found. The 
most frequent definition, with three appearances, was one which stated that sovereignty 
has changed. This definition is not saying what sovereignty is; rather, it is saying that 
certain ideas of sovereignty are not prominent anymore. For example, ³7KH$XVWLQLDQ
idea of sovereignty completely finLVKHG  ´ (Mr Percy Grieve, Conservative). Ironically, 
these views suggest that it is difficult to define sovereignty at this stage. The second most 
frequent definitions, with two appearances, were ones which focussed on both practical 
and theoretical meanings. 
   In 1972, nine comments on definition can be found. The most frequent definitions, 
with two appearances, were ones which focussed on a theoretical meaning, sovereignty 
has changed and the location of sovereignty as in the House of Commons.  
   In 1975, when Conservatives were in opposition, seven comments of definition can 
be found. The most frequent definition, with four appearances, was one which focussed 
on a practical meaning. The second most frequent definition, with two appearances, was 
one which focussed on a theoretical meaning.  
   Overall, the most frequent definitions throughout this period, with six appearances, 
were ones which focussed on both theoretical and practical meanings. And the second 
was, with five appearances, one which sovereignty has changed. This result will be 
compared with the Labour Party and the Favour group. 
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The Labour Party 
   In 1971, only three comments on definition made by Labour Party MPs can be found. 
They are all different and relate to: sovereignty has changed, a practical meaning and the 
location of sovereignty as in Parliament. All of them also appear in the debates in 1972.  
In 1972, 21 comments on definition were found. The most frequent definitions, with 
four appearances, were ones which focussed on a practical meaning and the location of 
sovereignty as in Parliament. The second most frequent, with three appearances, was 
one which focussed on a theoretical meaning. The third most frequent, with two 
appearances, were many and relate to: a legal meaning, not a practical meaning, 
sovereignty has multiple meanings and the location of sovereignty as both in Parliament 
and in the people. 
In 1975, four comments on definition were found. The most frequent definition, with 
two appearances, was one which focussed on a practical meaning.  
In total, the most frequent definition of this period was, with seven appearances, one 
which focussed on a practical meaning. The second most frequent, with five 
appearances, was the location of sovereignty as in Parliament, and the third, with three 
appearances, was one which focussed on a theoretical meaning and not a practical 
meaning. In comparison with the Conservative Party, focussing on a theoretical meaning 
by members of the Labour Party was less though this was the third frequent. And also, 
the location of sovereignty as in Parliament was more than the Conservative Party. 
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However, other points of discourse were not so much different from the Conservative 
Party. 
 
Favour 
   In 1971, nine comments on definition can be found. The most frequent definition, 
with four appearances, was that sovereignty has changed. The second frequent definition, 
with three appearances, was one which focussed on a practical meaning. 
   In 1972, ten comments were also found. The most frequent definitions, with two 
appearances, were that sovereignty has changed and the location of sovereignty as in 
Parliament.  
   In 1975, 12 comments were found. The most frequent definition, with seven 
appearances, was one which focussed on a practical meaning. The second frequent 
definition, with two appearances, was one which focussed on a theoretical meaning. 
   In total, the most frequent definition among the Favour group, with 11 appearances, 
was on which focussed on a practical meaning. The second frequent definition, with six 
appearances, was that sovereignty has changed. The total of these two definitions was the 
majority of the Favour group. It is reasonable to consider that the Favour group tends to 
view the definition of sovereignty in these perspectives. 
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Against 
   In 1971, four comments on definitions were found. The most frequent definition, 
with two appearances, was one which focussed on a theoretical meaning.  
   In 1972, 25 comments were found. The most frequent definitions, with five 
appearances, were one which focussed on a theoretical meaning and the location of 
sovereignty as in Parliament. The second, with four appearances, was one which 
focussed on a practical meaning. And the third, with three appearances, was one which 
focussed on a legal meaning. Thus these three points of argument were largely paid 
attention by the Against group in this year. . 
   In 1975, only one comment was found. This was the comment from the SNP that 
focussed on a practical meaning. 
   In total, the most frequent definition, with seven appearances, was one which 
focussed on a theoretical meaning. The second, with six appearances, was the location of 
sovereignty as in Parliament. The third, with five appearances, was one which focussed 
on a practical meaning. What is the difference from the Favour group is that focussing 
on a theoretical meaning is larger than the Favour group. Although the difference 
between theoretical and practical meanings in the Against group was not so large, the 
trend was that the Favour group tended to focus on a practical meaning, whereas the 
Against group tended to focus on a theoretical meaning. 
 
 166 
It is not possible to conduct analysis of the newspapers because there was only one 
definition of The Times in this period and in the third period (1997-2009). There is also 
only one definition of The Guardian in the second period (1985-1993) and no definition 
in the third period. 
 
Total and summary of Definition analysis 
   In total of this period, the most frequent definition, with 16 appearances, was one 
which focussed on a practical meaning. The second most frequent definition, with ten 
appearances, was one which focussed on a theoretical meaning. The third most frequent 
definition, with eight appearances, was the location of sovereignty as in Parliament. And 
the forth, with seven appearances, was one which stated that sovereignty has changed. 
Although a variety of definitions can be found, according to the above results with the 
cross-cutting view, it is possible to conclude that members of the Conservative Party who 
were in favour of bills tended to focus on a practical meaning and to state that 
sovereignty has changed. On the other hand, members of the Conservative Party who 
were against bills tended to focus on a theoretical meaning and nobody focussed on a 
practical meaning. Thus the definition of the Conservative Party in this period was 
completely divided in the view of a practical meaning. In the Labour Party, on the other 
hand, there was no statement on a theoretical meaning in the Favour group. Thus 
definition of this view was divided in the Labour Party. However, focussing on a 
practical meaning was the same number in both the Favour and Against groups. 
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Thereofore, the division of each party was made by different perspectives. With these 
results in mind, it is necessary to observe whether those two definitions and other 
definitions will have been retained or changed over time or whether a different definition 
has emerged. 
   The table below is the total points of definition through this period. Tables of each 
debate are shown in Table A2.3 in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 5.1: 1971-1975 Total 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Governments: 4 practical: 1 
legall: 1 
in all : 1 
in Parliament:: 1 
Conservative: 24 theoretical: 6 
practical: 6 
changed: 5 
legal: 1 
multiple: 1 
not theoretical: 1 
in Parliament: 2 
in the House of Commons: 2  
 
Labour: 28 practical: 7 
not practical: 3 
theoretical: 3 
legal: 2 
changed: 2 
multiple: 2 
in Parliament: 5 
in the House of Commons: 2 
both in Parliament and the 
people: 2 
 
Favour: 31 practical: 11 
changed: 6 
theoretical: 3 
not practical: 2 
legal: 1 
multiple: 1 
in the House of Commons: 3 
in Parliament: 3 
in all: 1 
in the people: 1 
Against: 30 theoretical: 7 
practical: 5 
legal: 3 
multiple: 3 
not practical: 2 
changed: 1 
in Parliament: 6 
both in parliament and the 
people: 2 
in the House of Commons: 1 
 
Total: Favour + Against practical: 16 
theoretical: 10 
changed: 7 
legal: 4 
not practical: 4 
multiple: 4 
in Parliament: 9 
in the House of Commons: 4 
both in parliament and the 
people: 2 
in all: 1 
in the people: 1 
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   In another aspect, I consider how often the statement of definition appeared. In 1971, 
there were 13 definitions in total out of 111 statements of sovereignty.15 The percentage 
was 11.7%. In 1972, there were 35 definitions in total out of 398 statements of 
sovereignty. The percentage was 8.8%. In 1975, there were 13 definitions in total out of 
123 statements of sovereignty. The percentage was 10.6%. Thus, the statement of 
definition appears at rate of about 10% in each debate. I will consider this result in the 
next two periods.  
 
5.3 Interpretation analysis 
   In this section, I analyse how MPs interpret sovereignty in the context of the 
phenomenon of European integration. The interpretation of sovereignty would express 
what would happen to or has happened to sovereignty at each resolution and ratification 
process. Therefore, I expect that MPs¶ interpretation of sovereignty can be affected and 
changed over time through the mechanisms of adaptational pressure and interactions as 
to the progress of European integration and through other factors such as competitive 
discussion between government and opposition, the Conservative and the Labour, the 
Favour and the Against etc. As a result, the inclination of discourse in each group and 
period can be found. Because the number of discourses that speakers refer to in their 
                                                 
15
  This is not the number of mentions of µsovereignty¶. This is the number of statements that include the 
term µsovereignty¶. Therefore, one statement includes one term of sovereignty, and the other statement 
includes a couple of terms of sovereignty. 
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interpretation is diverse, it is impossible to analyse them one by one. Hence, the analysis 
is carried out by applying the following theoretical classifications: 
 
By joining in the EC or passing a bill of European matter, 
1.  Cession: Sovereignty will be transferred to the EC/EU, or all or a part of 
sovereignty will be lost or limited. 
2.  Unaffected: Sovereignty will not be changed. 
3.  Utilisation: Sovereignty will be transferred to or be pooled in the EC/EU in 
exchange for some advantages. 
 
And also, through membership activities in the EC/EU, 
4.  Reinforcement: Sovereignty will be strengthened, be used or be transformed 
by way of enhancing its capacity. 
 
As I have noted in the previous chapter, the aim is to find what is perceived to happen to 
sovereignty through European integration. Hence, most interpretations can be classified 
into these four groups. I examine the interpretations of each group and specific people, as 
outlined in the previous chapter and previous sections. 
 
 
 
 170 
Governments 
   In 1971, only Mr Edward Heath, the Prime Minister, made a statement of 
interpretation. His interpretation can be classified as a reinforcement type of interpretation. 
He said: 
In joining we are making a commitment which involves our sovereignty, but we 
are also gaining an opportunity. «%XWWREHWKHUHDVDPHPEHURIWKH&RPPXQLW\
in my view, would be an effective use of our contribution of sovereignty. 
 
He does not say anything about reinforcement or transformation of sovereignty but does 
mention the effective use of sovereignty as a member of the Community. Therefore, I 
consider his interpretation to be categorised as reinforcement. 
   In 1972, Mr Geoffrey Rippon, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, the Solicitor-General, repeatedly made statements of interpretation. 
Their statements are many; thus, I cannot cite all of them. Both of them also relate to the 
categories of sovereignty being unaffected, utilisation of European integration for 
national interests and reinforcement of sovereignty by membership as well. Mr Rippon¶s 
statement of reinforcement type of interpretation was, µ, EHOLHYH WKDW E\ SRROLQJ RXU
sovereignty we sKDOOLQIDFWVWUHQJWKHQLW¶ Sir Geoffrey Howe also made a comment that 
fits the reinforcement type of interpretation as well, µ$GHFLVLRQWRVKDUHSRZHUWRWKH
common advantage is an enhancement rather than a loss of sovereignty.¶ Both said 
sovereignty would be strengthened or enhanced.  
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   In 1975, only Mr Edmund Dell, the Paymaster-General, made a couple of statements 
of interpretation that would be classified as sovereignty being unaffected and as 
utilisation of European integration for national interests. It is possible to find some 
changes in his discourse as he was against the European Community Bill 1972 when the 
Labour Party was in opposition. Although he voted against the bill, he made a quite 
affirmative statement in 1972: 
Whatever the legal position, I believe that this Parliament could in practice give 
away its sovereignty. But we are not doing that in this Bill. We do not, as a result of 
entry into the European Community, give away our sovereignty. We have the 
continuing power to recall what we give away. On that basis I am prepared to say 
that membership of the European Community is consistent with national 
sovereignty. 
 
His point was that parliamentary sovereignty is given away in practice but will not be 
done in this bill. However, in 1975 as a member of government, he did not speak about 
the possibility of giving away. He just said, µAn industrial free trade area would involve 
QRULVNWRVRYHUHLJQW\¶ And further, he stated: 
I believe that Europe is an association of sovereign States for certain common 
purposes, States which have agreed to pool their sovereignty in the interest of these 
common purposes. 
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He does not use the word µgive away¶ this time and instead uses the word µpool¶.  
Surprisingly then, interpretations of government in this period are diverse. 
 
The Conservative Party 
   In 1971, 15 members of the Conservative Party made statements of interpretation. 
Three of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, three of them were classified as 
sovereignty being unaffected, and nine of them were as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests. No statement categorised as reinforcement of 
sovereignty by membership could be found. 
   In 1972, 14 members made statements and many of them presented their 
interpretations more than once throughout the reading process. Six of them can be 
classified as cession of sovereignty, two of them were as sovereignty being unaffected, 
four of them were as utilisation of European integration for national interests, and two of 
them were as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. One reinforcement type of 
interpretation was made by Mr David Knox. He said: 
By joining the Common Market, Britain will have access to a new sovereignty 
which neither she nor any of the individual countries of the Common Market can 
ever enjoy if they stay separate.  
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His µnew sovereignty¶ can be viewed as the transforming of sovereignty of this category. 
The other reinforcement type of interpretation was made by Mr John Selwyn Gummer 
and he said: 
I believe the Clause to be not just a necessary evil but an advantage, because it says 
at long last that we are not merely going to have pious hopes of being friendly with 
our neighbours but that with them we shall exercise greater sovereignty inside that 
community which we are joining. 
 
His expression of µexercise greater sovereignty¶ can be regarded as reinforcement of 
sovereignty by membership.  
In 1975, eight members made their statements of interpretation. Four of them were 
classified as cession of sovereignty, one of them was as sovereignty being unaffected, one 
of them was as utilisation of European integration for national interests, and two of them 
could be as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. One of the reinforcement types 
of interpretations was made by Mr Iain Sproat. He said: 
Inside, we can increase our own sovereignty, as I take sovereignty to mean control 
E\ RQHVHOI RYHU WKDW ZKLFK DIIHFWV RQHVHOI PRVW LPSRUWDQWO\ « :H DUH IUHHO\
sharing with like-minded neighbour nations something of the illusion of 
sovereignty so that we may gain much more of the substance of sovereignty. 
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He said that sovereignty would be increased or the substance of it would be gained. Sir 
John Eden also stated the reinforcement type of interpretation when he said: 
Sovereignty lies in the power to exercise, influence and to affect decisions. To that 
extent I feel that within the greater authority of the European Communities our 
sovereignty, far from being weakened, will be extended. 
  
Focussing on individuals, only Mr Gilbert Longden and Sir Geoffrey Howe made 
their statements of interpretation in different debates. Mr Gilbert Longden gave 
statements in 1971 and in 1972, and both interpretations were as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests. Sir Geoffrey Howe states in 1972 as a member of 
government and in 1975 as a member of the opposition. Although his interpretation was 
various in 1972, his interpretations in both periods were included the utilisation type of 
interpretation. Hence, it is hard to find discourse change just focussing on this period. 
 
The Labour Party 
   In 1971, 12 members of the Labour Party made statements of interpretation. Their 
interpretations were clearly separated into two groups in that four members were 
categorised as utilisation of European integration for national interest who voted in 
favour of the bill and eight members were as cession of sovereignty who voted against 
the bill. 
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   In 1972, 22 members made statements. Eighteen of them were as cession of 
sovereignty, three of them were as sovereignty being unaffected, and one was as 
utilisation of European integration for national interests. The result of the large number of 
the cession type of interpretations is because there was no member who voted in favour 
of the bill. These interpretations merely mentioned the surrender or the limitation of 
sovereignty. However, Mr John P. Mackintosh and Mr William Hamilton made a 
different statement of the cession type of interpretation. Mr John P. Mackintosh said: 
     I quite accept that some sovereignty will move away from the British Executive to 
the European Executive and it is right that we should ask how we shall be able to 
maintain detailed scrutiny of what is being proposed by the European Executive. 
 
Mr William Hamilton said: 
     We must accept that if and when we join any bigger community, whether it be the 
EEC or an even wider community, there is bound to be a diminution or pooling of 
national sovereignty. We have been doing this for many years, particularly since 
the end of the war, and we should not be shocked by that, but before we abrogate 
that sovereignty we must have the right to insist on adequate time for debating 
whether it is worthwhile and what price we are paying. 
 
Although they voted against the bill in the end, their interpretation was different from 
others in that they accepted the need for a transfer or a diminution of national sovereignty 
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where others did not. I will discuss this kind of interpretation further in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile, the utilisation type of interpretation was made by Mr Maurice Edelman: 
     There is a conscious divestment of sovereignty for specific purposes. Our 
divestment of sovereignty in Europe, properly controlled and observed, may well 
be to our advantage. 
 
This was the only interpretation that was classified into as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests in this year. 
   In 1975, five members made statements of interpretation. Three of them were as 
cession of sovereignty, one was as sovereignty being unaffected, and one was as 
utilisation of European integration for national interests. The interesting feature was that 
only one member Mr Nigel Spearing, voted against the bill, and he was the only member 
who made a statement of the utilisation type of interpretation. He said, µI am not against 
giving limited sovereignty to an international organisation as long as we can deal with the 
limits of that organisation on the merits¶ 
   As a whole, members of the Labour Party in this period, regardless of whether it was 
in power or not, tended to make statements of the cession type of interpretation. And in 
all statements of the utilisation type of interpretation, as the feature of this period, there 
were no µPositive words¶ in their interpretation. 
   Focussing on individuals, six members made their statement in both 1971 and 1972. 
Five of them repeated the same interpretation. One individual, Mr John P. Mackintosh, 
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changed his interpretation. As I cited his statement of 1972 above, it was the cession type 
of interpretation. However, in 1971, he said, µ6R WKH GHFLVLRQ WR MRLQ ZLWK WKH RWKHU
powers was not in fact a derogation or loss of sovereignty; it was in reality an increase in 
WKHHIIHFWLYHSRZHURIWKLV+RXVH¶ He clearly mentioned the advantage in 1971 but does 
not mention it in 1972. As I have cited in the section on government, Mr Edmund Dell is 
the only member who was in government, the Paymaster-General, in 1975, and who 
made a statement in 1972 as well. 
 
Favour, Against and Abstention 
   In 1971, 19 members who voted in favour of the bill made their statement of 
interpretation. One of them was classified as cession of sovereignty, three of them were 
as sovereignty being unaffected, 14 of them were as utilisation of European integration 
for national interests, and one was as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. On 
the other hand, 12 members who voted against the bill made their statements of 
interpretation. Eleven of them were classified as cession of sovereignty, and one was as 
utilisation of European integration for national interests. Except for members of 
government, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, two members of the Liberal 
Party who voted in favour of the bill made statements of the utilisation type of 
interpretation, and one member of the Scottish National Party (SNP) who voted against 
the bill made his statement of the cession type of interpretation. The feature of this year is, 
as the results have shown, almost all members of the Favour group were the utilisation 
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type of interpretation and almost all members of the Against group were the cession type 
of interpretation. 
   In 1972, 14 members, except members of government who interpreted a couple of 
categories, who voted in favour of the bill made statements of interpretation. Four of 
them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, one of them was as sovereignty being 
unaffected, six of them were as utilisation of European integration for national interests, 
and three of them were as reinforcement of sovereignty as a result of European 
integration. On the other hand, 22 members who voted against the bill made statements 
of interpretation. Eighteen of them were classified as cession of sovereignty, three of 
them were as sovereignty being unaffected, and one was as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests. Thus, their interpretations were overwhelmingly 
classified into the cession type of interpretation. In this year, three members of the Liberal 
Party made statements of interpretation. Two of them voted in favour of the bill and one 
abstained from voting. One who voted in favour made his statement as utilisation of 
European integration for national interests and the other, Mr Russel Johnston, made a 
statement of the reinforcement type of interpretation, µ,DPRQHRIWKRVHZKREHOLHYHWKDW
sharing sovereignty in Europe will strengthen rather than weaken our capacity to protect 
RXULQWHUHVWV¶ 
   In 1975, 14 members who voted in favour of the bill made statements of 
interpretation. Seven of them were classified as cession of sovereignty, three of them 
were as sovereignty being unaffected, two of them were as utilisation of European 
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integration for national interests, and two of them were as reinforcement of sovereignty 
by membership. Surprisingly, the cession type of interpretation is the most frequent in 
this year. Mr Russel Johnston, who made his statement in 1972 with the reinforcement 
type of interpretation, made the cession type of interpretation this time but it explains 
about the future. He says: 
If the EEC develops, as I hope and believe it probably will, into some kind of 
union, whether federal or not, with a directly-elected Parliament, certainly 
sovereignty will depart from this House. 
 
As he desired the EEC to develop, thus, some of the cession type of interpretations may 
have just omitted the explanation of advantage but it is impossible to say so in general. 
   Only two members who voted against the bill made statements of interpretation. One 
of them was categorised as the cession type of interpretation and the other was the 
utilisation type of interpretation. This utilisation type of interpretation was made by Mr 
Nigel Spearing. His statement was cited in the section of the Labour Party.  
 
   As a whole in this period, members who voted in favour of the bill tended to make 
statements of the utilisation type of interpretation and those who voted against the bill 
tended to make their statements of the cession type of interpretation. As expected, there 
was no reinforcement type of interpretation amongst members who voted against the bill. 
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Newspapers 
   The Times in this period did not introduce many statements of interpretation. Two of 
them were by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs; one of them was by Sir Geoffrey Howe; and one of them was 
the common statement of some members of the Conservative Party. Interpretation of Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home is not found in debates. The Times introduces his statements in June 
1972 as follows: µ-RLQLQJ WKH((&GLGQRWPHDQD ORVVRIVRYHUHLJQW\.¶ µ,W LVPRUe a 
sharing of sovereignty rather than a loss.¶ These two statements can be regarded as one 
discourse. The problem is how I should regard his comment ³more a sharing .´ This does 
not say anything about some advantage in return, nor enhancement of capacity as the 
utilisation and the reinforcement types of interpretations. Therefore, his interpretations 
would be categorised as sovereignty being unaffected. Interpretation of Sir Geoffrey 
Howe is cited in July 1972, µ7KHGHFLVLRQWRVKDUHSRZHUWRFRPPRQDGYDQWDges was 
enhancing rather than DORVVRIVRYHUHLJQW\¶ He said that the decision was enhancing 
sovereignty. That is classified as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. 
Interpretation of Conservative cheers is also introduced at the same day with Howe. This 
is written as follows: 
It was the fundamental belief, shared by the preceding administration, that the 
purpose of the action to join the Community was a deliberate use of sovereignty to 
engage in sharing sovereignty to the greater advantage of them all. 
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This interpretation can be classified as utilisation of European integration for national 
interests. As The Times introduced this statement as reflecting views of some members of 
the Conservative Party, it seems that this interpretation would represent the Conservative 
Party itself.  
   The Guardian in this period, on the other hand, introduced nine members with 
interpretations. Four of them were members of government, from both the Conservative 
Party and the Labour Party. Two of them were members of the Conservative Party, two 
of them were members of the Labour Party, and one was a member of the Liberal Party. 
In government, one was Mr Geoffrey Rippon of the Conservative Party. The Guardian 
cited at the beginning of debate 1972, µ0U 5LSSRQ GHFODUHG WKDt nothing in the Bill 
DEULGJHV WKH XOWLPDWH VRYHUHLJQW\ RI 3DUOLDPHQW¶ Hence, this interpretation would be 
categorised as sovereignty being unaffected. Three others were members of the Labour 
Government. The statement of Mr Elwyn Jones, Lord Chancellor, was cited on 17th 
March 1975 as sovereignty being unaffected, µ$VDOawyer, he is committed to the view 
that the Treaty of Accession cannot be regarded as over-riding parliamentary 
VRYHUHLJQW\¶ Mr Edward Short, the Leader of the House of Commons and the Lord 
President of the Council, cited his interpretation twice. On 11th April 1975, The 
Guardian cited his statement as sovereignty being unaffected, µ7KHFRXQWU\¶VXOWLPDWH
sovereignty was unaffected by membership of the EEC, because continued membership 
couOGDWDQ\WLPHEHUHYHUVHGE\$FWRI3DUOLDPHQW¶ However, one month later, on 6th 
May 1975, it cited his statement as cession of sovereignty: 
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     µ7KHEDVLFGLIILFXOW\¶ DGPLWWHG WKH/HDGHURI WKH+RXVH0U6KRUW GXULQJRQH
GHEDWHµLVWKDW3DUOLDPHQWKas lost its sovereignty over a whole area of legislation 
ZKLFKDSSOLHVWRWKHSHRSOHRIWKLVFRXQWU\¶ 
 
Thus, within one month, The Guardian introduced two different interpretations of Mr 
Short. And finally, Mrs Shirley Williams, the Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer 
Protection, was cited with a statement categorised as cession of sovereignty: 
     Of course the Community represents change and it does represent some sacrifice 
of sovereignty. I very much doubt whether sovereignty without power is 
meaningful anyway. 
 
Consequently, The Guardian did not cite any interpretation of the utilisation or the 
reinforcement type of government in this period. 
   Two statements of the Conservative Party were both categorised as the cession type 
of interpretations and two of the Labour Party were as cession of sovereignty and as 
sovereignty being unaffected. One exception is, therefore, the statement of Mr Russell 
Johnston, the Liberal Party, in this period. The Guardian cited on 6th July 1972: 
     Mr Johnston considered that we should gain sovereignty by going into the 
Community, rather than losing any. 
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Thus, this is the only reinforcement type of interpretation that the Guardian introduced in 
this period. 
 
Summary of Interpretation analysis 
   Utilisation of European integration for national interests and reinforcement of 
sovereignty by membership were surprisingly found a lot amongst members of 
government in this period, contrary to my expectation. One reason can be presumed that 
this period differs from the other two periods (1985-1993 and 1997-2009) in a certain 
manner. Debates in the other two periods were about the legal and institutional reform of 
the Community or the Union as a member state. In other words, the UK is passively 
required to ratify it. However, debates in this period (1971-1975) are about whether the 
UK should join and whether the UK should stay in the existing Community. Therefore, 
the result of many interpretations of utilisation type and especially interpretation as 
reinforcement of sovereignty by membership would be a description of the active 
behaviour of the UK itself. 
   Viewing in detail this reinforcement type of interpretation, it is expressed by some 
members of the Conservative Party including members of government and the Liberal 
Party but there was no statement from members of the Labour Party. According to 
expectation, there was no interpretation of reinforcement type in the Against group as 
well. One point of this analysis is whether the reinforcement type of interpretation will 
increase and spread throughout the three periods.  
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   Taking all the results in this period into account, the analysis will be carried out by 
comparing with other periods.  
 
1971-1975 Conclusion 
In the word of exposition of Word usage analysis, the difference was clear between 
groups. Members of government tended to use more µPositive words¶ and backbenchers 
tended to use more µNegative words¶. In Interpretation analysis, further, a couple of 
reinforcement types of interpretations in the Conservative Government were found. 
These results show that members of government would have been Europeanised by 
adaptational pressure or competitive discussion with the opposition. Contrary to 
expectations, the reinforcement type of interpretation was accepted by some 
non-government members too. In the word of possession of Word usage analysis, the 
difference was not clear. Therefore, it is impossible to find a clear trend in this period. In 
Definition analysis, the Conservative Party in this period was completely divided in the 
view of a practical meaning. The Labour Party, on the other hand, was divided in the 
view of a theoretical meaning. Thereofore, the division of both parties was in different 
perspectives. As I have argued in the summary of Interpretation analysis, however, it is 
important to consider the nature of this period which is about whether the UK should join 
and whether the UK should stay in the existing Community in comparison with other 
two periods (1985-1993 and 1997-2009) which are debates about the legal and 
institutional reform of the Community or the Union as a member state.  
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6  The Single European Act and the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1985-1993) 
This chapter outlines the discourse analysis undertaken of the periods between 1985 
and 1993. Samples of analysis include: 1) debates on the SEA which include the readings 
of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill (June and July 1986), and 2) debates 
on the Treaty of Maastricht, which include the readings of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill (May 1992 - May 1993).  
   The size and extent of the data for each sample is shown as Table A3.1 in Appendix 3. 
The analysis is conducted in the same manner as the analysis of Chapter 5. 
 
6.1 Word usage analysis 
As in the previous chapter, the analysis is conducted using a quantitative approach 
and focusses on what kind of word, including phrasal verbs, speakers have used in 
sentences related to sovereignty. My expectation is that those words that explain or 
qualify the word µsovereignty¶ are different depending on MPs¶ political stand and the 
context of debates. 
 
6.1.1 The word of exposition 
Like the previous chapter, some related pie charts will be shown in the text and all 
pie charts with numbers of data are shown as Figures A3.1 ± A3.7 in Appendix 3. 
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Government (Figure A3.1) 
   As shown in Figure A3.1, there was no data for government around the time of the 
SEA and only three data of the word of exposition around the time of the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The result was one each for the µNegative¶, the µUnchanged¶ and the 
µPositive usage¶. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate a trend of this period and, also, it 
is almost impossible to compare with the first period. 
   According to the number of statements on sovereignty (Table A3.1), although there is 
only one in the SEA debates, we can find nine statements on sovereignty in the debate on 
the Treaty of Maastricht. In the first period (Table A2.1), the number of statement on 
sovereignty in 1971 and 1975 are less than 10, so that I cannot say that the number of 
data for government has decreased.  
 
The Conservative Party (Figure A3.2) 
   Both pie charts of the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht periods are very similar. The 
number of MPs who stated the word of exposition during the SEA period was six people 
with 15 comments and the number of MPs at the time of the Treaty of Maastricht was 22 
people with 60 comments. One of the MPs who made statements on both debates 
changed his stand. This was Mr Bill Cash. He voted in favour of the SEA but against the 
Treaty of Maastricht. Two other MPs made statements during both debates but did not 
change their stands. Mr Hugh Dykes voted in favour of both bills and Mr Tony Marlow 
voted against both bills. Other MPs did not make a statement in either debate. Therefore, 
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it is possible to view that MPs of the Conservative Party throughout this period tended to 
use the word of exposition with the ratio of these two results when they made statements. 
Further, the result of the first period also shows that the percentage of the µNegative 
usage¶ was almost the same. That is, discourse of the Conservative Party in this aspect 
did not change. 
   However, the Conservative Party in this period was beset by internal disputes in 
relation to Europe. The tension was also seen in the cabinet. Sir Geoffrey Howe resigned 
as Deputy Prime Minister in protest at Thatcher¶s attitude to Europe in 1990 (Budge et al. 
2007, pp369-371). Although the ratio of both debates was similar, the conflict over 
Europe within the Conservative Party seemed to be escalated between two debates. 
Ludlam estimates the percentage of rebels against European integration in the 
Conservative Party and shows that only 2% of Conservative MPs rebelled at the 
resolution of the SEA on the one hand, but 18% rebelled at the resolution of the Treaty of 
Maastricht on the other hand (Ludlam and Smith 1996, pp104-105 Table 6.1). Ludlam 
argues that the Maastricht rebellion illustrated more dramatically than ever the extent to 
which a sovereignty/interdependence dimension was displacing and cutting across the 
party¶s traditional ideological fault line over how interventionist the state should be 
(Ludlam and Smith 1966, pp11-112). Nevertheless, it is interesting that the result of the 
word of exposition has not changed throughout this period. 
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Figure 6.1: The results of the Conservative Party in each debate 
   
N=15 (out of 32 words of sovereignty)   N=60 (out of 116) 
 
The Labour Party (Figure A3.3) 
   The results of the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht periods are different. Only the 
µNegative usage¶ was found during the SEA debates, whereas more µPositive usages¶ 
than was the case with the Conservative Party were found in the Treaty of Maastricht 
debates. This 30% µPositive usage¶ was the greatest ever in the result of the Labour Party. 
What was the reason behind it? In the debate of the SEA, only MPs who voted against 
the bill made statements of the word of exposition. In the debate of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, however, three members who voted in favour of the bill and ten members 
who abstained in the voting made statements of the word of exposition. All members 
who voted in favour of the bill used µPositive words¶ and some members who abstained 
in the voting used µPositive words¶ too. As I have argued in Chapter 3, the year 1988 was 
the turning point for the Labour Party from an anti-European to a pro-European stance; 
the result of the word of exposition reflects the change of the Labour Party. However, the 
percentage of the µNegative usage¶ was still over 60% and eight members who 
mentioned the word of exposition voted against the bill. Although an indication of 
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changed stance can be seen, the result of the word of exposition indicates that many 
Labour MPs seemed to be still holding an anti-European stance.  
 
Figure 6.2: The results of the Labour Party in each debate 
   
N=12 (out of 20)                    N=54 (out of 116) 
 
Favour and Against (Figures A3.4 & A3.5) 
   A comparison between the Favour group (Figure A3.4) and the Against group 
(Figure A3.5) has not much changed since the first period. Still more than 80% of the 
µNegative usage¶ were found in the Against group. The result of more µPositive usages¶ in 
the Treaty of Maastricht debates than in the SEA debates in the Favour group would 
reflect the change of the Labour Party. 
 
Figure 6.3: The results of the Favour and the Against group in each debate 
   
N=9 (out of 24)                     N=36 (out of 90) 
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N=21 (out of 38)                    N=56 (out of 108) 
 
Total (Figure A3.6) 
   Although it seems that the µPositive usage¶ has increased in this period, the total result 
of this second period between 1985 and 1993 was almost the same as the result of the 
first period between 1971 and 1975. The µNegative usage¶ of the first period is 67% and 
of the second period is 66%; the µUnchanged usage¶ of the first period is 13% and of the 
second period is 14%; and the µPositive usage¶ of the first period is 18% and of the 
second period is 20%. On the whole, consequently, discourse in this aspect has not 
changed.  
 
Figure 6.4: A comparison of total 1971-1975 and with 1985-1993 
   
N=532 (out of 998)                  N=152 (out of 339 + 1 by Chairman) 
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Newspapers (Figure A3.7) 
   The results of newspapers were completely different from the first period. The ratio 
of the word of exposition was the opposite. The Times introduced more the µPositive 
usage¶ in the first period but no µPositive usage¶ in the second period. On the other hand, 
The Guardian introduced more µPositive usage¶ in the second period. The result of The 
Guardian can be imagined because of the stance change of the Labour Party in 1988. 
Although the µPositive usage¶ of the Conservative Party has decreased, the remarkable 
change of The Times is difficult to explain. As I presented the conflict within the 
Conservative Party in this period, The Times might stand behind Prime Minister Thatcher. 
I raised the question of whether The Times has been Europeanised in the previous chapter. 
It is definite that The Times has not been Europeanised in this period. 
 
Figure 6.5: A comparison of The Times and with The Guardian 
   
N=10 (out of 24)                    N=13 (out of 23 + 1 by Queen) 
 
6.1.2 The word of possession 
Some related pie charts will be shown in the text and all pie charts with numbers of 
data are shown as Figures A3.8 ± A3.14 in Appendix 3. 
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Government (Figure A3.8) 
   Because of no data for the SEA period, it is impossible to find any change in this 
period. The remarkable feature of the Treaty of Maastricht is that, although there is only 
one, the word µGovernment¶ was used for the first time. This was by Mr Norman 
Lamont, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He said, µ1RWKLQJLQWKHWUHDW\LQWHUIHUHVZLWK
the sovereignty of the Government of this country in monetary and fiscal matters in stage 
¶16  
   Looking at the difference between the two periods, in the previous period, the 
percentage of µParliament¶ was the largest and of µour¶ was the second largest. In this 
period, µParliament¶, µthe House¶ and µnational¶ were the same percentage, and there was 
no usage of µour¶.  
 
Figure 6.6: A comparison of governments 1971-1975 and with government 1985-1993 
   
N=16 (out of 73)                    N=7 (out of 9)   
 
 
                                                 
16
  This comment by Lamont stated almost the final stage of the third reading of the bill in 1993. He was a 
Eurosceptic but voted in favour of the bill as a member of the cabinet. He soon resigned his post one 
week after the resolution.  
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The Conservative Party (Figure A3.9) 
   The feature of the Conservative Party in this period is that the percentage of 
µParliament¶ has decreased. This is the opposite result of the previous period. µParliament¶ 
tended to be used a lot in the previous period but only the Conservative Party and the 
Favour group in the SEA period used this word as the largest. The usage of µour¶, on the 
other hand, has increased in this period. Why has the percentage of µParliament¶ 
dramatically decreased in the debate of the Maastricht Treaty? Forster argues that 
European debate was deliberately and effectively confined to the parliamentary arena in 
the period from 1979 until 1988 (Forster 2002, p63). And he views that the Bruges 
speech of 1988 set the seal on a new phase characterised by Margaret Thatcher¶s move 
from an instrumental and pragmatic position on European integration to an ideological 
one (Forster 2002, p64). This reason may have led to the result of a high percentage of 
µour¶ and µnational¶ references in the Treaty of Maastricht debates. The year 1988 was the 
turning point not only for the Labour Party but also for the Conservative Party. 
 
Figure 6.7: The results of the Conservative Party in each debate 
   
N=20 (out of 32)                    N=67 (out of 116) 
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The Labour Party (Figure A3.10) 
   In comparison with the Conservative Party, members of the Labour Party used a 
variety of words of possession both in the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht debates. The 
ambiguous word µour¶ was much smaller than the Conservative Party in this period and 
also the Labour Party in the previous period. The interesting feature is that, although the 
attitude of the Labour Party changed in 1988, both results of the SEA and the Treaty of 
Maastricht were quite similar.  
 
Figure 6.8: The results of the Labour Party in each debate 
   
N=12 (out of 20)                    N=54 (out of 116) 
 
Favour and Against (Figures A3.11 & A3.12) 
   Except for the Favour group in the SEA period, µnational¶ was the largest percentage 
across both groups. In both the Favour and the Against groups, the usage of µParliament¶ 
decreased. In comparison with the previous period, the percentage of both µour¶ and 
µParliament¶ decreased a lot in both the Favour and the Against groups. The percentage 
of µnational¶ was the largest for both groups, but not more than 50%. 
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Figure 6.9: The results of the Favour and the Against group in each debate 
   
N=11 (out of 24)                    N=50 (out of 90) 
 
   
N=25 (out of 38)                    N=58 (out of 108) 
 
Total (Figure A3.13) 
   The result of the analysis of the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht periods shows that 
the percentage of use of µParliament¶ has decreased, and the percentage of µnational¶ has 
increased. However, neither word ever accounted for the majority. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say that the usage of the word of possession has shifted in this period. In 
comparison between the previous period and this period, the same phenomenon can be 
seen. The percentage RIµ3DUOLDPHQW¶KDValso GHFUHDVHGDQGWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIµQDWLRQDO¶
has also increased. In addition to that, the percentage of µour¶ has decreased. That means, 
µnational¶ was the third largest in the previous period but became the largest in this period. 
Although it is difficult to conclude, national sovereignty has gradually become an 
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important aspect for MPs. In the next chapter, I will determine whether this inclination 
appears in the next period. 
 
Figure 6.10: The results of total in each debate and the whole of this period 
     
N=37 (out of 63)                    N=148 (out of 276 + 1 by Chairman)    N=185 (out of 339 + 1 by Chairman) 
 
Newspapers (Figure A3.14) 
   The change of newspapers reflected the result of the above total. The percentage of 
µnational¶ was the largest in both newspapers. The change is obvious when we see the 
result of the previous period. The percentage of µParliament¶ has also dramatically 
decreased. The difference between the above total and newspapers is the extent of 
µnational¶. The percentages of µnational¶ were 77% in The Times and 50% in The 
Guardian. One of the reasons why the percentage of µnational¶ was so high, especially in 
The Times, was because of more data being available from the Treaty of Maastricht than 
from the SEA. As I argued that there was the change in the Conservative Party which 
included a more ideological view before the Treaty of Maastricht, The Times might be 
responding to this movement. 
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Figure 6.11: A comparison of The Times and with The Guardian 
   
N=13 (out of 24)                    N=10 (out of 23 + 1 by Queen) 
 
Summary of Word usage analysis 
   In the word of exposition, the percentage of the µPositive usage¶ in the Conservative 
Party was much smaller than the previous period. On the other hand, the percentage of 
the µNegative XVDJH¶ has not changed much. This means that the µUnchanged usage¶, 
which includes a defensive meaning such as µprotect¶ or µpreserve¶, was made in 
statements. As mentioned above there was a conflict within the Conservative Party in this 
period; thus members, especially the Favour group, might avoid using µPositive words¶ 
as the contrasting meaning.  
In the Labour Party, in spite of the attitude change, the percentage of the µNegative 
usage¶ was still larger than the Conservative Party. This trend is the same as the previous 
period. Then, the feature of the Labour Party is that the µPositive usage¶ has increased and 
the µUnchanged usage¶ has decreased, compared with the previous period. And, also, the 
µPositive usage¶ is larger and the µUnchanged usage¶ is smaller than the Conservative 
Party. The usage of Labour MPs was quite obvious. All statements at the time of the SEA 
were made by the Against group and the usage was all µNegative words¶. In the Treaty of 
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Maastricht debates, the voting behaviour was not the same but, for example, the usage of 
the Favour group was all µPositive words¶ and the usage of the Against group was almost 
all µNegative words¶ except one µUnchanged word¶. 
Between the Favour group and the Against group, the difference is still clear. 
Especially, as the percentage of the µNegative usage¶ in the Favour group was less than 
50%, the difference between the two groups became bigger. This result would be led by 
the result of the Labour Party because the usage of the Favour and the Against groups 
within this party was obvious, as I stated earlier.  
The difference between the two newspapers became smaller. However, the result was 
the opposite of the previous period. The percentage of the µPositive usage¶ was larger in 
The Guardian than in The Times. It is reasonable to view that this result reflected the 
change of stance in the Labour Party and the conflict within the Conservative Party. The 
change of the newspapers might be the most in this period. 
   In the word of possession, as a whole, the percentage of µour¶ and µParliament¶ has 
decreased and the percentage of µnational¶ has increased in each group and the result of 
the total. The percentage of µnational¶ has also increased in both newspapers. This result 
might include the intensification of the ideological view in the Conservative Party. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that people tended to use more µnational¶ in this period. 
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6.2 Definition analysis 
The analysis is carried out in the same way as for the previous chapter. Thus this 
section analyses how speakers define sovereignty. My expectation is that Definition 
analysis can indicate which argument MPs emphasise and can suggest whether their 
points of argument have changed. Therefore, I tried to find differences, commonalities 
and consistencies from the various comments. The extent of the data that I found from 
each debate is shown in Table A3.2 in Appendix 3. In order to analyse definitions easily, 
the point of discourse was focussed on each speech, especially taking three points of 
argument over sovereignty into consideration: legal, theoretical and practical as in the 
previous chapter. The extent of the data, especially in the SEA period, is not great. 
Therefore, I mainly look at the Total of Table A3.3. The interesting result is that only 
definitions, which focussed on a practical meaning and the location of sovereignty as in 
Parliament, were found during the SEA debates. 
 
Government 
   Only one comment of definition was found in this period from Government Minister. 
This was by Mr Douglas Hurd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, and he said, µ,IWKHUHLVQR%LOOWKHUHLVQRUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKHWUHDW\DQGWKDWLV
what parliamentary sovereignty meDQV¶ He talked about the meaning of parliamentary 
sovereignty. This definition includes, of course, the location of sovereignty as in 
Parliament. 
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The Conservative Party 
   Eleven comments on definitions were found amongst Conservative Party members 
during this period. The most frequent definition, with four appearances, was one which 
focussed on a practical meaning.  The second most frequent definition, with three 
appearances, was one which focussed on a theoretical meaning. And the third, with two 
appearances, was that sovereignty is myth. This third definition was not found in the 
previous period and can be found one statement in the Labour Party of this period too. 
On the other hand, the second most frequent definition in the previous period, 
sovereignty has changed, was not found in this period. This definition cannot be found 
for any other MPs in this period as well. Therefore, one possibility is that those people 
who believed that the meaning of sovereignty has changed have come to the conclusion 
that the idea of sovereignty itself was myth from the beginning.  
 
The Labour Party 
   In total, eleven comments by Labour MPs on definitions were found during this 
period. The most frequent definition, with six appearances, was one which focussed on a 
practical meaning. The second frequent definitions, with two appearances, were ones 
which should not focussed on a theoretical meaning and the location of sovereignty as in 
the people. In the previous period, the definition focussed on a practical meaning was 
also the most frequent in the Labour Party. On the other hand, the location of sovereignty 
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as in Parliament was the second frequent in the previous period but there was no this 
definition in this period. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that whether the definition of 
the Labour Party has changed or not over time. In comparison with the Conservative 
Party, focussing on a practical meaning was the most frequent in both parties in this 
period. Thus they seem to have the same focus point of definition. However, the second 
frequent definition which focussed on a theoretical meaning in the Conservative Party 
was made an opposite meaning as a negative phrase by members of the Labour Party as 
the second frequent in this period. Therefore, the view on a theoretical meaning is 
different between both parties.  
 
Favour, Against and Abstention 
   In the Favour group, ten comments on definitions were found in total. The most 
frequent definition, with three appearances, was one which stated the location of 
sovereignty as in Parliament. The second most frequent definitions, with two 
appearances, were ones which stated the location of sovereignty as in the people and 
focussed on multiple meanings of sovereignty. In comparison with the previous period, 
the number of appearances which focussed on a practical meaning has largely 
decreased.  
   In the Against group, eight comments on definitions were found in total. The most 
frequent definition, with three appearances, was one which focussed on a practical 
meaning. The second most frequent definition, with two appearances, was one which 
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focussed on a theoretical meaning. That is to say, focussing on a theoretical meaning has 
stepped down from the most frequent since the previous period. 
   In this period, there were ten comments of the Abstention group in total. The result 
was similar to the Labour Party. That means that many members of the Labour Party in 
the debate on the Treaty of Maastricht abstained from voting. The most frequent 
definition, with six appearances, was one which focussed on a practical meaning. The 
second most frequent definitions, with two appearances, was one which stated the 
location of sovereignty as in the people. As focussing on a practical meaning in the 
Favour group has decreased, it is possible to consider that some people who focussed on 
a practical meaning in the Favour group in the previous period have abstained voting of 
the Treaty of Maastricht. 
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, it is not possible to conduct analysis of the 
newspapers because there was only one definition of The Times in the first period 
(1971-1975) and in the third period (1997-2009). There was also only one definition of 
The Guardian in the second period (1985-1993) and no definition in the third period. 
 
Total and summary of Definition analysis 
   In total of all groups, the most frequent definition, with ten appearances, was one 
which focussed on a practical meaning. The second most frequent definition, with four 
appearances, was the location of sovereignty as in the people. And the third frequent 
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definitions, with three appearances, were ones which focussed on a theoretical meaning 
and multiple meanings of sovereignty and the location of sovereignty as in Parliament.  
In comparison with the total of the previous period, focussing on a practical meaning 
was the major point of argument as before. On the other hand, the number of definition 
which focussed on a theoretical meaning has decreased. And also, the number of 
definitions that focussed on a legal meaning and sovereignty has changed have been 
reduced to zero in this period. What do these results mean, especially those definition 
which focussed on what sovereignty should be? It is possible to view that the main point 
of argument over sovereignty has come down to focus on a practical meaning. There 
was a definition which denied focussing on a practical meaning in the first period but 
this definition has also been at zero. Many MPs might find that claiming theoretical and 
legal meanings of sovereignty did not generate a productive discussion. Regarding the 
location of sovereignty, claiming sovereignty in Parliament has decreased and in the 
people has increased. And claiming sovereignty in the House of Commons could not 
been fund in this period. What we can find from this result is that MPs have shifted their 
view on sovereignty from a narrow sphere of Parliament to a wide extent the people. 
   The table below is the total points of definition through this period. Tables of each 
debate are shown in Table A3.3 in Appendix 3. 
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Table 6.1: 1985-1993 Total 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: 1 N/A in Parliament: 1 
Conservative: 11 practical: 4 
theoretical: 3 
myth: 2 
multiple: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
Labour: 11 practical: 6 
not theoretical: 2 
myth: 1 
in the people: 2 
Favour: 10 multiple: 2 
theoretical: 1 
practical: 1 
myth: 1 
in Parliament: 2 
in the people: 2 
Against: 8 practical: 3 
theoretical: 2 
not theoretical: 1 
myth: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
(Abstention): 10 practical: 6 
not theoretical: 1 
myth: 1 
in the people: 2 
 
Total: Favour+Against 
+Abstention 
practical: 10 
theoretical: 3 
myth: 3 
multiple: 2 
not theoretical: 2 
in Parliament: 3 
in the people: 4 
 
   I will now briefly mention turn to the frequency of definition. In the SEA debates, 
there were four statements of definition in total out of 46 statements of sovereignty.17 
The percentage was 8.7%. In the Treaty of Maastricht debates, there were 28 statements 
of definition in total out of 209 statements of sovereignty. The percentage was 13.4%. 
Thus, the statement of definition appears at a rate of about 10% in each debate. This is 
identical to the first period.  
 
6.3 Interpretation analysis 
The analysis is carried out in the same way as for the previous chapter, applying the 
following theoretical classifications: 
                                                 
17
  As I noted in the previous chapter, this is not the number of the term µsovereignty¶. This is the number of 
statements that include the term µsovereignty¶. 
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By joining in the EC or passing a bill of European matter, 
1.  Cession: Sovereignty will be transferred to the EC/EU, or all or a part of 
sovereignty will be lost or limited. 
2.  Unaffected: Sovereignty will not be changed. 
3.  Utilisation: Sovereignty will be transferred to or be pooled in the EC/EU in 
exchange for some advantages. 
 
And also, through membership activities in the EC/EU, 
4.  Reinforcement: Sovereignty will be strengthened, be used or be transformed 
by way of enhancing its capacity. 
 
My expectation is that MPs¶ interpretation of sovereignty can be affected and changed 
over time through the mechanisms of adaptational pressure and interactions as to the 
progress of European integration and through other factors such as competitive 
discussion between government and opposition, the Conservative and the Labour, the 
Favour and the Against etc. As a result, the inclination of discourse in each group and 
period can be found. 
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Government 
   In the SEA debates, amongst Government Ministers only Mrs Lynda Chalker, the 
Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, made a statement of interpretation. 
Her interpretation can be classified as sovereignty being unaffected. She said, µ,WIROORZV
therefore, that there is no diminution of sovereignty involved in the amendments to the 
WUHDW\¶ However, this is talking about only Article 99 on the harmonisation of indirect 
taxation in the bill. Thus, there is no overall interpretation of sovereignty as it relates to 
the SEA. 
   In the Treaty of Maastricht period, only Mr Norman Lamont, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, made statements of interpretation. His statements were: 
     I simply fail to understand how British sovereignty would be enhanced if we 
forwent that right which was negotiated at Maastricht and is enshrined in the 
United Kingdom protocol. 
And, 
     Nothing in the treaty interferes with the sovereignty of the Government of this 
country in monetary and fiscal matters in stage 2. 
 
The first statement can be classified as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership, if 
we go behind his words. The second one can be classified as sovereignty being 
unaffected. 
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   It is difficult however to find the amongst Government Ministers trend with only two 
people. I would like to consider it with other analyses at the end of this chapter. 
 
The Conservative Party 
In the SEA period, six members of the Conservative Party made statements of 
interpretation. Four of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, one of them was 
as sovereignty being unaffected, and one of them was as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests. No interpretation categorised as reinforcement of 
sovereignty by membership could be found. All members who voted against the bill 
made statements of the cession type of interpretation. 
In the Treaty of Maastricht debates, 13 members made statements of interpretation. 
Seven of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, three of them were as 
sovereignty being unaffected, and three of them were as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests. No interpretations categorised as reinforcement of 
sovereignty by membership could be found. All members who voted against the bill 
made statements of the cession type of interpretation. Therefore, in this aspect, the 
Against group in the Conservative Party has not changed in this period. One of utilisation 
type of interpretations is conditional. This was made by Mr Patrick Cormack. He said: 
We preserve, by insisting upon unanimity--I should vote against it if it did not--our 
ultimate independent sovereignty, some of which should be pooled in the interests 
of the future peace, stability and prosperity of Europe. 
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It seems to me that he assumed unanimity. However, since the SEA, the scope of 
qualified majority voting (QMV)18 has extended. Mr Cormack did not refer to this 
QMV in all his statements on the day of discussion.   
Focussing on individuals, only one member, Mr Hugh Dykes who voted in favour of 
both bills, made a statement in both the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht debates. His 
statements were classified as sovereignty being unaffected in the SEA debates and as 
utilisation of European integration for national interests in the Treaty of Maastricht 
debates. 
 
The Labour Party 
         In the SEA period, four members of the Labour Party made statements of 
interpretation. All of them voted against the bill and made statements of the cession 
type of interpretation.  
In the Treaty of Maastricht period, 12 members of the Labour party made statements 
of interpretation. Six of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, five of them 
were as utilisation of European integration for national interests, and one was as 
reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. No interpretation categorised as 
sovereignty being unaffected could be found. The result of the Labour party is obvious. 
All members who voted against the bill made statements of the cession type of 
                                                 
18
 In some areas, QMV existed before the UK joined. The SEA extended its area. 
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interpretation. This result is completely the same with the Conservative Party. All 
members who voted in favour of the bill and who abstained in the voting made 
statements of the utilisation type and the reinforcement type of interpretation. 
Notwithstanding the opposition party, more utilisation types of interpretations and even 
reinforcement type of interpretations, were found than the ruling party. In the previous 
period, there were no µPositive words¶ in the utilisation type of interpretations in the 
Labour Party. In this period, two statements out of five used µPositive words¶. This aspect 
might change since the previous period. Although the other three statements of the 
utilisation type of interpretation used µNegative words¶, two of them seem to accept a 
negative meaning. Mr Tony Banks stated, µ,DPQRWZRUULHGDERXWORVLQJVRYHUHLJQW\«¶ 
And also, Dr Jack Cunningham said: 
Of course nation states will be expected to surrender some of their sovereignty--a 
very emotive word--and, sometimes, although not always, it will be in their best 
interests as well as the common interest to do so. 
 
These expressions in the utilisation type of interpretation could be found in both parties 
in the previous period. In the Conservative Party of this period, however, it is not possible 
to find them. They usually deny negative behaviour. That is, they do not accept the 
situation that sovereignty is transferred into or limited by the EC/EU. Although I did not 
divide categories into great detail in the beginning, I provide three kinds of discourses in 
the utilisation type of interpretation at this stage. The first is the way of the denial of the 
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negative behaviour. That is, there are those who claim that this is not any transferring or 
limiting sovereignty but just for obtaining some advantages. The second is the way of the 
acceptance of the negative behaviour. That is, there are those who accept that sovereignty 
is transferred into or limited by the EC/EU in order to obtain some advantages for 
member states. And the third is the way of the presentation of the µPositive usage¶. In 
other words, there are those who believe that pooling sovereignty brings some 
advantages for member states. In the Labour Party, therefore, the first and the second 
kinds could be found in the first period, and the second and the third kinds could be 
found in this period. I will discuss this aspect in the next period as well. 
   The reinforcement type of interpretation was made by Mr Derek Enright and he said: 
As a result of coming together and pooling our sovereignties, we shall gain 
infinitely more sovereignty over the pound and economic policy than we have at 
present. 
 
His statement µgain infinitely more sovereignty¶ can be regarded as reinforcement of 
sovereignty by membership.  
 
Favour, Against and Abstention 
   In the SEA period, five members who voted in favour of the bill made their 
statements of interpretation. Two of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, two 
of them were as sovereignty being unaffected, and one of them was as utilisation of 
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European integration for national interests. On the other hand, eight members who voted 
against the bill made their statements of interpretation. All of the eight can be classified as 
cession of sovereignty.  
In the Treaty of Maastricht period, 10 members, except members of the government, 
who voted in favour of the bill made their statements of interpretation. Three of them can 
be classified as cession of sovereignty, three of them can be classified as sovereignty 
being unaffected, and four of them can be classified as utilisation of European integration 
for national interests. On the other hand, 12 members who voted against the bill made 
their statements of interpretation. All of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty. 
Throughout this period, therefore, all members who voted against bills made statements 
of the cession type of interpretation. Further, there were six members who abstained in 
the voting. One of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, four of them were as 
utilisation of European integration for national interests, and one of them, Mr Enright, 
was as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. 
Focusing on individuals apart from the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, Sir 
Russell Johnston, of the Liberal Party at the time of the SEA and the Liberal Democrats 
at the time of the Treaty of Maastricht, made his statements in both debates. He voted in 
favour of both bills and interpreted both debates as cession of sovereignty, but stated 
differently. In the SEA, he said: 
The Single Act, if ratified by all governments by the end of the year, will certainly 
herald a transfer of sovereignty. Not a transfer from the national to the Community 
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legislative structure, but a transfer from government and Commission civil 
servants to the democratically elected representatives of the people. 
 
And in the Treaty of Maastricht, he stated: 
Liberal Democrats want a wider but deeper Europe; not the spurious spectre of the 
single united states of Europe which Mrs. Thatcher advances, but a decentralised 
federal Europe of European states, with national sovereignty pooled in the 
European Council and Council of Ministers, and popular sovereignty pooled in the 
European Parliament. 
 
He has changed the exposition of sovereignty using the words from µtransfer¶ to µpooled¶. 
Is this because he came to understand that sovereignty can be pooled? Mr Johnston 
stated his interpretation in 1972 as well and he used the word µshare¶ as the reinforcement 
type of interpretation at that time: 
I am one of those who believe that sharing sovereignty in Europe will strengthen 
rather than weaken our capacity to protect our iQWHUHVWV«6RYHUHLJQW\LVDERXW
protecting one's interests. 
 
Taking these three statements into consideration, Mr Johnston may view that 
administrative sovereignty will be transferred, and national and popular sovereignty will 
be pooled or shared for protecting national interests and democracy.  
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Newspapers 
   The Times in this period introduced five members with interpretations. Three of them 
can be classified as cession of sovereignty, one of them was as sovereignty being 
unaffected and one of them was as utilisation of European integration for national 
interests. These unaffected and utilisation type of interpretations were members of 
government. The Times cited a statement of Mr John Major, the Prime Minister, as 
follows: 
JOHN Major tried yesterday to defuse Conservative tensions over Europe, revived 
by the Queen's address to the European parliament, as he reassured Tory MPs that 
the Maastricht treaty would not threaten British sovereignty. 
 
Thus, this can be classified as sovereignty being unaffected. The statement of Mr 
Norman Lamont was also cited: 
A legally binding VAT floor was a vital component of the EC single market, and 
although the government had handed a portion of taxation sovereignty to Brussels, 
µJHQHUDOO\WKLVLVDYHU\JRRGGHDOIRU%ULWDLQ¶KHVDLG 
 
Although I regard his interpretation as utilisation of European integration for national 
interests, he did not say what advantage Britain could get. His statement was retaliated by 
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citing other MPs¶ statements and by The Times itself with the title of the article as µ%ULWDLQ
IRUIHLWVVRYHUHLJQW\WR%UXVVHOVRQ9$7¶. 
The Guardian in this period, on the other hand, introduced four statements of 
government and one statement of member of the Conservative Party. One of them can be 
classified as cession of sovereignty, three of them were as sovereignty being unaffected 
and one of them was as utilisation of European integration for national interests. One of 
statements of government was Mr John Major, the Prime Minister: 
The Prime Minister sought to reassure his Euro-sceptics yesterday afternoon at his 
first Commons Question Time since the general election when he said some 
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJFRXOGEHSRROHGLQ(XURSHEXWµWKHVRYHUHLJQW\RIWKLV+RXVHLV
QRWDPDWWHUWKDWLVXSIRUJUDEV¶ 
 
I regard this statement as sovereignty being unaffected because there was no comment 
for an advantage in return. Two other members in government, Mr Douglas Hurd, the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Mr Kenneth Clarke, the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, were cited in their statements as 
sovereignty being unaffected. The utilisation type of interpretation is a comment of Mr 
Norman Lamont: 
He reassured anti-federalists that while it was justified to cede some sovereignty to 
BrusseOV LQ UHVSHFW RI WKH VLQJOH PDUNHW 0DDVWULFKW VWLOO µVDIHJXDUGHG %ULWDLQ
V
LQWHUHVWVDQGDFKLHYHG%ULWDLQ
VJRDOV¶ 
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The statement of Mr Lamont in The Times was cited on 28th July 1992. This statement 
in The Guardian was cited about two months later on 8th October 1992 as a speech at 
the party conference.  
   Apart from the statement of MPs, interestingly, The Guardian introduced the 
statement of interpretation of the Queen in this period on 12th May 1992:  
In the most sensitive section of the speech, she will insist that the new powers for 
the European Parliament will not detract from the sovereignty of the Westminster 
Parliament, a view contrary to that passionately held by Mrs Thatcher. 
 
On the other hand, The Times did not insert this part in any articles and blamed the 
Foreign Office for putting the Queen in this position. The debate of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in the House of Commons was opened just after this speech. Regrettably, as I 
have examined, it is difficult to find the influence of the Queen on the debate. 
  
Summary of Interpretation analysis 
   In this period, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the interpretation of 
µsovereignty¶ by government MPs because of a shortage of data. What became clear is 
that all members of the Against group in this period made their statements of the cession 
type of interpretation and also that all members of the Against group in the Conservative 
Party had not changed their interpretation since the previous period along with this 
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classification. In the Labour Party, one possibility is to assume that detailed 
interpretations of the utilisation type, which is mentioned in the section of the Labour 
Party, have changed. That is, for pursuing some advantages, the usage of the word of 
exposition in the utilisation type of interpretation has changed. This possibility needs to 
be revisited in the next chapter. Another possibility is, in relation to the first possibility, 
that the concept of pooling sovereignty in the utilisation type of interpretation has slightly 
penetrated some members of the Favour group in debates of the Treaty of Maastricht 
because there was no such expression in the SEA. These possibilities may indicate that 
discourse change of sovereignty is taking place. However, the reinforcement type of 
interpretation has dramatically decreased since the previous chapter. This phenomenon 
presents some difficulty in terms of finding any µnew¶ interpretation of sovereignty. That 
is, it appears thus far that MPs understanding of µsovereignty¶ has not changed 
substantially as a result of European integration. 
 
1985-1993 Conclusion 
   A feature of this period is the shortage of data for Government Ministers. Especially, 
the amount of data in Hansard for all three analyses was small. Does this mean that 
sovereignty is less important of a concept for them? It seems to me that cabinet members 
were careful about saying the word sovereignty. Because this period was in transition of 
approach to European integration in both parties, they might try to avoid bringing 
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differences to the surface within government too. On the other hand, newspapers that can 
make their stance clear could introduce more comments of government than Hansard. 
The change in the word of exposition in the Conservative Party was the increase of 
the µUnchanged usage¶. This result can be assumed that the Favour group of the 
Conservative Party has tried to avoid using the µPositive words¶ in order to not aggravate 
the hostility within the party. In the Labour Party, on the other hand, the µPositive usage¶ 
has increased. However, the µNegative usage¶ was still larger in the Labour Party than in 
the Conservative Party as before. Between the Favour group and the Against group, the 
difference is still clear. Then, the difference between the two newspapers became smaller. 
This result was the opposite of the previous period. In the word of possession, as a whole, 
the percentage of µour¶ and µParliament¶ has decreased and the percentage of µnational¶ 
has increased in each group and the result of the total. The percentage of µnational¶ has 
also increased in both newspapers. This result might include the transformation in the 
Conservative Party towards more Eurosceptics before the debate of the Treaty of 
Maastricht. 
In Definition analysis, focussing on a practical meaning was still the major point of 
argument as before. On the other hand, the number of definitions which focussed on a 
theoretical meaning has decreased. It is possible to view that the main point of argument 
over sovereignty has come down to focus on a practical meaning. 
In Interpretation analysis, detailed interpretations of the utilisation type in the Labour 
Party have changed. That is, for pursuing some advantages, the expression in the 
 218 
utilisation type has changed. $OO03VXVHGµ1HJDWLYHZRUGV¶LQWKHutilisation type of 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQWKHILUVWSHULRG+RZHYHUVRPH03VXVHGµ3RVLWLYHZRUGV¶DQGVRPH
other MPs expressed the acceptance of the negative behaviour in the utilisation type of 
interpretation in this period. Another change which is related to the above was that the 
concept of pooling sovereignty in the utilisation type of interpretation has slightly 
penetrated some members of the Favour group in debates of the Treaty of Maastricht 
because there was no such expression in the SEA. 
   Consequently, the debate relating to the creation of the EU has affected the discourse 
and the attitude of members in both parties. And it is worth noting that some people, such 
as Sir Russell Johnston who was analysed in the section of µFavour, Against and 
Abstention¶, have not changed their attitude and developed their arguments in direction 
moving toward a positive meaning under the circumstances in transition of the 
Conservative Party and the Labour Party.  
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7  New Labour (1997- 2009) and comparisons 
of three periods 
This chapter conducts discourse analysis of the period between 1997 and 2009. 
Samples of analysis are: 1) debates on the Treaty of Amsterdam, which are readings of 
the European Communities (Amendment) Bill (November 1997 ± January 1998), 2)  
debates on the Treaty of Nice, which are readings of the European Union (Amendment) 
Bill (July - Oct 2001), and 3) debates on the Treaty of Lisbon, which are readings of the 
European Union (Amendment) Bill (January - March 2008). 
The amount of data in each sample, which I found through the process of 
transcription and coding, is shown as Table A4.1 in Appendix 4. The analysis is 
conducted in the same manner as for Chapters 5 and 6. 
Further, this chapter provides a comparison of all three periods in each analysis. 
Some changes could be found the comparison between the first and the second periods. 
Therefore, it will become clear whether the changes which could be recognized in 
Chapter 6 are temporary phenomena or not. The final comparison summary of all 
analyses will be stated in the concluding chapter. 
 
7.1 Word usage analysis 
As with the previous two chapters, the analysis is conducted by a quantitative 
approach and focusses on what kind of word, including phrasal verbs, speakers have 
used in sentences related to sovereignty. My expectation is that those words that explain 
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or qualify the word µsovereignty¶ are different depending on MPs¶ political stand and the 
context of debates. 
 
7.1.1 The word of exposition 
As in the previous two chapters, some key pie charts will be shown in the text and 
all pie charts, including numbers of data points are shown as Figures A4.1 ± A4.7 in 
Appendix 4. 
 
Government (Figure A4.1) 
Analysis of the third period and the over-time comparison 
   As shown in Figure A4.1, there was no data for the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
Treaty of Nice periods, and only three discourses of the word of exposition for the Treaty 
of Lisbon period for Government Ministers. Therefore, it is difficult to compare with 
other periods. As there was also a shortage of data in the previous period (1985-1993), 
members of governments rarely used the word of exposition. In the Treaty of Lisbon 
debates, all three statements of the word of exposition were the µPositive usage¶. This is 
the only result available for this period. By observing the limited data of governments, it 
is possible to say that members of governments tended to use µPositive words¶ in general. 
As I have argued in Chapter 3, it may be reasonable to contend that members of 
governments have been Europeanised in this aspect of analysis. 
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Figure 7.1: The result of government 
 
N=3 (out of 7 words of sovereignty) 
 
The Labour Party (Figure A4.2) 
Analysis of the third period 
   In this period, I brought the analysis of the Labour Party to the next section of 
government because it was the ruling party. As shown in Figure A4.2, the percentage of 
the µPositive usage¶ was over 60% in all three debates. This large percentage of the 
µPositive usage¶ has never been seen in both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party 
in last two periods. A possible reason for the large percentage could be because only two 
people who were against the bills made statements on sovereignty in the Labour Party 
but they did not use the word of exposition. This trend, of which no data exist for the 
Favour group or the Against group in each party, often occurred so far; thus, it is not 
reasonable to say that only this reason was in the context of the large percentage of the 
µPositive usage¶. Then, what was the other reason or factor? I will discuss this in the next 
section. 
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Figure 7.2: The results of the Labour Party in each debate 
     
N=6 (out of 13)                     N=23 (out of 32)                    N=17 (out of 29) 
 
The over-time comparison 
   In comparison with the first period, the result of the third period is completely the 
reverse. As I have argued in Chapters 3 and 6, the year 1988 was a turning point for the 
Labour Party from an anti-European to a pro-European stance when Jacques Delors, the 
president of the Commission, visited Britain and laid out his thinking on a social charter 
for Europe. The result of the change has appeared since the Treaty of Maastricht. As I 
showed in Chapter 3, a survey of Labour MPs in the 1992-97 parliament indicated that a 
majority accepted that British sovereignty could be pooled (Daniels 1998, p89; 
Featherstone 1999, p7). Then, when the Labour Party took power in 1997, though this is 
the result of backbenchers, this study verifies the result of the survey by the large 
percentage of the µPositive usage¶. Further, Fella argues that the Labour party turned its 
attentions towards a more pluralistic model of power. And he says that this vision 
requires the increased µpooling¶ national sovereignties for the fulfilment of certain policy 
objectives (Fella 2002, p26). Given the fact that the µNegative usage¶ was quite large in 
the Treaty of Maastricht period, discourse does not change at once but it has been 
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gradually constructed. Consequently, it is reasonable to say that the Labour Party has 
Europeanised in this aspect of analysis. 
 
Figure 7.3: The results of the Labour Party in each period 
     
N=248 (out of 483)                  N=66 (out of 136)                  N=46 (out of 74)  
 
The Conservative Party (Figure A4.3) 
Analysis of the third period 
   Both the result for Conservative MPs of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of 
Nice periods are similar. The percentages of the µNegative usage¶ were more than 70%, 
and the percentages of the µPositive usage¶ were less than 20%. The only difference is 
that the percentage of the µUnchanged usage¶ in the Treaty of Nice was larger than in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the result of the Treaty of Lisbon was different from the 
other two debates. The percentage of the µNegative usage¶ was 50%, and the percentage 
of the µPositive usage¶ was more than 30%. Over 30% of the µPositive usage¶ by the 
Conservative Party is the largest ever since the debate in 1971. Is this result reflecting the 
change in the Conservative Party, as Tim Bale suggested?19 It is not appropriate to say 
                                                 
19
 This is cited in Chapter 3 as follows: Tim Bale suggested that the Conservative Party would turn into 
µEurorealism¶, or softer Eurosceptism, rather than harder Eurosceptism under the leadership of David 
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that the Conservative Party has changed or has been Europeanised by concluding from 
just one debate. 
 
Figure 7.4: The results of the Conservative Party in each debate 
     
N=32 (out of 58)                    N=7 (out of 9)                      N=24 (out of 50) 
 
The over-time comparison 
   Since 1971, except for the Treaty of Lisbon, regardless of whether the Conservative 
Party held power or not, the percentage of the µNegative usage¶ has been large. Therefore, 
it is obvious that discourse of the Conservative Party did not change until the Treaty of 
Nice in this aspect of analysis. As I noted, I cannot say whether discourse has changed in 
the debate of the Treaty of Lisbon. Even if we could see the trend of change, the 
percentage of the µNegative usage¶ would be larger than the percentage of the µPositive 
usage¶. 
 
Favour and Against (Figures A4.4 & A4.5) 
Analysis of the third period 
                                                                                                                                 
Cameron, even if the Conservatives left the European People¶s Party ± European Democrats (EPP-ED) 
(Bale 2006, p385).  
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   For debates in this period, the percentages of the µPositive usage¶ in the Favour group 
were exactly the same (67%). These results were greatly brought about by the result of 
the Labour Party. The result of the Treaty of Amsterdam period was the same as the one 
with the Labour Party, and other results included only a few non-Labour MPs who voted 
in favour. 
 In the Against group, on the other hand, the percentages of the µNegative usage¶ in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice periods were more than 70%. However, the 
percentage of it in the Treaty of Lisbon period was 50%. This result was greatly brought 
about by the result of the Conservative Party because only two MPs were not members 
of the Conservative Party in the Against group of 18.  
 
Figure 7.5: The results of the Favour and the Against group in each debate 
     
N=6 (out of 13)                     N=21 (out of 29)                    N=27 (out of 46) 
 
     
N=25 (out of 48)                    N=8 (out of 12)                     N=18 (out of 47) 
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The over-time comparison 
   In the Favour group, the percentage of the µPositive usage¶ was never larger than the 
percentage of the µNegative usage¶ until the SEA. In other words, MPs in the Favour 
group tended to use µNegative words¶ in the beginning. However, in the Treaty of 
Maastricht period, the result was reversed but the percentage of the µPositive usage¶ was 
still under 50%. In the third period, then, the percentages of the µPositive usage¶ were 
67% in all debates. The result clearly shows that MPs in the Favour group had shifted the 
usage of the word of exposition from µNegative words¶ to µPositive words¶ in debates. 
   In the Against group, the percentage of the µNegative usage¶ was very large until the 
Treaty of Nice. Further, the percentage of the µPositive usage¶ was less than 10% in the 
first and the second periods. Therefore, it is possible to say that MPs in the Against group 
have hardly used µPositive words¶ in debates. In the third period, however, the 
percentages of the µPositive usage¶ were much larger than before. I do not say that this 
result immediately indicates the change in the Against group because the percentages of 
the µNegative usage¶ were still much larger than the percentages of the µPositive usage¶. 
The next section will show whether this result has indicated the change or not. 
 
Total (Figure A4.6) 
Analysis of the third period 
   In this period, the percentage of the µNegative XVDJH¶ has gradually decreased. In the 
Treaty of Amsterdam debates, it was more than 60%; but in the Treaty of Lisbon debates, 
 227 
it was less than 40%. The percentage of the µPositive usage¶, on the other hand, was less 
than 30% in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and was over 50% and was exactly doubled in 
both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. It seems to me that a certain change 
occurred in this period. The change from the Treaty of Amsterdam period to the Treaty of 
Nice period was largely because of the amount of data. The amount of data for the 
Conservative Party in the Treaty of Amsterdam period was much larger than for the 
Labour Party on the one hand; the amount of data for the Labour Party in the Treaty of 
Nice period was much larger than for the Conservative Party on the other hand. Then, the 
change in the Treaty of Lisbon period was caused by the result of the Conservative Party 
and the Against group. The change of usage in these people, mainly Eurosceptics, is 
worthy of attention. In total, however, the percentage of the µNegative usage¶ is still larger 
than the percentage of the µPositive usage¶. Therefore, it may not be reasonable to say 
that discourse has changed in this period. 
 
Figure 7.6: The results of total in each debate 
     
N=38 (out of 75)                    N=33 (out of 45)                  N=48 (out of 97) 
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The over-time comparison 
   Looking at the total of the first and the second periods, interestingly, they are almost 
the same. The difference is less than 2% in each usage. Though I have argued that there 
have been some differences and some changes in each period and in each group so far, it 
is clear that the overall usage has not changed. However, the total of the third period is 
completely different. The percentage of the µNegative usage¶ has decreased by almost 
20%, the percentage of the µUnchanged usage¶ has decreased by about 5%, and the 
percentage of the µPositive usage¶ has increased by more than 20%. How should we view 
these differences? I would like to say that these results indicate the existence of some 
degree of change. Taking the analysis within the third period into consideration, further, 
the change is more obvious after the year 2000. Around the year 2000, what happened in 
Europe and in Britain? Before attempting to answer this question, the remaining analysis 
must be concluded. I thus return to this query in the concluding chapter. 
 
Figure 7.7: The results of total in each period 
     
N=532 (out of 998)                  N=152 (out of 339 + 1 by Chairman)    N=119 (out of 217) 
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Newspapers (Figure A4.7) 
Analysis of the third period 
   Although the extent of the data for both newspapers was not great, the percentages of 
the µPositive usage¶ in both newspapers were very large. In The Times, four usages out of 
five in total were made by members of government. In the Guardian, there was no usage 
data of members of government but three usages out of four in total were made by the 
Favour group. The remaining one usage in both newspapers was made by the Abstention 
group. Therefore, the statement of usage in the Against group was not reported. 
 
Figure 7.8: A comparison of The Times and with The Guardian 
   
N=5 (out of 10)                     N=4 (out of 7) 
 
The over-time comparison 
   The results of The Guardian were quite obvious. The percentage of the µPositive 
usage¶ had gradually increased and the µNegative usage¶ had gradually decreased. This 
trend of the change is very similar to the over-time result of the Labour Party. However, 
as I noted, the extent of the data, especially in the third period, was very small. It is not 
reasonable to say that The Guardian has Europeanised like the Labour Party. On the 
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other hand, the results of The Times are varying. Although the trend of the change is 
similar to the Conservative Party, the percentages of those usages were widely apart from 
the results of the Conservative Party. By observing these two newspapers, interestingly, 
the results were gradually getting closer.    
 
Figure 7.9: The results of both newspapers in each period 
     
N=8 (out of 16)                      N=10 (out of 24)                   N=5 (out of 10) 
 
     
N=34 (out of 111)                   N=13 (out of 23 + 1 by Queen)         N=4 (out of 7) 
 
7.1.2 The word of possession 
Some related pie charts will be shown in the text and all pie charts with numbers of 
data are shown as Figures A4.8 ± A4.14 in Appendix 4. 
 
Government (Figure A4.8) 
Analysis of the third period and the over-time comparison 
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   Because of no data for the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice debates, it is 
impossible to find the change in this period. In the Treaty of Lisbon period, which 
became automatically the total of this period, the largest percentage was µnational¶ and 
the second was µParliament¶. This result means that the usage of µnational¶ has gradually 
increased over time. In the first period, it was the third largest with only 6% followed by 
µParliament¶ and µour¶. In the second period, the usage of µnational¶ became the same 
percentage with as µParliament¶ and µour¶. Then, in the third period, it became the largest. 
Although the amount of data is not much, we may say that governments have shifted the 
usage of the word of possession in this aspect of analysis. 
 
Figure 7.10: The results of government in each period 
     
N=16 (out of 73)                    N=7 (out of 9)                      N=6 (out of 7) 
 
The Labour Party (Figure A4.9) 
Analysis of the third period 
   In the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice periods, members of the Labour 
Party tended to use the word µour¶ when they talked about sovereignty. The results were 
50% in both debates. In the Treaty of Lisbon, however, the percentage of µour¶ decreased 
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and became the second largest with µParliament¶, and the usage of µnational¶ became the 
largest percentage in this debate.  
 
Figure 7.11: The results of the Labour Party in each debate 
     
N=6 (out of 13)                     N=14 (out of 32)                    N=16 (out of 29) 
 
The over-time comparison 
   The change in the Labour Party seems to be uniform. The usage of µour¶ decreased in 
the second period but greatly increased in the third period. And the percentage of 
µnational¶ increased more than double in the second period but slightly decreased in the 
third period. However, the percentage of µParliament¶ gradually decreased over time: 
33% in the first period, 23% in the second period, and 14% in the third period. Therefore, 
the Labour Party tended to not use µParliament¶ in this aspect. However, how should I 
treat the usage of µour¶? If some of them intended to use µour¶ instead of µParliament¶, 
this result would be changed. Thus it is hard to evaluate when the usage of µour¶ occupies 
a large percentage. 
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Figure 7.12: The results of the Labour Party in each period 
     
N=98 (out of 483)                   N=66 (out of 136)                   N=36 (out of 74) 
 
The Conservative Party (Figure A4.10) 
Analysis of the third period 
   In general, the percentage of µour¶ and µnational¶ were quite large in this period. The 
feature of the Conservative Party in this period is the usage of µmonarch¶ and µEuropean¶. 
The usage of µmonarch¶ was stated in the debate of the Treaty of Amsterdam by Mr 
Robert Jackson who voted against the bill. He said that legitimacy has changed the way 
in which it was expressed. Then he stated: 
In the long history of my party, we have successively envisaged the basis of 
legitimacy as the divine right of the monarch; the union of the throne and altar; the 
sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament; and²in the dawning era of 
referendums²the sovereignty of the people. 
 
This means that the possession of sovereignty has shifted from monarch to the people. 
The usage of µEuropean¶ was by Mr Chris Grayling, who voted against the bill of the 
Treaty of Nice. He said, µ7KHSRROLQJRI(XURSHDQVRYHUHLJQW\EHOLHV WKHIDFW WKDW LI
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recent history teaches us one lesson, it is that nationalism in Europe is not dead and that 
WKHVSLULWRIVRYHUHLJQQDWLRQVLVQRWGHDG¶ Though no other MPs used µEuropean¶ in 
statements in this period, he might purposely use µEuropean¶ as the opponent word of 
nationalism. 
 
Figure 7.13: The results of the Conservative Party in each debate 
     
N=21 (out of 58)                    N=4 (out of 9)                      N=35 (out of 50) 
 
The over-time comparison 
   Throughout the three periods, I cannot see a distinguished change in the Conservative 
Party. And also, I cannot see a big difference between the Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party. In the first period, although the percentages were not the same, the 
usage of µParliament¶ was the largest in both parties. In the second period, the usage of 
µnational¶ was the largest in both parties. And, in the third period, the usage of µour¶ was 
the largest in both parties. That means there was not much difference of the word of 
possession between parties. As I argued in the section of the Labour Party, it is difficult to 
evaluate the usage of µour¶. If both parties tended to use the ambiguous word µour¶, there 
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would be an intention or a meaning. I would like to consider it in the total section with 
other aspects. 
 
Figure 7.14: The results of the Conservative Party in each period 
     
N=90 (out of 371)                   N=87 (out of 148)                   N=60 (out of 117) 
 
Favour and Against (Figures A4.11 & A4.12) 
Analysis of the third period 
   The result of the Favour group was almost linked with the Labour Party in this period. 
On the other hand, the result of the Against group was close to the Conservative Party. 
The differences between the two groups were more usage of µnational¶ and µour¶ in the 
Favour group and more usage of µParliament¶ in the Against group in total of this period.  
 
The over-time comparison 
   In the Favour group, the percentage of µnational¶ has gradually increased over time: 
17% in the first period, 31% in the second period, and 35% in the third period. On the 
other hand, the percentage of µParliament¶ has gradually decreased over time: 32% in the 
first period, 25% in the second period, and 12% in the third period. This means that the 
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Favour group has certainly shifted its usage in this aspect of analysis. Although it is 
difficult to evaluate the usage of µour¶ again, because this is also 35% as the largest in the 
third period and the first period, why has the usage of µnational¶ superseded the usage of 
µparliament¶? It is hard to regard it as the rise of the nationalism because they are the 
Favour group. One possibility would be the national interest. As I have presented as the 
theoretical classification in the Interpretation analysis, MPs might seek national interests 
when they talk about the European matters. I will discuss it in the section of 
Interpretation analysis and the conclusion chapter with other aspects. 
   In the Against group, it is difficult to see the change throughout the three periods. The 
percentage of each usage has gone up and down throughout the three periods. 
 
Figure 7.15: The results of the Favour and the Against group in each period 
     
N=110 (out of 500)                  N=61 (out of 114)                   N=49 (out of 88) 
 
     
N=109 (out of 488)                  N=83 (out of 146)                  N=53 (out of 107)  
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Total (Figure A4.13) 
Analysis of the third period 
   The feature of this period was that the usage of µParliament¶ in the Treaty of Lisbon 
period was much larger than the other two debates. In the Treaty of Amsterdam period, 
the percentage of µParliament¶ was 11%, and in the Treaty of Nice period it was 5%. In 
the Treaty of Lisbon period, however, it was 28%. Although the usage of µParliament¶ 
dramatically increased in the Treaty of Lisbon period, the largest percentage was the 
XVDJHRIµour¶, and the second one was the usage of µnational¶ in total of this period. 
 
Figure 7.16: The results of total in each debate 
     
N=27 (out of 75)                    N=21 (out of 45)                    N=60 (out of 97) 
 
The over-time comparison 
   Similarly to the Labour Party and the Favour group, the percentage referring to 
µParliament¶ in the context of sovereignty gradually decreased over time. The change of 
other usages was varying. For example, the usage of µour¶ decreased in the second period 
but increased in the third period, and the usage of µnational¶ increased in the second 
period but decreased in the third period. The assumption which I presented in the 
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previous chapter was that national sovereignty gradually became an important aspect of 
MPs. However, this will not be an appropriate conclusion if the third period is included. 
The problem is, as I have previously stated, lies with the usage of µour¶. Although the 
usage of µour¶ can be replaced by other usages, this usage can imply a couple of other 
usages. For example, the usage of µour¶ means µnational¶ and µthe people¶. In this case, 
when the usage of µour¶ is large, MPs might view sovereignty from various aspects. 
However, this is nothing but one assumption. I need to evaluate it with other aspects of 
analysis. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that only the usage of µParliament¶ has shifted 
throughout the three periods in this aspect of analysis. Does this mean that parliamentary 
sovereignty has become unimportant for MPs or that MPs have changed their viewpoint 
of sovereignty? I will discuss this in the final chapter.  
 
Figure 7.17: The results of total in each period 
     
N=224 (out of 998)                  N=185 (out of 339 + 1 by Chairman)    N=108 (out of 217) 
 
Newspapers (Figure A4.14) 
Analysis of the third period and the over-time comparison 
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   The extent of the data was not great in this period. In both newspapers, the usage of 
µnational¶ was the majority and there was no usage of µParliament¶. 
   Throughout the three periods, the usage of µnational¶ increased and the usage of 
µParliament¶ decreased in both newspapers. This is a quite similar result with the Hansard 
records. Therefore, newspapers have faithfully reflected the discourse of MPs. 
 
Figure 7.18: The results of both newspapers in each period 
     
N=7 (out of 16)                     N=13 (out of 24)                    N=3 (out of 10) 
 
     
N=40 (out of 111)                   N=10 (out of 23 + 1 by Queen)         N=4 (out of 7) 
 
Summary of Word usage analysis 
   In the word of exposition, the result of Hansard in this period is definitely different 
from those in the other two periods. The percentage of the µPositive usage¶ is very large. 
Especially, the increase in the µPositive usage¶ amongst the Conservative Party and the 
Against group is a surprise. Of course, the percentage of the µPositive usage¶ amongst 
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them is still smaller than of the µNegative usage¶. Taking the volume of difference from 
other periods into account, however, it is safe to say that the usage in this aspect of 
sovereignty has changed.  
In the word of possession, on the other hand, it is not clear but possible to find that the 
percentage of the usage of µparliament¶ decreased. With only this view point, it is hard to 
conclude that the usage has changed. 
 
7.2 Definition analysis 
The analysis is carried out in the same way as for the previous two chapters. Thus this 
section analyses how speakers define sovereignty. My expectation is that Definition 
analysis can indicate which argument MPs pay attention and can suggest whether their 
points of argument have changed. Therefore, I tried to find differences, commonalities 
and consistencies from the various comments. The extent of the data that I found from 
each debate is shown as Table A4.2 in Appendix 4. The extent of the data is not great in 
this period. Paradoxically speaking, MPs have tended not to talk about the definition of 
sovereignty. Has the definition of sovereignty come down to a certain agreement or have 
MPs tried to abstain from stating the definition of sovereignty? Because of the shortage 
of data in this period, I include the over-time comparison in each group discussion. 
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Governments 
   There was no statement of government in this period. Five statements of definition in 
total were found in the first and the second period. Two of them stated the location of 
sovereignty as in Parliament. The statements of what sovereignty should be in 
governments can be seen only in the first period. Hence, members of government have 
tended to abstain from speaking their definitions of what sovereignty should be and it is 
almost impossible to find the change in governments in this aspect of analysis.  
 
The Labour Party 
   In the Treaty of Amsterdam debates, there was no statement of definition. In the 
Treaty of Nice debates, Mr Wayne David said that sovereignty rested with the people. In 
the Treaty of Lisbon debates, Mr Mark Hendrick said, µ6RYHUHLJQW\LVHLWKHUZLWKWKH
House or the people.¶ Both of them talked about which body or who should have 
sovereignty. In the previous two periods, members of the Labour Party made a variety of 
definitions of what sovereignty should be. In this period, there was no such statement in 
three debates. 
 
The Conservative Party 
   Two definitions in the Treaty of Amsterdam debates and one in the Treaty of Lisbon 
debates were found in this period. No definition was found in the Treaty of Nice debates. 
In the Treaty of Amsterdam debates, Mr Owen Paterson said that sovereignty should rest 
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with the people. And also, Mr Laurence Robertson focussed on a practical meaning and 
said, µSovereignty enables us to create the economy that suits our own industry, our own 
EXVLQHVVHV DQG RXU RZQ ZRUN IRUFH¶ In the Treaty of Lisbon debates, Mr Richard 
Shepherd said that sovereignty surely lies in the House. Therefore, two of them made 
statements about who or which body should have sovereignty. Only one made a 
statement of what sovereignty can do rather than what sovereignty should be.  
   In comparison with previous two periods, it is possible to say the same thing of the 
Labour Party. 
 
Favour and Against 
   All statements of the Labour Party were as the Favour group, and two statements of 
the Conservative Party, except for Mr Paterson who abstained from voting, were as the 
Against group. Therefore, the result is not different from two parties. And it is difficult to 
compare between two groups and over time. 
 
Summary of Definition analysis 
   The most important point of this analysis would be how the shortage of definitions in 
the third period should be evaluated. As I have examined the frequency of definition in 
the previous two periods, the frequency in this period is as follows. In the Treaty of 
Amsterdam period, there were two statements of definition in total out of 52 statements 
of sovereignty. The percentage was 3.8%. In the Treaty of Nice period, there was only 
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one statement of definition in total out of 34 statements of sovereignty. The percentage 
was 2.9%. In the Treaty of Lisbon period, there were two statements of definition in total 
out of 84 statements of sovereignty. The percentage was 2.4%. In the previous two 
periods, the percentages of definition in all statements were between 8.5% and 11.7%. 
Thus, the statements of definition in this period are obviously few. Especially, there was 
no definition of µwhat sovereignty should be¶ in the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon debates. 
Why has no-one, except one in the Treaty of Amsterdam period, talked about what 
sovereignty should be like in the first and the second periods? Some of the answers may 
be those two which I provided in the beginning of this section. 1) The definition of 
sovereignty has come down to a certain agreement. 2) MPs have tried to abstain from 
stating the definition of sovereignty. If answer no.1 was true, there should be found a 
certain agreement of definition. In the second period, it was possible to find the trend that 
the point of argument was likely to come down to focus on a practical meaning. In fact, 
the only definition of what sovereignty should be, which stated in the third period, was 
the one which focussed on a practical meaning. However, it is impossible to find any 
statements that mentioned about an agreement for the definition of sovereignty. Thus, 
answer no.2 seems to be appropriate. But why have MPs needed to abstain from making 
statements of definition? What I can say is that almost all statements of what sovereignty 
should be, although some statements of who or which body should have sovereignty 
were found, appeared before the implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht; in other 
words, before the creation of the EU. It is reasonable to suppose that the impact of the 
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creation of the EU was strong on elites¶ discourse of definition. Have MPs been unable to 
make any statements of definition after the creation of the EU? Certainly, they can assert 
the definition as before if they want to do so. Then, why did not they assert it? One 
possibility is that to assert just one aspect of various definitions became meaningless for 
them under the evolution of European integration that involves complex institutional 
changes. As we have seen three points of argument: legal, theoretical and practical, these 
definitions are non-equivalent in various angles of European policies because it is 
possible to lose sovereignty in one sense and gain it in another (Lord 1992, p422). Hence 
the result in this period shows the difficulty of definition argument. As for when I 
examined the usage of possession in the previous section, the ambiguous usage µour¶ was 
the largest percentage in the third period. One may say that it became difficult to state a 
clear view on sovereignty for MPs in relation to the European matter. And as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, political elites would attract the usage of function rather than discuss what it 
means in political practices. 
The table below is the total points of definition through this period. Tables of each 
debate are shown in Table A4.3 in Appendix 4. 
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Table 7.1: 1997-2009 Total 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: Nil N/A N/A 
Labour: 2 N/A in the people: 1 
either with the House or the 
people: 1 
Conservative: 3 practical: 1 in the House: 1 
in the people: 1 
Favour: 2 N/A in the people: 1 
either with the House or the 
people: 1 
Against: 2 practical: 1 in the House: 1 
(Abstention): 1 N/A in the people: 1 
Total: Favour+Against 
+Abstention 
practical: 1 in the people: 2 
in the House: 1 
either with the House or the 
people: 1 
 
7.3 Interpretation analysis 
The Interpretation analysis was carried out in the same way as for the previous two 
chapters, applying the following theoretical classifications: 
 
By joining in the EC or passing a bill of European matter, 
1.  Cession: Sovereignty will be transferred to the EC/EU, or all or a part of 
sovereignty will be lost or limited. 
2.  Unaffected: Sovereignty will not be changed. 
3.  Utilisation: Sovereignty will be transferred to or be pooled in the EC/EU in 
exchange for some advantages. 
 
And also, through membership activities in the EC/EU, 
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4.  Reinforcement: Sovereignty will be strengthened, be used or be transformed 
by way of enhancing its capacity. 
 
My expectation is that MPs¶ interpretation of sovereignty can be affected and changed 
over time through the mechanisms of adaptational pressure and interactions as to the 
progress of European integration and through other factors such as competitive 
discussion between government and opposition, the Conservative and the Labour, the 
Favour and the Against etc. As a result, the inclination of discourse in each group and 
period can be found. 
 
Government 
   In the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice debates, there was no statement of 
government.  
   In the Treaty of Lisbon debates, four members made statements of interpretation. All 
of them can be classified as sovereignty being unaffected but their points of discourse are 
not the same. For example, Ms Bridget Prentice, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Justice, talked about µWKHKXPDQULJKWVSURYLVLRQ¶ in the treaty and Mr David 
Miliband, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, talked about 
µLPPLJUDWLRQDV\OXPYLVDVSROLFHFR-operation and FLYLOODZ¶ in the treaty. They argue 
that these provisions do not reduce or infringe sovereignty of the UK or member states. 
In the previous two periods, members of government usually talked about sovereignty in 
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general or talked in an evasive way of expression like µultimate¶ sovereignty or a certain 
defined field without specification. One exception was that Mr Norman Lamont stated, 
µ1RWKLQJLQWKHWUHDW\LQWHUIHUHVZLWKWKHVRYHUHLJQW\RIWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIWKLVFRXQWU\
LQPRQHWDU\ DQG ILVFDOPDWWHUV LQ VWDJH ¶ in the debate of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
However, two other members in this period talked about the treaty in general, therefore, 
pointing out that certain provisions by members of government would be one feature of 
this period.  
In addition to the categorisation, Mr John Hutton, the Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, made a different statement of interpretation or, 
precisely, a statement of affirmation. He said, µ7KHWUHDW\FRQWDLQVDSURSHUUHFRJQLWLRQLQ
the laws of the EU, for the first time, of the sovereignty of member states over their 
QDWLRQDO UHVRXUFHV¶20 Paradoxically speaking, this reveals that there are no other 
provisions that contain a proper recognition of the sovereignty of member states. That is 
to say, it is reasonable to view that members tend to consider the interpretation of 
sovereignty focussing on some specific provisions. 
 
The Labour Party 
   In the Treaty of Amsterdam debates, three members of the Labour Party made 
statements of interpretation. Two of them can be classified as sovereignty being 
unaffected and one of them can be classified as utilisation of European integration for 
                                                 
20
  Some more statements, which are not the way of interpretation, on this matter can be found in members 
of back-benchers and the Conservative Party. 
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national interests. This utilisation type of interpretation was made by Mr Bill Rammell 
who had repeatedly made the same meaning in statements like, µ%\SRROLQJVRPHRIRXU
VRYHUHLJQW\ZHZRXOGKDYHJUHDWHUHFRQRPLFFRQWURO¶ 
   In the Treaty of Nice debates, six members made statements of interpretation. One of 
them can be classified as cession of sovereignty, two of them were as sovereignty being 
unaffected, and three of them were as utilisation of European integration for national 
interests.  
   In the Treaty of Lisbon debates, four members made statements of interpretation. 
One of them can be classified as sovereignty being unaffected and three other members 
can be classified as utilisation of European integration for national interests. 
   Throughout this period, there was no member of the Against group and two 
members who abstained in the voting. Thus, others voted in favour of the bills. One 
member who made a statement of the cession type of interpretation in the Treaty of Nice 
abstained in the voting. Therefore, all members of the Favour group made statements of 
either as sovereignty being unaffected or utilisation of European integration for national 
interests. Compared with the debate in the Treaty of Maastricht that came after the 
change of attitude in the Labour Party, the statement of the cession type of interpretation 
had dramatically decreased. Is this because the Labour Party had transformed from the 
opposition to the government? As I illustrated in the section of the Labour Party in 
Chapter 3, for the vast majority of the Labour Party MPs, there is a tendency to toe the 
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party line. They follow the party leader (Jones 2007, pp136-137). This tendency is now 
confirmed by this Interpretation analysis.  
   Regarding the division of the utilisation type of interpretation which I presented in 
the section of the Labour Party in the previous chapter, there were no first and second 
kinds that are the denial of the negative behaviour and the acceptance of the negative 
behaviour in this period. All statements were the third kind that is the presence of the 
µPositive usage¶. Although this tendency will be discussed again later in the section of 
µFavour, Against and Abstention¶, discourse of the utilisation type of interpretation in the 
Labour Party has definitely changed in this aspect. 
   Focussing on individual members in the Labour Party, only Mr Peter Hain made 
statements in both the second and the third period. His statements obviously show the 
change in discourse. In the debate of the Treaty of Maastricht, he voted against the bill 
and said, µ6RYHUHLJQW\ ZDV FHGHG WR D (XUR-level, not so much politically but, more 
LPSRUWDQWHFRQRPLFDOO\DORQJWLPHDJR¶21 In the debate of the Treaty of Nice, on the 
other hand, he voted in favour of the bill and said: 
Membership of the European Union does not mean surrendering sovereignty, which 
we have kept. We have retained the veto where it matters: for example, over taxation, 
social security and defence. As my hon. Friend said, we are considering pooling 
sovereignty. 
 
                                                 
21
 Mr Hain opposed not European integration but the content of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
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Even if his attitude to European integration had not changed, his discourse on 
sovereignty would have obviously changed. It is dangerous to conclude whether 
discourse of all members of the Labour Party had changed on the basis of the discourse 
of just one person. Allowing for a tendency to toe the party line in the Labour Party, and 
as long as the basic line of the Labour Party for the EU had not changed, his tendency of 
change would penetrate other members¶ discourse.  
 
The Conservative Party 
   In the Treaty of Amsterdam debates, eight members of the Conservative Party made 
statements of interpretation. Seven of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty. 
All of them voted against the bill. One of them can be classified into either the cession 
type or the utilisation type of interpretation: this was made by Mr Ian Taylor who 
abstained in the voting. He paradoxically expressed the importance of joining: 
It is not only by joining that we lose sovereignty, but by not joining. We lose 
sovereignty by not having influence and not being able to ensure that the rules of 
the game are not only properly formed but observed. 
 
He did not say anything about the advantage of the UK in return but this discourse said 
that the advantage would be lost if we did not join. Therefore, it is difficult to classify into 
four interpretations.   
 251 
In the Treaty of Nice debates, two members made statements of interpretation. Both 
of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty and voted against the bill. 
   In the Treaty of Lisbon debates, five members made statements of interpretation. 
Four of them can be classified as cession of sovereignty and one of them can be 
classified as utilisation of European integration for national interests. All four members of 
the cession type of interpretation voted against the bill. And one member of the utilisation 
type of interpretation voted in favour of the bill. This was Mr Kenneth Clarke and he was 
the only member who voted in favour of the bill within all statements of interpretation of 
the Conservative Party throughout this period. He said, µ:HKDYHSRROHGRXUVRYHUHLJQW\
ZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQG,WKLQNWKDWWKDWKDVEHHQRYHUZKHOPLQJO\WRRXUEHQHILW¶ 
This, only one member of the Favour group, is the feature of the Conservative Party in 
this period. In the first and second periods, it was possible to find more members of the 
Favour group in the Conservative Party.  
   Focussing on individuals, four members of the Conservative Party made their 
statements in the previous period as well. They are Sir Teddy Taylor, Mr Bill Cash, Sir 
Patrick Cormack and Mr Kenneth Clarke. Sir Teddy Taylor made statements in the 
debate of the SEA and the Treaty of Amsterdam and both statements can be classified as 
cession of sovereignty. Mr Bill Cash made statements also in the debate of the SEA and 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and both statements can be classified as cession of sovereignty. 
However, his discourse has slightly changed in a certain aspect. This will be explained in 
the next section. Sir Patrick Cormack made statements in the debate of the Treaty of 
 252 
Maastricht and the Treaty of Lisbon. As I introduced in the section of the Conservative 
Party in the previous chapter, his interpretation can be classified as utilisation of 
European integration for national interests but it was conditional. This condition might 
not be met. His interpretation in this period can be classified as cession of sovereignty. 
On the other hand, Mr Kenneth Clarke made his statement as sovereignty being 
unaffected in the debate of the Treaty of Maastricht and as utilisation of European 
integration for national interests in the debate of the Treaty of Lisbon. Accordingly, there 
was no fixed sign of the individual change of interpretation.  
 
Favour, Against and Abstention 
   In the Treaty of Amsterdam debates, the number of the Favour group corresponds 
exactly to the Labour Party. On the other hand, seven members who voted against the bill 
made statements of interpretation. They are all from the Conservative Party and all their 
statements can be classified as cession of sovereignty. Further, there was one member 
who abstained in the voting. This was Mr Ian Taylor, as I cited in the section of the 
Conservative Party. 
   In the Treaty of Nice debates, four members who voted in favour of the bill made 
statements of interpretation. They were all from the Labour party. One of them can be 
classified as sovereignty being unaffected and three of them were as utilisation of 
European integration for national interests. On the other hand, three members who voted 
against the bill made statements of interpretation. All statements can be classified as 
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cession of sovereignty. Further, there were two members who abstained in the voting. 
They are both from the Labour Party and one of their statements can be classified as 
cession of sovereignty and the other statement can be classified as sovereignty being 
unaffected. 
   In the Treaty of Lisbon debates, nine members who voted in favour of the bill made 
statements of interpretation. Five of them can be classified as sovereignty being 
unaffected and four of them can be classified as utilisation of European integration for 
national interests. On the other hand, four members who voted against the bill made 
statements of interpretation. They are all from the Conservative Party and all statements 
can be classified as cession of sovereignty.  
 
   As the result of the word of exposition shows, µPositive words¶ were used quite often 
in this period in both the Favour and the Against groups. Needless to say, this 
phenomenon can be seen in the statements of interpretations. In the Favour group, they 
often used µNegative words¶ in the first and the second periods when they made 
statements of the utilisation type of interpretation. In the first period, there were 26 
members who stated the utilisation type of interpretation in the Favour group in total. 
Eighteen of them used µNegative words¶ and six of them used µPositive words¶ for 
explaining the advantage of the UK. In the second period, there were seven members 
who stated the utilisation type of interpretation in the Favour group in total. Two of them 
used µNegative words¶ and three of them used µPositive words¶ for explaining the 
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advantage of the UK. And, in this period, there were nine members who stated the 
utilisation type of interpretation in the Favour group in total. None of them used 
µNegative words¶ and eight of them used µPositive words¶ for explaining the advantage of 
the UK. Thus, it is possible to find the change of discourse to explain the advantage in the 
Favour group. This trend can be seen in the Against group as well. 
Because there was only a couple of the utilisation type of interpretations in the 
Against group, I examine the whole members of the Against group by focussing on the 
µPositive words¶. In 1971 and 1975 of the first period, no-one in the Against group used 
µPositive words¶. In 1972, some members of the Labour Party in the Against group used 
µPositive words¶ in the statement of interpretation. In the second period, no-one in the 
Against group used µPositive words¶ in the statement of interpretation. This reveals two 
things. One is that members of the Conservative Party in the Against group never used 
µPositive words¶ in the statement of interpretation. And the other is that no-one in any 
parties has used µPositive words¶ since Britain actually became a member of the EC. 
Therefore, this period is the first time to find µPositive words¶ in the statement of the 
Conservative Party in the Against group and the first time to use µPositive words¶ since 
the accession to the EC.  
   Further, I will look at those statements with µPositive words¶. Four statements can be 
found in 14 statements of the Against group. In the debate of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
Mr David Prior and Mr Bill Cash made their statement of interpretation. Mr David Prior 
said: 
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I, too, am in favour of the Single European Act, but when the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer says that monetary union will involve some pooling of economic 
sovereignty, that statement is disingenuous. I believe that monetary union goes 
beyond that. That view is not necessarily wrong, as I accept that there are different 
views on Europe, but monetary union goes way beyond some pooling of 
economic sovereignty. 
 
Mr Prior recognised some pooling of economic sovereignty in the EU but he did not 
recognise monetary union as some pooling of economic sovereignty. Mr Cash states: 
However, we are moving beyond thin slices to enormous chunks of our 
sovereignty being taken away from us, or being pooled with those of other 
countries and put into a legal framework, which will create impossible difficulties 
for us in the future. 
 
Of course he opposed that sovereignty was to be pooled with other countries. However, 
what we can find from his discourse is that he did not say that sovereignty cannot be 
pooled. He said that pooled sovereignty would create impossible difficulties. In the 
debate of the Treaty of Nice, Mr Chris Grayling said: 
Step by step, as we move from treaty to treaty, the process of integration develops, 
we hand over more sovereignty to an international pool, and decisions that should 
be taken in this country are taken at European level. 
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Mr Grayling recognised the concept of an international pool. And finally, in the debate of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, Mr Gerald Howarth said: 
The British people have found out that the pooling of sovereignty to which she 
refers has proceeded to such an extent that we, the elected representatives of the 
people of this country, are no longer able to decide on a whole raft of issues on 
their behalf because powers have been progressively handed over to Brussels. 
 
The expression of µthe pooling of sovereignty¶ in this statement is to use a previous 
speaker¶s phrase. However, he did not say that sovereignty cannot be pooled. Thus all 
four members have not only used for the first time µPositive words¶ in their statements of 
interpretation but also, surprisingly, not denied the concept of pooling or pooled 
sovereignty as an act or an existence. 
 
Newspapers 
   The Times in this period introduced two members with interpretations. Both of them 
were members of government. The Times cited a statement of Mr Tony Blair, the Prime 
Minister, at the time of the debate of the Treaty of Amsterdam, as follows: 
We willingly pay the price of pooled sovereignty in defence, for the greater prize of 
collective security through NATO. We should be ready to pay a similar price in the 
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European Union for the prizes of political security and stability, liberal and open 
markets, higher incomes and more jobs. 
 
And also a statement of Mr Jack Straw, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, at the time of the debate of the Treaty of Nice was cited: 
The EU does not threaten our independence, our sovereignty or our identity. 
Rather, in today's world, more interdependent than it ever has been, the EU 
provides the surest guarantee that our voice will be heard in the world. 
 
Thus, both interpretations can be classified as utilisation of European integration for 
national interests. In the data of Hansard, there was no statement of interpretation of 
government in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. Therefore, these statements are the 
only interpretation of government.  
The Guardian in this period, on the other hand, introduced three members with 
interpretations. All of them can be classified as utilisation of European integration for 
national interests. One of them was a statement of Mr Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister, 
and was cited as follows: 
Brown insists the treaty does not impinge on British sovereignty and breaks new 
ground in providing opportunities for the EU to tackle global poverty, climate 
change and children's rights. 
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He did not directly say that Britain would get some advantages in return. He expands the 
scope of the advantage for the world. Two other statements of interpretation also referred 
to the scope of the world. One was Mr Peter Hain, of the Labour Party: 
     6SHDNLQJWRWKH/DERXUJURXS3URJUHVVKHVDLGLWZDVWLPHWRµJHWUHDO¶DERXWWKH
issue of sovereignty and recognise that in a globalised economy, pooling 
sovereignty could promote British interests. 
 
The other was Mr Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrats: 
     In an increasingly insecure world, the EU offers us safety in numbers. It 
strengthens our real sovereignty in an age in which national borders have become 
increasingly meaningless. 
 
The statement of Mr Hain can be classified as utilisation of European integration and the 
statement of Mr Clegg can be classified as reinforcement of sovereignty by membership. 
This is the only interpretation of reinforcement type in this period. The statement of Mr 
Hain was delivered in the debate of the Treaty of Nice where he also made statements in 
the House of Commons as I cited in the section of the Labour Party, and the statements 
of Mr Brown and Mr Clegg were delivered in the debate of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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Summary of Interpretation analysis 
In this analysis, three key words were found: provision, pooling, and the scope of the 
world. In interpretation of government, members tend to view sovereignty through some 
provisions in the law or the Act such as human rights. Some members of the Against 
group in the Conservative Party have used the term µthe pooling of sovereignty¶ and have 
recognised it for the first time. According to the study of Ludlam in Chapter 3, the 
Conservative Party can be divided into two camps: µabsolutists¶ and µpoolers¶ (Ludlam 
1998, p42). Consequently, some absolutists have changed their discourse. And some 
statements of MPs, which were reported in newspapers, tend to view and consider 
sovereignty in relation to the scope of the world such as globalised economy.  
Regarding detailed interpretations of utilisation type that were presented in the 
previous chapter, further, the change is obvious. Now all interpretation of utilisation type 
is expressed with the µPositive usage¶. This result can correspond with a survey of 
Labour MPs in the 1992-97 Parliament. This was shown in Chapter 3 and indicated that 
a majority accepted that British sovereignty could be pooled (Daniels 1998, p89; 
Featherstone 1999, p7).  
These results would give indications of the change in discourse. However, the result 
that there was no interpretation of reinforcement type, except for one in newspapers, in 
this period was contrary to my expectation. As I argued in the previous chapter, this result 
makes it difficult to argue that there is a µnew¶ interpretation of sovereignty. Therefore, is 
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it reasonable to conclude that discourse change has not taken a direction of the 
reinforcement type of interpretation? I would like to argue this in the final chapter. 
 
1997-2009 Conclusion 
In the debate of the Treaty of Lisbon, Sir Stuart Bell, of the Labour Party, states, 
µ%DFNLQ(GZDUG+HDWKWDONHGDERXWSRROHGVRYHUHLJQW\DQGZHDUHVWLOOWDONLQJ
about pooled sovereLJQW\WRGD\:HKDYHQHYHUJLYHQDVLQJOHSRZHUDZD\WR(XURSH¶ 
Apart from whether a single power has been given away or not, surely, they are still 
talking about pooled sovereignty. However, is it the same in recent years? As we found in 
the Word usage analysis and in the Interpretation analysis, the use of µPositive words¶ 
including the term µpool¶ has dramatically increased in this period, and, further, some 
members of the Conservative Party in the Against group have used this word for the first 
time ever in their statements of interpretation throughout three periods. Are they only a 
short-lived phenomenon of this period? Meanwhile, the definition of sovereignty has 
come to be not discussed in this period. One possibility of this trend is that it became 
difficult to state a clear general definition on sovereignty in relation to European matters 
as individual provisions of the treaties were focussed on in some interpretations. I will 
take up this question and detailed conclusion that came to light in this period in the next 
chapter. 
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8  Conclusion 
   I shall summarise, firstly, what I have examined up to Chapter 3. In the Introduction, 
three contexts of the research were provided. The historical context revealed that the 
meaning of sovereignty has evolved as political and historical contexts change. This 
result indicated that the impact of European integration would be another change of 
political context with potential implications for the meaning of sovereignty. The 
component context raised the question of whether dual and constitutive character of 
sovereignty could explain the phenomenon of European integration. In other words, the 
problem is whether it is possible to recognise the power in the supranational institution as 
sovereignty and whether sovereignty can truly be detached from a state as an ideology. 
These questions might suggest that the concept of sovereignty would require another 
component of sovereignty, neither internal nor external, as a member state of the EU. The 
theoretical context showed that the studies of International Relations and European 
integration have presented various views on sovereignty that would predict discourse 
change surrounding sovereignty. These contexts suggested the possibility of discourse 
change on sovereignty by European integration. The originality of this study was to focus 
on actual parliamentary debates and to analyse them to determine the extent of change. 
This study thus aimed at investigating the question of whether elite discourse on 
sovereignty has indeed changed in the context of European integration by applying 
discourse analysis. 
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   To start with, in Chapter 1, I illustrated and examined how the academic literature has 
discussed sovereignty in the contemporary world. Academic literatures would be the 
basis from which to understand sovereignty for political elites. In academic literature, 
rationalists and constructivists have presented a variety of views on sovereignty. 
According to the shared viewpoint of constructivists, sovereignty can be changed 
through the construction of national interests within various social practices in a state. In 
recent works, Daniel Philpot and Neil Walker argued for the possibility of the change in 
sovereignty (Philpot 2001; Walker 2003). Especially, Philpot pointed out that the 
phenomenon of European integration would be one of five revolutions in sovereignty 
that was brought by revolutions in ideas. In relation to elites¶ understanding, then, the 
study focussed on the usage of sovereignty. Rebecca Adler-Nissen introduced the view 
by which µsovereignty is a discourse¶ and argued that, by emphasizing sovereignty as a 
claim, the emphasis is placed on how it is used, or being played out, in legal and political 
practices (Alder-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen ed. 2008, p82). As a result, these 
academic debates have given meaning to the study of discourse change of sovereignty in 
the context of European integration. 
   In Chapter 2, my focus narrowed down to Britain. The chapter examined how 
sovereignty has generally been conceptualised in Britain. The concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty had been established over a long period of time, from the sixteenth century 
to the nineteenth century. This study understood how the concept was uniquely accepted 
in Britain, whereas it also contained some intrinsic problems. Despite some criticisms, 
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the concept has been given support by British people, history and culture. In comparison 
with other member states of the EU, further, it was possible to draw attention to the 
differences of the conceptualisation in Britain. The concept of parliamentary sovereignty 
and its context were likely to be the grounds of discourse of MPs as well.  
   Chapter 3, therefore, examined the challenge of European integration on Britain 
thoroughly, including the perspective of theory, law, constitution and politics. The first 
section considered a theoretical perspective and concluded that theories of European 
integration have developed conflictingly but have offered a neutral view by focussing on 
the logic of arguing or communicative action. That is to say, an idea or a preference can 
be altered through argumentative persuasion. The change in theory might lead the trend 
of the debate on sovereignty. Nevertheless, I raised some unsolved questions about 
sovereignty such as whether sovereignty can be divided, whether shared sovereignty can 
be viewed as the same sovereignty of the nation state, and whether pooled or delegated 
sovereignty can be understood as keeping supreme power at the national level. These 
questions were posed by the gap between theoretical and practical perspectives and 
between a viewpoint of the state and the EU. Before we consider these answers, the 
section required to view a legal perspective of sovereignty as well. The examination of 
the legal perspective showed that µsupremacy¶ and µdirect effect¶ of Community law has 
already been established and accepted by the ECJ through court cases prior to the British 
accession to the EC. As a result, we found that sovereignty can be theoretically changed 
and EU law has already affected the sovereignty of member states. 
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Under these circumstances, how has European integration influenced elites 
discourse? The next section presented two possible mechanisms of discourse change and 
examined the impact on governmental machinery (Whitehall) of the UK. One of 
mechanisms could be found through the Europeanisation approach as adaptational 
pressure and the other mechanism could be found through the MLG approach as 
interactions between three levels: supra-national, member states and subnational. As the 
latter mechanism has worked mainly since the Blair Government implemented 
devolution, Europeanisation was the major mechanism of change for the whole period of 
European integration in the UK. This section cited such mechanisms as Europeanisation 
of Whitehall at the end. 
As we have examined British case of Europeanisation, the next section considered 
the legal impact on the British constitution, especially on parliamentary sovereignty. 
Consequently, scholars and lawyers viewed that parliamentary sovereignty has declined 
or, at least in Foster¶s words, is in abeyance (Foster 2007, p63). However, existing 
literature indicated that debates of MPs on sovereignty have not always developed in 
accordance with these legal understandings. Nicol argued that MPs have failed to 
perceive parliamentary sovereignty in terms of judicial power (Nicol 2001, p106). The 
reason behind this was that there were three points of argument: legal, theoretical and 
practical, which were incompatible, over sovereignty. One possible reason why the 
questions, which were mentioned in the first section of the chapter, were unsolved would 
be the divergence of arguing points over sovereignty. The point here was MPs could 
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change their focus on these arguing points over time by the mechanisms of discourse 
change. 
The last section found that the British political system has also complicated these 
arguments. Thus the section examined how debates over sovereignty developed into a 
confrontation, between and within parties, in the British political system. This 
confrontational style of British politics would be a factor of discourse change as well.  
The examination of Chapter 3 revealed that the challenge of European integration 
has made an impact on both theoretical and legal perspectives, which can be elements of 
three different points of argument over sovereignty with practical perspective, and has 
provided the possibility of discourse change by mechanisms of institutional change such 
as adaptational pressure and interactions, and domestic factors like a competitive political 
culture.  
 
   It follows from what has been said thus far that elites¶ discourse change on 
sovereignty is fully conceivable. The dissertation then moved to an analysis of elite 
discourse surrounding sovereignty. This study used discourse analysis by applying key 
stages of the work of Potter and Wetherell for investigating discourse change. 
Sample selection: The sample of this study was members of the House of Commons 
and eight debates on European matters. 
Collection of records and documents: My data sources were Hansard records and 
two newspapers. 
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Transcription: Hansard records and newspaper articles were already transcribed and 
can be accessed by websites or documents in libraries.22 
Coding: The first step of coding was to find a sentence which includes the word 
µsovereignty¶. Those sentences that were repetitions of other speakers and views as a 
third party were excluded. The second step was to classify speakers by their backgrounds, 
which were their party and their attitude to the resolutions.  
Analysis: The analysis was carried out by comparing patterns and differences over 
time. The period of time was separated into three groups: 1971-1975; 1985-1993, 
1997-2009.  
In addition to these steps, this study applied three approaches for discourse analysis: 
Word usage analysis, Definition analysis and Interpretation analysis. The focus of this 
analysis was the question of how MPs have used the word µsovereignty¶ and of whether 
they have changed its meaning or usage. Thus, more precisely, the viewpoints were how 
they have qualified or explained the word µsovereignty¶, how they have expressed the 
definition of sovereignty and how they have interpreted sovereignty in relation to 
European integration.  
 
 
                                                 
22
 Although transcription of data in 1970s was conducted manually, it appears that the data from the 1970s is 
now available electronically. Unfortunately, there was not enough time to re-do the analysis by using the 
search function like other periods. It may be conceivable that a couple of instances of µsovereignty¶ might 
have been missed during the manual analysis. However, the result of the manual analysis is not likely to differ 
too much from the one electrical because the data for this period was large enough that one or two missing 
observations should not have a substantial impact on the overall results.  
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Findings 
   From Chapter 5 to Chapter 7, this study conducted the analysis of three time periods. 
The following results were obtained. 
 
Not changed 
   Firstly, I present what has not changed throughout the three periods. In the word of 
exposition, the µNegative usage¶ of the Against group was over 60% in total of all periods. 
And, also, in Interpretation analysis, the majority (all in the second and the third periods) 
of the Against group has continuously made statements of cession type of interpretation. 
The analysis shows that the usage of discourse has not changed in these two aspects of 
approaches. 
 
Changed 
   The big change in the word of exposition was the Labour Party in Hansard records. 
The µPositive usage¶ has dramatically increased throughout the three periods. It was only 
11% in total between 1971 and 1975, then 24% between 1985 and 1993, and finally 
65% between 1997 and 2009. As the result shows a continuous 65% at all debates in the 
third period, the change became clear. The µPositive usage¶ in newspapers is also very 
large in the third period but it was not possible to view any stable movement in the 
newspaper analysis throughout the three periods. In the word of possession, the usage of 
µParliament¶ in Hansard records has decreased throughout the three periods. This result 
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can also be found in both newspapers. On the other hand, the usage of µnational¶ in The 
Guardian has increased throughout the three periods. The usage of µnational¶ in The 
Times is also very large and larger than The Guardian in the third period but has 
decreased since the second period. 
   In Definition analysis, what was obvious is the shortage of data in the third period. 
MPs have begun to not speak about the definition of sovereignty. Also, in comparison 
between the first and the second periods, it was impossible to find consistency of 
definitions. One can say that the point of argument over sovereignty was likely to come 
down to focus on a practical meaning. And finally, in the third period, only one MP 
mentioned the definition of what sovereignty should be. This is discussed further below. 
   In the Interpretation analysis, the interpretation of reinforcement type has decreased 
throughout the three periods and is non-existent in the third period in Hansard records. In 
the interpretation of utilisation type, on the other hand, the µPositive usage¶ like the term 
pooling of sovereignty has increased and all interpretations in the third period were the 
µPositive usage¶. Further, the third period is the first time to find the µPositive usage¶ in 
the statement of the Conservative Party in the Against group and the first time to use 
µPositive words¶ in any parties since the accession to the EC. And also, all members who 
made statements with µPositive words¶ did not deny but, to put it another way, recognised 
µpooling or pooled sovereignty¶ as an act of the nation or an existence of the concept. 
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Has discourse changed? 
   Contrary to my expectation, it was impossible to find definite evidence for a new 
interpretation of sovereignty. I expected that a new phrase or new interpretation of 
sovereignty could be found from the Definition analysis and Interpretation analysis. The 
conclusion of no finding can be explained that there was almost no definition in the third 
period and that the interpretation of reinforcement type could not be found in the third 
period in Hansard records, though these may not be the only way for finding a new 
interpretation of sovereignty. If so, have we not found the answer to questions which 
were raised in the beginning of Chapter 3 in MPs¶ discourse as well? These were three 
questions of whether sovereignty can be divided between the state and the EU or into 
several sectors, whether shared sovereignty can be viewed as the same sovereignty of the 
nation state, and whether pooled or delegated sovereignty can be understood as keeping 
supreme power at the national level. As we could find in Interpretation analysis, all 
detailed interpretations of utilisation type now used µPositive words¶ and some members 
in the Against group recognised µthe pooling of sovereignty¶ for the first time in the third 
period. Governmental elites and some members of the Favour group have already had 
this concept from the beginning. Therefore, it seems to me that the concept of µthe 
pooling of sovereignty¶ may be penetrating the Against group as well.  
This result could indicate the answer to whether it is perceived that sovereignty can 
be divided. Facing the fact of sectional legal impact and in order to accept it, and having 
continuous discussion of sovereignty, it appears that MPs may have gradually adopted 
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the divisibility of sovereignty. If so, British discourse on sovereignty has changed. As 
cited in Chapter 2, Pappamikail argued, µthe British often view sovereignty as something 
indivisible, either you have it or you don¶t¶ (Pappamikail 1998, p217). Almost all the 
Against group has repeatedly denied any loss or the limitation of sovereignty by 
European integration, and they said that a further step of integration would be the 
surrender or the transfer of sovereignty in the first period. Mr Raymond Fletcher, of the 
Labour Party, in 1972 said, µ,FDQDFFHSWQHLWKHUWKHSKUDVH³SRROLQJRf VRYHUHLJQW\ ´QRU
WKHLGHDEHKLQGLW¶ This discourse was representing the view of Pappamikail. However, 
the discourse of the pooling of sovereignty, at least the phrase, has permeated into the 
Against group. The idea of the pooling of sovereignty means that a part of sovereignty 
can be placed under joint control. The idea contains the meaning of the divisibility of 
sovereignty both between the state and the EU and between sectors. As Fella noted, the 
Labour party turned its attentions towards a more pluralistic model of power (Fella 2002, 
p26). And, in relation to it, as the Labour Government introduced devolution, a pluralistic 
view of power has gradually been accepted in the UK. Have some people in the Against 
group accepted this idea too? They may have tried to find a mediating interpretation in a 
controversial idea that the UK should pool sovereignty to the EU which is not desirable 
in legal and theoretical perspective but the UK still has influence on the joint control in a 
practical manner; thus, although MPs understand that sovereignty of the UK cannot be 
absolute because of membership, this mediating interpretation or pluralistic view can 
bring the interpretation that sovereignty has not completely separated from the UK. That 
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is why discourse has converged in the way that the Against group absorbed the idea of 
the pooling of sovereignty. People may struggle to find the way of interpretation within 
the established concept without applying new meaning or adding a new component of 
sovereignty, which is neither internal nor external, as discussed in the component context 
in the Introduction. The concept of pooling sovereignty will be discussed again below. 
How about the other two questions which were also raised as µunsolved questions on 
sovereignty¶ in Chapter 3? One of them was whether shared sovereignty can be viewed 
as the same sovereignty of the nation state, if the EU acquires full control over 
governance of member states. Well, this is almost impossible unless the EU becomes a 
nation state or a federal state. No-one has mentioned this view in debates. As long as 
member states are independent states, they will try to view sovereignty as the concept for 
a state. People cannot apply this concept other than to a state. The other question was 
whether pooled or delegated sovereignty can be understood as keeping supreme power at 
the national level. This may become possible if MPs seek the interpretation of 
sovereignty in the same way as the first question which was the idea of the pooling 
sovereignty, although there was no discourse of µdelegated sovereignty¶ in debates. That 
is to say, sovereignty has not detached from the UK in a practical manner. Thus the 
points are whether sovereignty can be viewed through the sight of national level and 
whether this trend of mediating interpretation will continue and will be generalised.  
Now, putting aside these points, I would like to find out the change of discourse by 
answering more questions which were raised during the analyses of Chapters 5-7.  
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In the analysis of the word of exposition in the third period, the result showed that a 
change was obvious after the year 2000. This was the double increase (from 26% to 
52%) of the µPositive usage¶ between the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice. 
And the same percentage of the µPositive usage¶ was seen in the Treaty of Lisbon. At the 
end, I raised the question of what happened in Europe and in Britain around the year 
2000. Apart from these treaties, the Euro was introduced in 1999 and circulated in 2002 
in Europe, and the Human Rights Act 1998, which aimed to apply the ECHR to UK law, 
came into force in 2000 in Britain. Although the ECHR is not a matter of the EU, the 
decision was likely to affect the interpretation of sovereignty. According to the study of 
Borthwick, as cited in Chapter 2, the ECHR and a written constitution was one of 
challenges to the sovereignty of Parliament (Borthwick 1997, p26). While Britain did not 
join the Euro, the argument on the sovereignty of currency has still become heated in 
Britain. Further, the Step Change programme of the Blair government in 1998, which 
sought to change the UK¶s European orientation from a passive and reactive approach, 
and devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1999 were viewed as critical 
junctures of institutional change by Bulmer and Burch (Bulmer and Burch 2005, p876; 
Bulmer and Burch 2009, p190). It is unclear whether all debates or some of them have 
influenced discourse on sovereignty. Although I took eight debates of European matters 
for the analysis in this study, there could be more debates which influence elites¶ 
discourse on sovereignty.  
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The second question which needs to be considered is the word of possession. The 
usage of µParliament¶ has decreased, the usage of µnational¶ was substantial in the second 
and the third periods, and the usage of µour¶ was the largest in the third period. How 
should we evaluate these results? One possibility is that tKHXVDJHRIµnational¶ and µour¶ 
has a meaning of larger extent than the XVDJHRIµParliament¶. With the development of 
the EU, the organisations and the functions have grown more complex. Discourse on 
sovereignty may not be as simple as transferring it between Westminster and Brussels. 
Under these circumstances, it is possible to consider that MPs had difficulty in specifying 
whose sovereignty should be applied. Therefore, it is unreasonable to suppose that 
parliamentary sovereignty has become unimportant for MPs. 
   The third question is what I see as the decrease of the specification of a definition of 
sovereignty. This result can be considered through the Europeanisation approach. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, although some definitions of who or which body 
should have sovereignty were found, almost all definitions, except one in the third period, 
of what sovereignty should be appeared before the implementation of the Treaty of 
Maastricht; in other words, before the creation of the EU. As Bulmer and Burch 
considered that the Treaty of Maastricht is a critical juncture for institutional changes in 
the UK (Bulmer and Burch 2009, pp189-190), MPs may also have adapted their 
discourse to one which can correspond to those institutional changes resulting from the 
implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht. They might realise that asserting only one 
aspect of definitions of sovereignty was meaningless in the context of complex 
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institutional changes. Weber and Barterson argue that to define sovereignty is impossible 
because sovereignty is a source of theoretical confusion and a site of political struggle 
(cited in Hoffman 1998, p17). Rather than claiming the contentious definition of 
sovereignty, elites needed to change their focus on how sovereignty can be connected to 
a certain political and economic results which involve national interests. In other words, 
political elites would be interested in using the function of sovereignty rather than 
discussing and seeking what it means in political practices as mentioned in Chapter 1.  
The fourth question is whether the increase of the pooling of sovereignty is a 
short-lived phenomenon or not. This is related to the question of the divisibility of 
sovereignty and the points which I temporarily put aside. This concept is not new but it is 
likely to start being accepted at a national level viewpoint. The concept has already been 
established for academics and at the European level. Anderson and Weymouth regarded 
pooled sovereignty as a European concept (see Pilkington 2001, pp87-88). That is why 
governmental elites and some of the Favour group have repeatedly used this concept that 
sovereignty can be pooled in the EU. It is true that those MPs in these groups who 
interpreted as utilisation of European integration for national interests at first tended to 
include µNegative words¶ instead of this concept for obtaining some advantages in their 
interpretation but, at last, the concept of the pooling of sovereignty came to be used by all 
of governmental elites and the Favour group. That is to say, the concept, which was used 
in a part of these groups, has gradually been adopted possibly by the mechanisms of 
Europeanisation and the competitive political debates between parties and within each 
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party. The Against group, in other words Eurosceptics, has repeatedly refused this 
concept until the second period, as µabsolutists¶ to use Ludlam¶s word. And, in the third 
period, some of them used it for the first time, like µpoolers¶ in Ludlam¶s words. 
Assuming that MPs in the Against group realised this concept as a useful phrase for 
explaining the issue of sovereignty in relation to European integration, which some 
institutions have already Europeanised, and that they believed the concept to be 
PDLQWDLQLQJWKH8.¶VSUactical aspect of sovereignty, the idea of pooling sovereignty that 
implies a view of British control would prevail into the viewpoint of national level by the 
pluralistic manner. Thus pooling sovereignty, which was firstly viewed as a European 
concept, could have been accepted as a useful interpretation in the domestic concept too. 
In short, it is quite likely that the discourse change has occurred by way of the adoption 
of European idea into the national standpoint. And if this concept had a sentiment that 
sovereignty has not completely separated from the UK, as stated above, the concept 
would evolve into the middle idea like building a bridge between rationalists¶ and 
constructivists¶ views on sovereignty, as Checkel argued (Checkel 2001). 
The fifth question is why discourse change did not take a course of interpretation of 
reinforcement type. In the first period, many MPs said that sovereignty will be enhanced 
or strengthened by joining the Community or sharing sovereignty. In the second period, a 
couple of reinforcement type of interpretations can be found, and no such statement can 
be found in the third period in Hansard records and only one in newspapers. Britain 
joined the EC almost 40 years ago. Since then, discourse on sovereignty has been 
 276 
repeated. As I illustrated at the end of the last chapter, from the statement of Sir Stuart 
Bell of which we are still talking about pooled sovereignty today, discourse on 
sovereignty has not changed at first glance. Further, it is impossible to find discourse 
which confirms how sovereignty has been strengthened or how enhanced sovereignty 
has worked by giving a specific example. Therefore, it was hard to reiterate the 
interpretation of reinforcement type. It is reasonable to say that some MPs have changed 
their sight from seeking the meaning of sovereignty in European integration to applying 
the practical aspect of sovereignty for the state as to changing the view levels from 
European to national.  
 
The implications of the demarcation 
   Those above findings pertain to data that were limited, as described in Chapter 4. 
Elites were defined as British MPs. Are the findings likely to be similar to these results if 
I examined the discourse of other British elites? As I wrote in Chapter 4, it is quite 
difficult to find discourse of other elites in consecutive actual debates. If we analysed 
sporadic debates of different elites, the findings are unlikely to be similar to these above. 
The hardest part for the analysis of other elites is how many of them should be included 
and how we can find their discourse. For example, if we need to examine discourse of 
scholars, who should be included? Is it enough to view just those scholars who have 
written about European integration? Even if we want to examine them, it will still be 
difficult to demarcate who should be included because there are unlimited people who 
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have written about sovereignty and European integration. Further, if we need to examine 
discourse of bureaucrats, which machinery or office should be included and from where 
can their statements be found? Journalists could be easier than other elites. Are they 
different from MPs? It seems very likely that journalists and MPs would, in fact, use 
similar discourse: journalists may speak or write in reacting to those discourses of MPs 
and vice versa. They may take one of postures in the debates of MPs. Although the 
detailed findings may differ from MPs, it is a likely supposition that the overall findings 
could be similar to them if we include a wide range of journalists This is an interesting 
question which should be pursued in future research projects on this topic.  
   What would happen if discourse outside of the period of parliamentary debates had 
been examined? Although there is a problem regarding how the other periods can be 
defined, it is possible to imagine that the discourse of the Cameron administration is 
different from those of the Labour government between 1997 and 2009. As we found 
that more members of the Conservative Party have changed their attitude towards 
European integration to scepticism, it seems likely that we will find more negative 
discourse on European integration than was the case with the Labour government. In 
terms of the crisis of European finance in recent years, non-government members also 
may imply more sceptic view in their discourse. The result of the current debates should 
be examined once a certain period has defined such as after the next change of 
administration. Prior to 1971 should be considered from a different perspective. As we 
have examined discourse change from the impact of European integration, the finding 
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under non-membership status could be different from those as a member of the EC/EU. 
Of course, it is possible to analyse discourse change on sovereignty by tracing back to 
1961 when Britain first applied to join the EEC or even to 1951 when the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed. As this study is 
including 1971 and 1972 before Britain actually joined the EC, and the findings of these 
years have showed different perspectives from other periods of this study such as more 
of the reinforcement type of interpretation, the analysis of 1971 and 1972 may reflect the 
result of the period prior to 1971. Although it is hard to say that discourse change has 
begun since the UK accession to the EC, this study has focussed more on the influence of 
membership as Europeanisation. Thus the period between 1971 and 2009 should be 
sufficient for analysing British elites¶ discourse change resulting from the impact of 
European integration so far. Future research could, however, extend the data collection 
back to the 1960s and provide a comparison of discourse over this lengthier time period 
to try to detect whether there have been fundamental changes in the usage and meaning 
of sovereignty in the pre- and post-accession periods. 
   Were discourses of MPs authentic? In other words, iVQ¶WLWSRVVLEOHWKDW03VZHUH
VLPSO\ µSRVWXULQJ¶ DQG WDNLQJ VWDQGV LQ SDUOLDPHQW LQ D ZD\ WKDW ZDV GHVLJQHG
specifically to support the government? When we look at the result of the word of 
exposition, for example, the numbers of Positive words by government members were 
obviously larger than non-government members of the Conservative Party in 1971 and 
1972. This result indicates that discourses of those MPs who were in parliament might 
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not be authentic. However, in the third period when we compare government members 
and non-government members of the Labour Party, these perspectives were not much 
different from one another, although it must be acknowledged that the amount of data for 
government members was small. What we can find from this result is that discourse of 
non-government members has actually changed whether discourse of government 
members were authentic or not and, further, whether non-government members of the 
Labour Party in the third period who used more Positive words than before also postured 
as the support for the government or not. Thus even if the intention of discourse was not 
clear, it should be possible to draw some conclusions regarding whether the usage of 
discourse has changed or not.  
In addition to this argument, then, could we find better indication of discourse change 
if we had examined discussions outside of parliament? This would depend on which 
people are included. Therefore, it might be possible to find more obvious change of 
discourse outside of parliament but the result could be biased in terms of whether all MPs 
have participated in such discussions. Ideally, data should be included for all kinds of 
MPs who are representative of various opinions. In parliament, all MPs participate in 
discussion though not all of them have the right to speak. We may find those MPs who 
have not made statement in parliament and add their discourse outside of parliament to 
data of this study. However, statements about sovereignty and the EU outside of 
parliament are almost unlimited, raising the problem of how to go about conducting such 
an analysis. Unfortunately, this must be left to future research. 
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Taking these implications of the demarcation into consideration, in sum, the findings 
of my research show that elites discourse on sovereignty has changed in the last four 
decades, and the change was especially obvious at the time of the Treaty of Maastricht 
and at around the year 2000. The divisibility of sovereignty has gradually been accepted. 
This is surmised by the prevailing concept of µpooling sovereignty¶. Further, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the interpretation of µpooling sovereignty¶ has evolved from 
the European concept as the idea, in which sovereignties of member states should be 
pooled in the EU for the development of European integration, into the national concept 
as the purpose, which the UK utilises its sovereignty in the way of pooling sovereignty 
while retaining the view that the UK still has influence on its matters in order to pursue 
national interests. The decrease of the definition of sovereignty also indicates that people 
have shifted from the pursuit of the meaning of sovereignty to the focus on its usage 
under complex institutional changes of the EU. It is reasonable to view that the 
mechanism of adaptational pressure in Europeanisation has contributed to the shift of 
elite focus. Further, the large difference of the result in the third period, in the word of 
exposition and in the Definition analysis, could be also explained by the mechanism of 
interactions in the MLG approach.  
These results do not mean MPs have changed the meaning of sovereignty. They have 
just changed the usage of sovereignty because they did not seek the meaning or the 
definition of sovereignty in the third period. In short, whether new phrases or new 
 281 
interpretations of sovereignty, which I assumed to be one of the indications of discourse 
change, emerge and evolve in discourse depends on whether people continuously seek 
the meaning or the definition of sovereignty in revolutionary phenomena like European 
integration. Thus, as long as people do not seek the meaning or the definition of 
sovereignty, this study showed that the change occurred in usage as the evolution of the 
established discourse such as the pooling sovereignty. 
   Has the change of meaning or interpretation ever occurred? It is difficult to examine 
and prove it at the time of writing or only with this study. It may be possible to detect in 
the future from a longer historical perspective. As we have seen, for the establishment of 
µpopular¶ sovereignty that had taken almost a century or of µparliamentary¶ sovereignty 
that took a couple of centuries, only four decades of discussion may not be enough to 
detect a substantial change. The difficulty also derived from the limitation of this study. 
The analysis only focussed on eight debates of European matter and only took three 
analytical approaches. Although this study analyses sovereignty discourse, further, data 
were only sentences which include the term sovereignty. Thus the problems were how 
those discourses that have spoken in other debates of European matter and those 
discourses that did not speak the term sovereignty but might have influenced the 
interpretation of sovereignty should be treated. Whether the hypothesis can be better 
analysed by making up for these deficiencies is open to discussion.  
Then, is there any possibility that the change in usage, which this study showed, lead 
to a change of meaning or interpretation? The institutions of the EU are under evolution. 
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The impact of European integration would continue bringing some institutional change 
within member states as Europeanisation, especially at a time when significant change 
will be found in the process of European integration from now on. The future of 
European integration may be decided depending on how elites understand sovereignty. 
To put it another way, a changed elites understanding of sovereignty which is a part of 
shared idea can affect and construct the future reality. If sovereignty evolves with the 
change in usage, this changed usage will affect and construct the collective understanding 
or the meaning itself in the future. The acceptance of the divisibility of sovereignty in 
usage could be an indication of the change meaning.  
Thus future research needs to find out whether the meaning of sovereignty will be 
sought in European integration by elites again and whether the change of the meaning 
can be derived from the change in usage. Of course, the analysis at least needs to view 
historical changes in discourse which can be found through the over-time analysis and to 
include institutional changes that bring adaptational pressure of Europeanisation.  
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Appendix 1 
 
The word list of usage analysis 
 
Table A1.1: The word of exposition  
Type Words 
Negative abandon/abandonment, abate, abdicate, abolish, abridge, 
abrogate/abrogation, at stake, barter away, bind, breach, cede/cession, 
cease, challenge, circumscribe, concede, curtail, damage, danger, 
decline, denigration, deny, depart, derogate/derogation, 
destroy/destruction, deterioration, detract from, dilution, 
diminish/diminution, dissolve, divest/divestment, do away with, 
encroach/encroachment, end, eradicate, erode/erosion, extinction, 
fetter, forfeit, gamble, gamble away, give, give away, give up, go, hand 
over, impinge, impair, impugn, infringe/infringement, interfere, 
intrusion, invasion, jettison, lack, limit/limitation, loss/lose/lost, lose 
out, move away, offer, pass, pass over, part with, qualify, 
reduce/reduction, relinquish, remove, render, renounce/renunciation, 
resignation, restrict/restriction, risk, rob, sacrifice, sap, secession, 
seepage, sell, sell out, shift, sign away, subject, 
subordinate/subordination, suffer, surrender, take, take away, 
threaten, trade, transfer, trespass, undermine, under pressure, 
weaken, wreck, yield, yield up 
Changed affect, change, combine, embody, merge, transform, 
Unchanged 
/Defensive 
assert, continue, defend/defence, exist/existence, guarantee, have, 
hoard, keep, leave, lie, maintain/maintenance, persist, possess, 
preserve, prevent, protect/protection, remain, reserve/reservation, 
retain/retention, safeguard, salvage, save, secure, unaffected, 
unchallengeable, unimpaired, uphold,  
Positive accretion, add, application, claim back, enhance, enjoy, exalt, 
exercise/exercisable, exert, extended, gain, get back, growth, increase, 
obtain, pool, reaffirm, re-establish, regain, restore, share, strengthen, 
use, wield, 
 
 
Table A1.2: The word of possession 
 
Our 
Government 
Parliament: parliamentary  
The House: the House of Commons, this Chamber 
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The people: electorates, the nations, popular, the citizens 
National: British, this country, the United Kingdom, state 
Monarch: Queen, the Crown 
European 
Restricted: legal, legislative, legitimate, economic, financial, personal  
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A2.1: The number of the word sovereignty (1971-1975) 
 
1) Debates which responded to the White Paper of July 1971 whereby the government announced 
the intention of entering the EC (October 1971) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Conservative Government (cabinet ministers) 8 3 
Conservative in favour 51 5 
Conservative against 32 5 
Labour in favour 39 Nil 
Labour against 36 6 
Other in favour 5 Nil 
Other against 3 Nil 
Total 174 19 
 
2) Debates on European Community Bill 1972 which are readings of the Bill for the accession to the 
EC (February ± July 1972) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Conservative Government (cabinet ministers) 59 17 
Conservative in favour 127 5 
Conservative against 65 9 
Conservative abstention 2 Nil 
Labour in favour Nil 1 
Labour against 322 21 
Labour abstention 3 Nil 
Other in favour 35 1 
Other against 4 Nil 
Other abstention 4 Nil 
Total 621 54 
 
3) Debates on continued membership which are called towards a referendum on membership (April 
1975) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Labour Government (cabinet ministers) 6 31 
Conservative in favour 84 16 
Conservative against 9 3 
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Conservative abstention 1 1 
Labour in favour 72 3 
Labour against 11 Nil 
Other in favour 14 Nil 
Other against 6 Nil 
Total 203 54 
 
The total number of the word sovereignty 1971-1975 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Governments (cabinet ministers) 73 51 
Conservative in favour 262 26 
Conservative against 106 17 
Conservative abstention 3 1 
Labour in favour 111 4 
Labour against 369 27 
Labour abstention 3 Nil 
Other in favour 54 1 
Other against 13 Nil 
Other abstention 4 Nil 
Total 998 127 
 
 
The word of exposition 1971-1975 
Colour coding 
negative: red, positive: blue, changed: purple, unchanged/defensive: green 
 
Figure A2.1 Government 
       
N=5 (out of 8 words of sovereignty)               N=26 (out of 59) 
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N=1 (out of 6)                                N=32 (out of 73) 
1971 and 1972 were the Conservative and 1975 was the Labour Government. 
 
Figure A2.2 The Conservative Party 
       
N=43 (out of 83 words of sovereignty)             N=112 (out of 194) 
 
       
N=44 (out of 94)                              N=199 (out of 371) 
In 1971 and 1972 were as the governing and in 1975 was as the opposition party. 
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Figure A2.3 The Labour Party 
       
N=43 (out of 75 words of sovereignty)             N=174 (out of 325) 
 
       
N=31 (out of 83)                              N=248 (out of 483) 
In 1971 and 1972 were as the opposition and in 1975 was the governing party. 
 
Figure A2.4 Favour 
       
N=51 (out of 103 words of sovereignty)            N=126 (out of 221) 
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N=72 (out of 176)                             N=249 (out of 500) 
 
Figure A2.5 Against 
       
N=43 (out of 71 words of sovereignty)             N=223 (out of 391) 
 
       
N=10 (out of 26)                              N=276 (out of 488) 
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Figure A2.6 Total 
       
N=94 (out of 174 words of sovereignty)            N=356 (out of 621) 
 
       
N=82 (out of 203)                             N=532 (out of 998) 
 
Figure A2.7 Newspapers 
       
N=8 (out of 16 words of sovereignty)              N=34 (out of 111) 
 
The word of possession 1971-1975 
Colour coding 
our: purple, Government: dark red, Parliament: red, the House: pink, the people: light blue, national: 
blue, restricted: green, European: orange 
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Figure A2.8 Government 
In 1971, there was only one µour¶. In 1975, there was no word of possession. 
       
N=15 (out of 59 words of sovereignty)             N=16 (out of 73) 
1971 and 1972 were the Conservative and 1975 was the Labour Government. 
 
Figure A2.9 Conservative 
       
N=26 (out of 83 words of sovereignty)             N=46 (out of 194) 
 
       
N=18 (out of 94)                              N=90 (out of 371) 
In 1971 and 1972 were as the governing and in 1975 was as the opposition party. 
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Figure A2.10 Labour 
       
N=16 (out of 75 words of sovereignty)             N=70 (out of 325) 
 
        
N=12 (out of 83)                              N=98 (out of 483) 
In 1971 and 1972 were as the opposition and in 1975 was the governing party. 
 
Figure A2.11 Favour 
       
N=26 (out of 103 words of sovereignty)            N=52 (out of 221) 
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N=32 (out of 176)                             N=110 (out of 500) 
 
Figure A2.12 Against 
       
N=20 (out of 71 words of sovereignty)             N=87 (out of 391) 
 
       
N=2 (out of 26)                               N=109 (out of 488) 
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Figure A2.13 Total 
       
N=46 (out of 174 words of sovereignty)            N=143 (out of 621) 
 
       
N=35 (out of 203)                             N=224 (out of 998) 
 
Figure A2.14 Newspapers 
       
N=7 (out of 16 words of sovereignty)              N=40 (out of 111) 
 
 
Table A2.2: The number of definition discourses (1971-1975) 
 1971 1972 1975 Newspapers (1971-1975) 
Governments 1 2 1 4 
Conservative 9 9 7 3 
Labour 3 21 4 1 
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Favour 9 10 12 5 
Against 4 25 1 4 
 
 
Table A2.3: The points of definition 
1971  
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: 1 N/A in all: 1 
Conservative: 9 changed: 3 
theoretical: 2 
practical: 2 
multiple: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
Labour: 3 changed: 1 
practical: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
Favour: 9 changed: 4 
practical: 3 
in all: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
Against: 4 theoretical: 2 
multiple: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
 
1972  
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: 2 legal: 1 in Parliament: 2 
Conservative: 9 theoretical: 2 
changed: 2 
not theoretical: 1 
legal: 1 
in the House of Commons: 2 
in Parliament: 1 
Labour: 21 practical: 4 
theoretical: 3 
not practical: 2 
legal: 2 
multiple: 2 
changed: 1 
in Parliament: 4 
both in Parliament and the 
people: 2 
in the House of Commons: 1 
Favour: 10 changed: 2 
theoretical: 1 
practical: 1 
not practical: 1 
legal: 1 
multiple: 1 
in the House of Commons: 2 
in Parliament: 1 
 
Against: 25 theoreticall: 5 
practical: 4 
legal: 3 
multiple: 2 
not practical: 2 
changed: 1 
in Parliament: 5 
both in Parliament and the 
people: 2 
in the House of Commons: 1 
 
 
1975  
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: 1 practical: 1 N/A 
Labour: 4 practical: 2 
not practical: 1 
in the House of Commons: 1 
Conservative: 7 practical: 4 
theoretical: 2 
in the people: 1 
Favour: 12 practical: 7 
theoretical: 2 
in the House of Commons: 1 
in the people: 1 
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not practical: 1 
Against: 1 practical: 1 N/A 
 
1971-1975 Total  
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Governments: 4 practical: 1 
legall: 1 
in all : 1 
in Parliament:: 1 
Conservative: 24 theoretical: 6 
practical: 6 
changed: 5 
legal: 1 
multiple: 1 
not theoretical: 1 
in Parliament: 2 
in the House of Commons: 2  
 
Labour: 28 practical: 7 
not practical: 3 
theoretical: 3 
legal: 2 
changed: 2 
multiple: 2 
in Parliament: 5 
in the House of Commons: 2 
both in Parliament and the 
people: 2 
 
Favour: 31 practical: 11 
changed: 6 
theoretical: 3 
not practical: 2 
legal: 1 
multiple: 1 
in the House of Commons: 3 
in Parliament: 3 
in all: 1 
in the people: 1 
Against: 30 theoretical: 7 
practical: 5 
legal: 3 
multiple: 3 
not practical: 2 
changed: 1 
in Parliament: 6 
both in parliament and the 
people: 2 
in the House of Commons: 1 
 
Total: Favour + Against practical: 16 
theoretical: 10 
changed: 7 
legal: 4 
not practical: 4 
multiple: 4 
in Parliament: 9 
in the House of Commons: 4 
both in parliament and the 
people: 2 
in all: 1 
in the people: 1 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table A3.1: The number of the word sovereignty (1985-1993) 
 
4) Debates on the Single European Act which are readings of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill (June and July 1986) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Conservative Government (cabinet ministers) 1 Nil 
Conservative in favour 20 Nil 
Conservative against 11 6 
Conservative abstention 1 1 
Labour in favour Nil Nil 
Labour against 20 1 
Other in favour 3 Nil 
Other against 7 Nil 
Total 63 8 
 
5) Debates on the Treaty of Maastricht which are readings of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill (May 1992 - May 1993) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Conservative Government (cabinet ministers) 9 18 
Conservative in favour 49 Nil 
Conservative against 56 8 
Conservative abstention 11 1 
Labour in favour 8 Nil 
Labour against 50 3 
Labour abstention 58 5 
Other in favour 24 4 
Other against 2 Nil 
Other abstention 9 Nil 
Total  276 (+1 by 
Chairman) 
39 (+1 by 
Queen) 
 
The total number of the word sovereignty 1985-1993 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Conservative Government (cabinet ministers) 10 18 
Conservative in favour 69 Nil 
Conservative against 67 14 
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Conservative abstention 12 2 
Labour in favour 8 Nil 
Labour against 70 4 
Labour abstention 58 5 
Other in favour 27 4 
Other against 9 Nil 
Other abstention 9 Nil 
Total 339 (+1 by 
Chairman) 
47 (+1 by 
Queen) 
 
 
The word of exposition 1985-1993 
 
Figure A3.1 Government 
  There are no data for SEA. 
N=3 (out of 9 words of sovereignty)   
This chart is also the Government total of the period between 1985 and 1993 (out of 10 words of 
sovereignty). 
 
Figure A3.2 The Conservative Party 
       
N=15 (out of 32 words of sovereignty)             N=60 (out of 116) 
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N=75 (out of 148) 
 
Figure A3.3 The Labour Party 
       
N=12 (out of 20 words of sovereignty)             N=54 (out of 116) 
 
 
N=66 (out of 136) 
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Figure A3.4 Favour 
       
N=9 (out of 24 words of sovereignty)              N=36 (out of 90) 
 
 
N=45 (out of 114) 
 
Figure A3.5 Against 
       
N=21 (out of 38 words of sovereignty)             N=56 (out of 108) 
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N=77 (out of 146) 
 
Figure A3.6 Total 
       
N=30 (out of 63 words of sovereignty)             N=122 (out of 276 + 1 by Chairman) 
 
 
N=152 (out of 339 + 1 by Chairman) 
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Figure A3.7 Newspapers 
       
N=10 (out of 24 words of sovereignty)             N=13 (out of 23 + 1 by Queen) 
 
The word of possession 1985-1993 
 
Figure A3.8 Government 
   There are no data for SEA. 
N=7 (out of 9 words of sovereignty)       
This chart is also the Government total of the period between 1985 and 1993 (out of 10 words of 
sovereignty). 
 
Figure A3.9 The Conservative Party 
       
N=20 (out of 32 words of sovereignty)             N=67 (out of 116) 
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N=87 (out of 148) 
 
Figure A3.10 The Labour Party 
       
N=12 (out of 20 words of sovereignty)             N=54 (out of 116) 
 
 
N=66 (out of 136) 
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Figure A3.11 Favour 
       
N=11 (out of 24 words of sovereignty)             N=50 (out of 90) 
 
 
N=61 (out of 114) 
 
Figure A3.12 Against 
       
N=25 (out of 38 words of sovereignty)             N=58 (out of 108) 
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N=83 (out of 146) 
 
Figure A3.13 Total 
       
N=37 (out of 63 words of sovereignty)             N=148 (out of 276 + 1 by Chairman) 
 
 
N=185 (out of 339 + 1 by Chairman) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 318 
Figure A3.14 Newspapers 
       
N=13 (out of 24 words of sovereignty)             N=10 (out of 23 + 1 by Queen) 
 
 
Table A3.2: The number of definition discourses (1985-1993) 
 SEA Maastricht Newspapers (1985-1993) 
Governments Nil 1 2 
Conservative 2 11 Nil 
Labour 1 11 Nil 
Favour 2 10 3 
Against 2 8 Nil 
(Abstention)  (10)  
 
Table A3.3: The points of definition 
SEA 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: Nil N/A N/A 
Conservative: 2 practical: 1 in Parliament: 1 
Labour: 1 practical: 1 N/A 
Favour: 2 practical: 1 in Parliament: 1 
Against: 2 practical: 1 in Parliament: 1 
 
Maastricht 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: 1 N/A in Parliament: 1 
Conservative: 8 practical: 3 
theoretical: 3 
myth: 1 
multi: 1 
N/A 
Labour: 10 practical: 5 
not theoretical: 2 
myth: 1 
in the people: 2 
Favour: 8 multiple: 2 
theoretical: 1 
myth: 1 
in Parliament: 2 
in the people: 2 
Against: 6 practicl: 2 
theortical: 2 
not theoretical: 1 
N/A 
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myth: 1 
(Abstention): 10 practcal: 6 
not theoretical: 1 
myth: 1 
in the people: 2 
 
1985-1993 Total 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: 1 N/A in Parliament: 1 
Conservative: 11 practical: 4 
theoretical: 3 
myth: 2 
multiple: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
Labour: 11 practical: 6 
not theoretical: 2 
myth: 1 
in the people: 2 
 
Favour: 10 multiple: 2 
theoretical: 1 
practical: 1 
myth: 1 
in Parliament: 2 
in the people: 2 
Against: 8 practical: 3 
theoretical: 2 
not theoretical: 1 
myth: 1 
in Parliament: 1 
(Abstention): 10 practical: 6 
not theoretical: 1 
myth: 1 
in the people: 2 
 
Total: Favour+Against 
+Abstention 
practical: 10 
theoretical: 3 
myth: 3 
multiple: 2 
not theoretical: 2 
in Parliament: 3 
in the people: 4 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table A4.1: The number of the word sovereignty (1997-2009) 
6) Debates on the Treaty of Amsterdam which are readings of the European Union (Amendment) 
Bill (November 1997 ± January 1998) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Labour Government (cabinet ministers) Nil 2 
Labour in favour 13 Nil 
Labour against Nil Nil 
Conservative in favour Nil Nil 
Conservative against 44 2 
Conservative Abstention 14 Nil 
Other in favour Nil Nil 
Other against 4 Nil 
Total 75 4 
 
7) Debates on the Treaty of Nice which are readings of the European Union (Amendment) Bill (July 
- Oct 2001) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Labour Government (cabinet ministers) Nil 6 
Labour in favour 27 2 
Labour against 1 Nil 
Labour abstention 4 Nil 
Conservative in favour Nil Nil 
Conservative against 9 Nil 
Conservative abstention Nil 1 
Other in favour 2 Nil 
Other against 2 Nil 
Total 45 9 
 
8) Debates on the Treaty of Lisbon which are readings of the European Union (Amendment) Bill 
(January - March 2008) 
The number of the word sovereignty 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Labour Government (cabinet ministers) 7 1 
Labour in favour 26 1 
Labour against 1 Nil 
Labour abstention 2 Nil 
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Conservative in favour 5 Nil 
Conservative against 43 Nil 
Conservative abstention 2 Nil 
Other in favour 8 1 
Other against 3 Nil 
Other abstention Nil 1 
Total 97 4 
 
The total number of the word sovereignty 1997-2009 
Party and stand for the resolution Hansard Newspaper 
Labour Government (cabinet ministers) 7 9 
Labour in favour 66 3 
Labour against 2 Nil 
Labour abstention 6 Nil 
Conservative in favour 5 Nil 
Conservative against 96 2 
Conservative abstention 16 1 
Other in favour 10 1 
Other against 9 Nil 
Other abstention Nil 1 
Total 217 17 
 
 
The word of exposition 1997-2009 
 
Figure A4.1 Government 
 There are no data for Amsterdam and Nice. 
N=3 (out of 7 words of sovereignty) 
This chart is also the Government total of period between 1997 and 2009. 
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Figure A4.2 The Labour Party 
       
N=6 (out of 13 words of sovereignty)              N=23 (out of 32) 
 
       
N=17 (out of 29)                              N=46 (out of 74) 
 
Figure A4.3 The Conservative Party 
       
N=32 (out of 58 words of sovereignty)             N=7 (out of 9) 
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N=24 (out of 50)                              N=63 (out of 117) 
 
Figure A4.4 Favour 
Amsterdam: Same as the Labour Party              
                                           N=21 (out of 29) 
 
       
N=27 (out of 46)                              N=54 (out of 88) 
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Figure A4.5 Against 
       
N=25 (out of 48 words of sovereignty)             N=8 (out of 12) 
 
       
N=18 (out of 47)                              N=51 (out of 107) 
 
Figure A4.6 Total 
       
N=38 (out of 75 words of sovereignty)             N=33 (out of 45) 
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N=48 (out of 97)                              N=119 (out of 217) 
 
Figure A4.7 Newspapers 
       
N=5 (out of 10 words of sovereignty)              N=4 (out of 7) 
 
The word of possession 1997-2009 
 
Figure A4.8 Government 
   There are no data for Amsterdam and Nice. 
N=6 (out of 7 words of sovereignty)       
This chart is also the Government total of the period between 1997 and 2009. 
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Figure A4.9 The Labour Party 
       
N=6 (out of 13 words of sovereignty)              N=14 (out of 32) 
 
       
N=16 (out of 29)                              N=36 (out of 74) 
 
Figure A4.10 The Conservative Party 
       
N=21 (out of 58 words of sovereignty)             N=4 (out of 9) 
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N=35 (out of 50)                              N=60 (out of 117) 
 
Figure A4.11 Favour 
       
N=6 (out of 13 words of sovereignty)              N=14 (out of 29) 
 
       
N=29 (out of 46)                              N=49 (out of 88) 
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Figure A4.12 Against 
       
N=19 (out of 48 words of sovereignty)             N=7 (out of 12) 
 
       
N=27 (out of 47)                              N=53 (out of 107) 
 
Figure A4.13 Total 
        
N=27 (out of 75 words of sovereignty)             N=21 (out of 45) 
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N=60 (out of 97)                              N=108 (out of 217) 
 
Figure A4.14 Newspapers 
       
N=3 (out of 10 words of sovereignty)              N=4 (out of 7) 
 
 
Table A4.2: The number of definition discourses (1997-2009) 
 Amsterdam Nice Lisbon Newspapers (1997-2009) 
Government Nil Nil Nil 1 
Labour Nil 1 1 Nil 
Conservative 2 1 1 Nil 
Favour Nil 1 1 Nil 
Against 1 1 1 Nil 
(Abstention) (1)    
 
Table A4.3: The points of definition 
Amsterdam 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: Nil N/A N/A 
Labour: Nil N/A N/A 
Conservative: 2 practical: 1 in the people: 1 
Favour: Nil N/A N/A 
Against: 1 practical: 1 N/A 
(Abstention): 1 N/A in the people: 1 
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Nice 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: Nil N/A N/A 
Labour: 1 N/A in the people: 1 
Conservative: Nil N/A N/A 
Favour: 1 N/A in the people: 1 
Against: Nil N/A N/A 
 
Lisbon 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: Nil N/A N/A 
Labour: 1 N/A either with the House or the 
people: 1 
Conservative: 1 N/A in the House: 1 
Favour: 1 N/A either with the House or the 
people: 1 
Against: 1 N/A in the House: 1 
 
1997-2009 Total 
Number of speakers What sovereignty should be Who or which body should have 
sovereignty 
Government: Nil N/A N/A 
Labour: 2 N/A in the people: 1 
either with the House or the 
people: 1 
Conservative: 3 practical: 1 in the House: 1 
in the people: 1 
Favour: 2 N/A in the people: 1 
either with the House or the 
people: 1 
Against: 2 practical: 1 in the House: 1 
(Abstention): 1 N/A in the people: 1 
Total: Favour+Against 
+Abstention 
practical: 1 in the people: 2 
in the House: 1 
either with the House or the 
people: 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
